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Abstract 
So many of our daily activities now take place “in the cloud,” 
where we use our devices to tap into massive networks that span 
the globe. Virtually every time that we plug into a new service, the 
service requires us to click the seemingly ubiquitous box indicating 
that we have read and agreed to the provider’s terms of service 
(TOS) and privacy policy. If a user does not click on this box, he is 
denied access to the service, but agreeing to these terms without 
reading them can negatively impact the user’s legal rights.  
As part of this work, we analyzed and categorized the terms of 
TOS agreements and privacy policies of several major cloud 
services to aid in our assessment of the state of user privacy in the 
cloud. Our empirical analysis showed that providers take similar 
approaches to user privacy and were consistently more detailed 
when describing the user’s obligations to the provider than when 
describing the provider’s obligations to the user. This asymmetry, 
combined with these terms’ nonnegotiable nature, led us to 
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conclude that the current approach to user privacy in the cloud is 
in need of serious revision.  
In this Article, we suggest adopting a legal regime that 
requires companies to provide baseline protections for personal 
information and also to take steps to enhance the parties’ control 
over their own data. We emphasize the need for a regime that 
allows for “data control” in the cloud, which we define as 
consisting of two parts: (1) the ability to withdraw data and 
require a service provider to stop using or storing the user’s 
information (data withdrawal); and (2) the ability to move data to 
a new location without being locked into a particular provider 
(data mobility). Ultimately, our goal with this piece is to apply 
established law and privacy theories to services in the cloud and 
set forth a model for the protection of information privacy that 
recognizes the importance of informed and empowered users. 
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 “You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.” 
—Scott McNealy, Chairman and former CEO of Sun 
Microsystems, 1999 
I. Introduction 
What price for your privacy? As social interactions and 
business activities have shifted online, or into “the cloud,” 
personal information has become a currency with an undervalued 
exchange rate. What data are consumers willing to trade in 
exchange for convenience and services online? Would they be as 
willing to engage in this trade if their privacy rights were more 
protected and if they had the ability to exercise meaningful 
control over their data?  
Technological and social changes have stimulated many 
developments over the last decade as the Internet became 
ingrained in society and social interactions. Substantial 
technological changes require the law to adapt. When our 
perceptions change, policymakers amend the law accordingly to 
address evolved expectations. In this Article, the perceptions and 
law that we are concerned about are those associated with 
privacy, especially privacy in the context of services provided over 
the cloud. 
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This is not the first time that conceptions of privacy have 
been shaped by technology. The Right to Privacy, published in 
1890, was the seminal work of Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis that substantially influenced privacy law in the United 
States in the twentieth century.1 The publication of this piece was 
spurred by the authors’ concerns about intrusions into personal 
privacy by the press, especially considering the technological 
improvements that had enabled the production of small, 
affordable cameras.2  
Portable cameras were just the beginning of technology that 
prompted major changes in privacy law and theory. Around the 
middle of the twentieth century, computers were becoming more 
pervasive and powerful, enabling the creation of databases that 
could hold and process huge amounts of information. The idea of 
informational privacy developed in greater detail around this 
time, as people realized that personal privacy could be threatened 
not just by appropriation of one’s name and likeness, but by 
access to and use of other information about a person.3  
While these informational privacy concerns were becoming 
more visible, the future of connecting computers in a global 
telecommunications network was just a glimmer in the eyes of 
some of the more innovative researchers. Today, in exchange for 
our personal information, we have access to free e-mail and free 
data storage, and we can use free services to keep in touch with 
former classmates and colleagues around the country and around 
the world. Thanks to Facebook, attendees of modern high school 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A 
Mixed Legacy, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1891–93 (2010) (describing the impact of 
the article on the landscape of privacy law). 
 2. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE 137 (2006) [hereinafter SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON]. Recent 
research posits that the authors’ concern about privacy stemmed from Warren’s 
experiences with the press when he married Mabel Bayard, the daughter of a 
politician. See Amy Gajda, What If Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t Married a 
Senator’s Daughter?: Uncovering the Press Coverage That Led to “The Right to 
Privacy,” 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35, 43–44 (explaining the suggestion of Warren 
and Brandeis that everyone has the right to keep the press away). 
 3. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and 
a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 
1836–37 (2011) (describing the myth of anonymity on the Internet). 
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reunions who live on opposite sides of the country can focus on 
catching up on events of the last week instead of the last ten 
years.  
As with any improvement in technology, however, there are 
also tradeoffs. Free services online are often funded by 
advertising revenue, and these ads are made more effective by 
utilizing the user’s personal information to target ads to their 
interests. To set up accounts for services online, consumers must 
typically click the ubiquitous box indicating that they have read 
and agreed to the website’s terms of service (TOS) and privacy 
policy. These agreements often contain broad provisions for what 
the provider is permitted to do with the consumer’s information, 
while giving the consumer few, if any, options for redress. In the 
majority of cases in which services are marketed to individual 
users, there is zero negotiability in these terms, and almost no 
one reads these terms anyway.  
In this Article, we urge the creation of baseline regulations 
that would guarantee a minimum level of protection of consumer 
privacy while preserving market vitality. One of the essential 
elements for this baseline regime would be the protection of the 
consumer’s right to control his data. People are often denied 
meaningful control over their personal information and the other 
information that they store with these services. Companies often 
do not address beforehand how a consumer can exercise control 
over their information in the event that the service is terminated, 
and many companies reserve a nonrevocable license to use the 
consumer’s intellectual property that is stored with its service. 
We view this right of data control as consisting of two parts: 
(1) data mobility, which we summarize as a right to move one’s 
data and terminate a relationship with a particular service 
provider, under which providers would be required to provide 
data to departing customers in a generally accepted file format 
such that customers do not become “locked in”; and (2) a broader 
right of data withdrawal that would permit a consumer to 
withdraw his information from the records of any entity, 
including a third party, through a notice-and-takedown process.  
In Part II, we explain the idea of cloud computing and 
introduce a number of issues related to it. In Part III, we turn to 
an examination of privacy fundamentals, first examining 
different theoretical approaches to privacy before turning to a 
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discussion of privacy law in the United States and an 
examination of statutes and case law. In Part IV, we describe 
issues relating to companies and customer data, including 
concerns about TOS agreements, privacy policies, and data 
security. In Part V, we turn to the results of our empirical 
analysis of the TOS agreements and privacy policies of a sample 
of cloud service industry leaders. Finally, in Part VI, we offer our 
recommendations based on our empirical work, as well as our 
research into privacy issues and the cloud. 
II. Cloud Computing Fundamentals 
In examining the legal implications of privacy and cloud 
computing, it is important to understand some of the background. 
In this Part, we will examine some of the technical background of 
the current technologies before discussing cloud computing and 
its advantages and disadvantages in more detail. We will also 
introduce some legal issues that arise in the cloud context and 
briefly review various calls for action that have sounded with 
respect to the cloud, such as calls for amending legislation, 
proposing legislation, or calling for standards or increased 
transparency.  
A. Background Technology 
Before the World Wide Web (Web) became so prevalent, there 
were two paradigms of computer use. The first was mainframe 
computing, and under this paradigm, users worked at “dumb 
terminals” that were connected to a large mainframe system, 
which in turn processed the users’ requests.4 As microprocessors 
became available, the personal computing paradigm took over, 
and the files and data were under the users’ physical control.5 
                                                                                                     
 4. William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing 
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1197 (2010). 
 5. Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and 
Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
359, 362 (2010). 
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The personal computing paradigm has weaknesses, however, 
including the low degree of scalability of individual systems, the 
need for technological expertise to assemble and maintain 
computer systems, and a low level of redundancy such that data 
loss through equipment failure is a significant danger.6 Under the 
traditional model of information technology (IT) management, 
based on this paradigm, a lot of space and human capital is 
required to maintain and secure the systems of a large 
enterprise.7  
Moving our technological worlds to the cloud is another 
paradigm shift that some view as the future of computing.8 Mark 
Weiser predicted in 1991 that the third wave of computing, after 
mainframe computing and personal computing, would be 
ubiquitous computing, where computers become so small, 
inexpensive, and ubiquitous that they virtually disappear.9 
Today, technologies continue to improve, but the truly ubiquitous 
nature of modern computing is not because of the computer’s size 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1200–01 (explaining the inefficiencies that 
occur when everyone has his or her own computer). 
 7. Mark H. Wittow & Daniel J. Buller, Cloud Computing: Emerging Legal 
Issues for Access to Data, Anywhere, Anytime, 14 NO. 1 J. INTERNET L. 1, 5 (2010). 
Wittow and Buller note that these limitations are mitigated by the use of things 
like centralized disk storage, the use of more advanced servers with smaller 
hardware footprints, and system virtualization. Id. Virtualization is one of the 
major technologies behind some applications of “cloud computing,” where spaces 
on hard drives are turned into “virtual machines” that segment the processing of 
different requests. VMWare, Virtualization Basics, http://www.vmware.com/ 
virtualization/virtualization-basics/how-virtualization-works.html (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See Ilana R. Kattan, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored 
Communications Act Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in 
the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 617, 621 (2011) (noting the transitions 
between paradigms); Soghoian, supra note 5, at 364 (noting that cloud 
computing has been deemed by many commentators to be the future of 
computing). Some suggest that the decentralized cloud computing model has the 
potential to make such services comparable to utilities, with data centers being 
the equivalent of power plants in the electrical utility context. Kevin Werbach, 
The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1817 (2011). If cloud providers are 
utilities, the argument for regulation of services on the cloud becomes stronger. 
Id. at 1818. 
 9. Gary M. Olson & Judith S. Olson, Human-Computer Interaction: 
Psychological Aspects of the Human Use of Computing, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 
491, 499 (2003). 
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or power. The Internet and high-speed connections allow people 
to be in touch not only with each other, but with service providers 
that can essentially rent out processing power and storage space 
over the Internet. Moving some functions to the cloud can allow 
users access to high-end services and technology without having 
to trade quality for mobility.10 This future of computing, however, 
may challenge the default assumption that a user will be able to 
control her own data.11 
1. The Internet 
The history of the Internet is often traced back to the late 
’60s and ARPANET.12 Even before ARPANET, however, some 
recognized the possible future value of computers being connected 
using communication lines.13 Regardless of how the ideas 
emerged, there is no doubt that the Internet is a pervasive 
element of today’s society. 
To say that the Internet has become a staple of modern life is 
an understatement. The Internet has had a substantial effect on 
the world and how people interact.14 Cyberspace is a major social 
                                                                                                     
 10. Additionally, increasingly large networks of computers can be used to 
create “ad hoc supercomputers” through distributed computing. Paul M. 
Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2064 
(2004) [hereinafter Schwartz, Property]. 
 11. Werbach, supra note 8, at 1820. 
 12. See J.R. OKIN, THE INTERNET REVOLUTION 318 (2004) (describing the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, created in the late 1960s, that 
eventually became today’s Internet). 
 13. See J.C.R. Licklider, Man–Computer Symbiosis, 1 IRE TRANSACTIONS 
ON HUM. FACTORS IN ELECTRONICS 4 (1960), available at http://groups. 
csail.mit.edu/medg/people/psz/Licklider.html (explaining the benefits of a 
system with “thinking centers” connected to each other by wide-band 
communication lines and to individual users); Werbach, supra note 8, at 1793 
(explaining that major network operators in the 1960s were cognizant that 
computers would increasingly become the technical foundation for the 
telecommunications system itself). Werbach notes that some researchers viewed 
networked computers as having the potential of being a new class of public 
utility. Id. at 1793–94.  
 14. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other 
Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 
626 (2011) (“It is not just that ‘the Internet is different’; it is that the Internet, 
like every major advance in infrastructural technology before it, has made 
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outlet that is often intertwined with the physical realm.15 People 
keep in touch through a variety of electronic messaging 
technologies, including e-mail, text messaging, other instant 
messaging over the Internet, and social networking websites.16 
Research by the Kaiser Family Foundation suggests that the 
average youth between the ages of eight and eighteen spends 
every permissible waking moment using electronic devices, many 
of which are connected to the Internet, like smart phones and 
computers.17 A study by the Nielsen Company found that across 
all ages, the average American Internet user is online over fifty-
five hours per month.18 
The Internet works because computers on the network use 
identical protocols that enable interconnection so that data can be 
delivered across the network.19 One of the well-known protocols is 
the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), which enabled e-mail 
exchanges in the 1980s in the days before the World Wide Web.20 
In the mid-1980s, the transfer of e-mail was fairly fragmented, 
with communications being transmitted from server to server, 
stored at various locations temporarily during the trip before 
being downloaded by the recipient.21 Today, webmail still uses 
the SMTP protocol, as well as the Internet Message Access 
                                                                                                     
everything different.”). 
 15. Id. at 639. 
 16. See John Soma, Melodi Mosley Gates & Michael Smith, Bit-Wise but 
Privacy Foolish: Smarter E-Messaging Technologies Call for a Return to Core 
Privacy Principles, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 487, 497–502 (2010) (explaining the 
five technologies, including telephone systems, e-mail, text messaging, instant 
messaging, and social networking); Strandburg, supra note 14, at 655–56 
(explaining how social media promise to change social interactions by 
supplementing physical interaction or replacing it). 
 17. Andrea Cascia, Don’t Lose Your Head in the Cloud: Cloud Computing 
and Directed Marketing Raise Student Privacy Issues in K–12 Schools, 261 
WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 883, 894 (2011). 
 18. Paul Lanois, Caught in the Clouds: The Web 2.0, Cloud Computing, and 
Privacy?, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 29, 29 (2010). About half of that time is 
spent on social networking, e-mails, games, and instant messaging. Id. 
 19. See Werbach, supra note 8, at 1769 (explaining the functionality and 
concept of the Internet). 
 20. OKIN, supra note 12, at 212. 
 21. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1205–06 (explaining the functionality of 
electronic communication services). 
INFORMATION PRIVACY AND DATA CONTROL 351 
Protocol (IMAP). IMAP allows e-mails to be accessed from 
anywhere with an Internet connection, with e-mails being 
perpetually stored on the provider’s servers.22 The ability to 
access information from anywhere is important for mobility and 
mobile computing. 
2. Mobile Computing 
Computers have shrunk in size over the last fifty years, from 
room-size computers to thirty-pound desktops to five-pound 
laptops to smart phones weighing just a few ounces. The early 
1980s saw the invention of the first laptop and the first cellular 
phone, and the first personal digital assistant (PDA) was released 
in 1993.23 This increase in mobility has been helpful for both 
personal and professional tasks. The Blackberry became a 
popular office tool after its release in 1999, functioning as both a 
cell phone and a PDA that permitted remote access to office e-
mail.24 Today’s smart phones go beyond the original Blackberry, 
giving users access to e-mail, the Web, appointment calendars, 
and even software that allows the users to review word 
processing files and full color PDFs in the palms of their hands. It 
is estimated that by 2013, about half of the mobile phone market 
will be smart phones,25 and many if not all of these are likely to 
have access to 3G or 4G data networks that do not require a 
separate wireless connection.26 
                                                                                                     
 22. See IMAP & POP, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA E-MAIL AND INTERNET 
ACCOUNTS GUIDES, http://www.oit.umn.edu/email/imap-pop (last visited Feb. 3, 
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 23. Kimberly L. Rhodes & Brian Kunis, Walking the Wire in the Wireless 
World: Legal and Policy Implications of Mobile Computing, 16 J. TECH. L. & 
POL’Y 25, 27–28 (2011). The first laptop computer was invented in 1981, and 
Motorola invented the first cellular phone in 1983. Id. 
 24. Id. at 28.  
 25. Daniel Zamani, Note, There’s an Amendment for That: A 
Comprehensive Application of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence to Smart 
Phones, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 169, 170 (2010). 
 26. Strategy Analytics: Global LTE Phone Shipments Will Surge Tenfold to 
67 Million Units in 2012, BUS. WIRE (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.virtual-
strategy.com/2012/03/23/strategy-analytics-global-lte-phone-shipments-will-surge-
tenfold-67-million-units-2012 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the 
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The desire for technologies that can go anywhere makes 
cloud computing more appealing. Even with improvements in 
personal computing technology, increased mobility generally 
requires a tradeoff with the hardware abilities of the device. This 
is where the value of the cloud becomes clearer: there are fewer 
tradeoffs from having smaller and cheaper end-user devices 
because these devices can tap into the power of network-based 
services.27 
However, mobile devices are vulnerable to the same sorts of 
security threats as full-sized computers, including spyware and 
viruses, and data transmitted using these devices may not be 
secure.28 For this reason, and because of the significant security 
concerns that arise in the cloud computing context, we turn to 
this topic next.  
3. Security 
The security of any information in the cloud is often unclear. 
There was an uproar when Scott McNealy of Sun Microsystems 
dismissed online privacy concerns by proclaiming in 1999, “You 
have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.”29 But regardless of 
whether consumers will be persuaded by assertions about the 
nature or extent of privacy, active efforts by third parties to 
infringe on privacy should properly raise red flags.  
One threat to devices accessing the cloud is spyware. One can 
define spyware as software that installs itself, runs, and uses its 
host computer, all without the owner’s permission.30 Similar 
software has been called “adware,” an example of which was the 
software produced by Gator, which was ad-supported and sent 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 27. See Werbach, supra note 8, at 1816 (explaining how cloud computing is 
changing the way people think about computers and computer networks). 
 28. See Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 32–33 (noting the existence of 
malware that targets mobile devices, worms with the ability to monitor and 
record cell phone conversations, and the exploitation by hackers of information 
transmitted using wi-fi hotspots).  
 29. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1196 (quoting John Schwartz, As Big PC 
Brother Watches, Users Encounter Frustration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2001, at C6). 
 30. Schwartz, Property, supra note 10, at 2065. 
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information about the user and his computer back to the 
company.31 In 2004, sources indicated that Gator software was 
installed on about thirty-five million computers located in the 
United States.32  
4. Related Regulations 
The degree to which the Internet is or should be regulated is 
the subject of much debate.33 Werbach traces the origins of the 
broadband regulation debate back to the 1960s, when the FCC 
launched the Computer Inquiries to determine when and how 
data processing services would become sufficiently intertwined 
with communications that they would be covered by the 
Communications Act.34 In the first of the Computer Inquiries, 
Computer I, the FCC concluded that there was “no public interest 
requirement for regulation by government of such activities” 
because of the competitive nature of the market for data 
processing services.35 However, the FCC did recognize that the 
communications circuits that carried these services might need to 
be regulated.36 
                                                                                                     
 31. Id. at 2066. 
 32. Id. at 2065. 
 33. See Shawn Hess, Research Shows America Hates Gov’t Regulation, 
WEBPRONEWS (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.webpronews.com/research-shows-
america-hates-govt-regulation-2012-03 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (addressing 
attitudes toward search engine regulation) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 34. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); Werbach, supra note 8, 
at 1804; see also Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the 
Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities 
(Computer I Final Decision), 28 F.C.C. 2d 267 (1971) (final decision and order). 
 35. See Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence 
of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities (Computer I Tentative 
Decision), 28 F.C.C. 2d 291, 297 (1970) (tentative decision); see also Werbach, 
supra note 8, at 1804 (discussing Computer I and the Communications Act). 
 36. Computer I Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 269 (“[W]ithout appropriate 
regulatory safeguards, the provision of data processing services by common 
carriers could adversely affect the statutory obligation of such carriers to 
provide adequate communication services under reasonable terms and 
conditions and impair effective competition in the sale of data processing 
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At the turn of the century, questions about regulating these 
communications circuits came to the fore. The Telecommunications 
Act of 199637 established a category of services called “information 
services,” which the Act defines as “the offering of a capability for 
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, 
retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via 
telecommunications.”38 Information services are not regulated as a 
common carrier under Title II of the Telecommunications Act. In 
2002, the FCC designated cable Internet as an “information 
service” instead of a “telecommunications service,” a designation 
that was upheld by the Supreme Court,39 and later expanded to 
include DSL service.40 The National Cable & Telecommunications 
Ass’n  v. Brand X case was regarded by some as marking a decision 
to not regulate the Internet, given the lesser degree to which 
information services were regulated compared to 
telecommunications services.41 
B. What Is Cloud Computing? 
Up to this point, we have referenced “the cloud” in the 
context of cloud computing as a new computing paradigm. In this 
subpart, we will go into more detail about cloud computing and 
what it is.  
                                                                                                     
services.”); Werbach, supra note 8, at 1825. 
 37. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 38. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006). 
 39. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X, 545 U.S. 967 (2005).  
 40. In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14864 para. 15 (Aug. 5, 2005) (report, 
order, and notice of proposed rulemaking). 
 41. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 967; Note, How Chevron Step One Limits 
Permissible Agency Interpretations: Brand X and the FCC’s Broadband 
Reclassification, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1021 (2011) (“The Supreme Court 
affirmed the FCC’s authority to deregulate cable broadband service in Brand 
X . . . .”). 
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1. Defining Cloud Computing 
The term “cloud computing” has become popular and trendy, 
but there are many concepts behind this idea. On a general level, 
“cloud” is used as a metaphor for the “ethereal Internet” and the 
virtual platform that it provides.42 Some view cloud computing 
abstractly as the result of the convergence of computing and 
communications,43 or more practically as a “scalable network of 
servers,”44 as “IT as a service,”45 or as the convenience of being 
able to access a shared pool of computing resources over a 
network like the World Wide Web.46  
                                                                                                     
 42. See David A. Couillard, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth 
Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2205, 2216 (2009); Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 1 
(noting that “cloud” is essentially a metaphor for the Internet). 
 43. Werbach, supra note 8, at 1811. 
 44. See Konstantinos K. Stylianou, An Evolutionary Study of Cloud 
Computing Services Privacy Terms, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 593, 
594–95 (2010) (stating that most business executives, lawyers, and computer 
technicians understand cloud computing as a scalable network of servers on 
which users store data that would traditionally reside on a local computer). 
Werbach also embraces this interpretation. Werbach, supra note 8, at 1811 
(“Cloud computing is an approach that places application processing and storage 
in network-based data centers, rather than in end-user devices such as personal 
computers.”); see also Timothy D. Martin, Hey! You! Get Off of My Cloud: 
Defining and Protecting the Metes and Bounds of Privacy, Security, and Property 
in Cloud Computing, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 283, 292–94 (2010) 
(explaining cloud computing as “Infrastructure-as-a-Service”). 
 45. See Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 30 (stating that at its core, cloud 
computing is an IT service because providers “rent” their services to customers). 
Wittow and Buller similarly note that definitions of cloud computing typically 
involve a third party provider who supplies a subscription-based service for 
computing and storage needs. Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 5. 
 46. See Couillard, supra note 42, at 2216 (“Cloud platforms give users 
‘anywhere access’ to applications and data stored on the Internet.”); William R. 
Denny, Survey of Recent Developments in the Law of Cloud Computing and 
Software as a Service Agreement, 66 BUS. LAW. 237, 237 (2010) (describing cloud 
computing as technology that gives users convenient network access to a shared 
pool of computing resources); Lanois, supra note 18, at 29 (referring to cloud 
computing as being based on the idea of storing software and data on Internet 
servers instead of locally); Martin, supra note 44, at 287 (quoting a definition for 
cloud computing as “a platform for the delivery of software services and other 
applications through remote file servers” in which the data and software stay on 
remote servers and are accessible from any computer anywhere); Fernando M. 
Pinguelo & Bradford W. Muller, Avoid the Rainy Day: Survey of U.S. Cloud 
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Denny maintains that there is not a uniform definition of 
cloud computing.47 On the other hand, many commentators also 
authoritatively cite the definition of cloud computing put forth 
by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), 
which currently defines it as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, 
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction.”48 For our purposes, we accept the 
NIST’s definition because it is broad enough to encompass the 
variety of uses for cloud computing. 
2. Growth of Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing is a growing segment of technology 
services, thanks in part to the availability of high speed Internet 
service.49 A study by the Pew Internet and American Life Project 
concluded that about 69% of Internet users in the United States 
already use webmail, other software programs located solely 
                                                                                                     
Computing Caselaw, 2011 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 1 (defining cloud 
computing as “a computer networking model that gives users on-demand access 
to shared software applications and data storage.”); Robison, supra note 4, at 
1200 (drawing a parallel between “dumb” terminals in the mainframe paradigm 
and how personal computers are used in the cloud paradigm); Soghoian, supra 
note 5, at 364 (applying the term “cloud computing” to “software offerings where 
the application is executed in a web browser, via software code that is 
downloaded (as needed) from a remote server that also stores users’ files.”); 
Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 1 (defining cloud computing as when “an 
Internet connection delivers hardware power and software functionality to users 
regardless of where they are or which computer they are using”). 
 47. Denny, supra note 46, at 237. 
 48. See Peter Mell and Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud 
Computing, Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech. (Sept. 2011), http://csrc.nist.gov/ 
publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf; see also David S. Barnhill, Cloud 
Computing and Stored Communications: Another Look at Quon v. Arch 
Wireless, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 621, 638–39 (2010) (discussing the NIST 
definition of cloud computing); George Jiang, Rain or Shine: Fair and Other 
Non-Infringing Uses in the Context of Cloud Computing, 36 J. LEGIS. 395, 412 
(2010) (discussing the NIST definition of cloud computing); Kattan, supra note 
8, at 620–21 (discussing the NIST definition of cloud computing). 
 49. Robison, supra note 4, at 1201. 
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online, or online data storage.50 A survey of technology insiders 
and critics in 2010 reflected a view by the majority that cloud 
computing technologies will be heavily used in work 
environments by 2020, with most expecting the PC model to 
decrease in importance.51 Some suggest that as cloud computing 
grows and more activities transition onto the Internet, there will 
be a greater focus on interoperability between cloud platforms 
and applications.52  
As a result of more people using cloud services, the revenue 
in this industry is expected to grow substantially. The cloud 
services industry saw revenue of $58.6 billion in 2009, and some 
analysts are anticipating that the industry’s revenue will 
increase between $40 billion and $160 billion over the next few 
years.53 Because of these large growth forecasts, many 
companies are pushing to be at the forefront of this movement.54 
                                                                                                     
 50. See John B. Horrigan, Cloud Computing Gains in Currency, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Sept. 12, 2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/948/cloud-computing-gains-in-
currency (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). A majority of those responding in the Pew study also indicated that 
they were very concerned about the use of their personal data by cloud 
providers. See id.; see also Martin, supra note 44, at 298 (discussing the Pew 
Research Center study); Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 5 (same). 
 51. Kattan, supra note 8, at 620. Some have noted that cloud computing 
has the potential to partially replace the desktop computer. See Stylianou, supra 
note 44, at 604; see also Werbach, supra note 8, at 1813–14 (discussing how the 
rise of smart, connected mobile devices will increase incorporation of cloud 
computing). 
 52. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 597 (stating that some platforms and 
applications will allow interoperability, which will allow users to transfer 
content easily). 
 53. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 30 (citing a study anticipating growth to 
$148.8 billion in revenue by 2014, and a study anticipating over a 20% increase 
in spending on cloud services by organizational customers); Soghoian, supra 
note 5, at 361 (citing analyst expectations of industry revenue growth between 
$40 billion and $160 billion). 
 54. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 30 (referring to a “recent bidding war 
between Hewlett-Packard and Dell to acquire cloud storage firm 3PAR”).  
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3. Uses of Cloud Computing 
There are a lot of uses of cloud computing and a lot of 
aspects to those uses. One of the earliest forms of cloud 
computing was server-side e-mail storage.55 There are many 
companies offering cloud services.56 Webmail in particular is very 
popular, and sometimes an organization may contract with cloud 
providers for e-mail in order to save money over running its e-
mail system in-house.57 Google provides such services to 
organizations through its Google Apps service,58 as well as free 
services to individuals over the Web. Google’s services to the 
public include webmail through Gmail and Web-based 
productivity software through Google Docs.59  
There are also a number of other uses that are not as 
immediately visible. Users can take advantage of the cloud to 
improve the functionality of locally run software, like the Weave 
add-on for the Firefox Web browser, which allows users to 
synchronize bookmarks, saved passwords, and cookies across 
multiple computers by storing this information on Mozilla’s 
servers.60 Additionally, Ford is working on a system that would 
bring features of cloud computing and social networking to new 
cars, perhaps including things like traffic alerts and real-time 
fuel consumption monitoring.61 Cloud computing could also be 
useful in education to increase student engagement and provide 
                                                                                                     
 55. See Couillard, supra note 42, at 2218 (explaining that server-side e-
mail was one of the first iterations of cloud computing); Robison, supra note 4, at 
1203 (referring to server-side e-mail storage as one of the first cloud computing 
services available to the public). 
 56. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 30 (listing offerings of companies, 
including Amazon, Microsoft, IBM, and VMWare). 
 57. Soma, Gates, & Smith, supra note 16, at 516. 
 58. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 367–68 (describing services offered by 
Google Apps). 
 59. John T. Kivus, Spring Training for Electronic Search: Examining U.S. 
v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. with Regards to Evolving Trends in 
Computing, 11 N.C.J.L. & TECH. ON. 115, 128–29 (2009). 
 60. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 397 (explaining the characteristics of 
Firefox, Mozilla’s browser). 
 61. Lanois, supra note 18, at 32. 
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students with additional tools like online forums and storage 
space in the cloud.62 
The cloud is also leading to many innovations in 
entertainment. Some gaming services are appearing in the cloud, 
like OnLive and Gaikai, and some posit that the cloud has the 
potential to let gamers play games with high-end graphics 
without having high-end computers.63 Other entertainment uses 
of the cloud include subscription or ad-supported video streaming 
services like Netflix and Hulu.64 There are also social networking 
websites, like Facebook, that behave in ways consistent with the 
NIST’s definition of cloud computing.65  
The providers of cloud services may take a variety of 
approaches to service provision, differing in areas like cost 
models, user interfaces, and treatment of user data. Because 
cloud services are still fairly new, some companies may also seek 
to ease the transition to the cloud by making their services 
resemble software that is run locally on a computer.66 In addition 
to easing the transition by focusing on the user experience, cloud 
service providers also may make their services more appealing by 
offering them for free. There are many cloud services that are 
already provided for free, and these services can remain 
profitable by relying on ad support.67 Companies that do so often 
                                                                                                     
 62. See Cascia, supra note 17, at 884 (discussing the benefits of integrating 
cloud computing in schools). The Department of Education takes the position 
that cloud computing, data mining, and data aggregation could play valuable 
roles in increasing student performance and keeping school districts 
accountable. Id. at 887.  
 63. Lanois, supra note 18, at 31. OnLive launched in June 2010, but is said 
to already be worth $1.1 billion. Id. 
 64. Netflix, How Netflix Works, https://signup.netflix.com/MediaCenter/ 
HowNetflixWorks (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Hulu, More About Hulu, http://www.hulu.com/about (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 65. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the NIST 
definition of cloud computing). 
 66. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 369–70 (explaining single-site browser 
technology). A cloud service provider, looking to ease the transition between 
local computing and cloud computing, might also choose to provide support for 
offline access, such as Google’s Gears browser add-on that allows limited access 
to Gmail. Id. at 370–71. 
 67. See Jiang, supra note 48, at 415 (explaining different business models 
for cloud computing). 
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use customer information to generate targeted advertisements, 
which some criticize as effectively monetizing users’ private 
data.68  
Providers may also take very different approaches to data 
protection and encryption depending on the service, and we argue 
that the public should be made aware of data protection issues. 
Remotely stored data that is not intended for public access is 
likely to be encrypted, password protected, or have unlisted 
links.69 Other data, especially data that is not considered 
“sensitive,” are typically stored in an unencrypted format.70 
Because cloud computing technology is still emerging, added 
features like increased security would cost more for early 
adopters, and this cost plus the current lack of market demand 
means that cloud service providers currently do not have much 
incentive to invest in enhancing security for a lot of the data 
involved.71 One of the things that current customers demand, 
however, is reliability, so cloud service providers often go to great 
lengths to have their services available at least 99.9% of the 
time.72 
4. Types of Cloud Computing Services 
Cloud services may be private, public, or some hybrid of the 
two.73 Private clouds may also be referred to as “internal” clouds, 
and are located solely within that organization and use only that 
                                                                                                     
 68. Soghoian, supra note 5, at 396. 
 69. Couillard, supra note 42, at 2217. Mozy asserts that it uses encryption 
technologies when user data is transmitted and stored, which is different from 
most other companies that say that they use SSL encryption for the exchange of 
data but do not specify whether data in storage is encrypted. Stylianou, supra 
note 44, at 603. 
 70. Stylianou, supra note 44, at 605. Because Google does not encrypt 
stored e-mails, for example, Google’s software can scan e-mail content for key 
words for the purpose of targeted advertising. Id. 
 71. Id. at 606. 
 72. Id. at 607. 
 73. Barnhill, supra note 48, at 640. 
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organization’s infrastructure.74 Public clouds are offered over the 
Internet and are supported by ads or fees.75  
There are three primary models for public cloud services: 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), 
and Software as a Service (SaaS).76 Companies that provide 
servers and storage for remote use are providing IaaS, while 
companies that provide platforms on remote servers to run 
applications are providing PaaS.77 A company that makes 
software applications available over the Internet, including 
webmail, is providing SaaS.78 Gmail and Facebook are examples 
of SaaS cloud services.79 SaaS goes much further, however, and 
includes services like online gaming and online legal research.80 
SaaS is arguably the level that consumers are most familiar 
with. The other types of cloud computing services may be more 
appealing to developers and computing professionals. PaaS, for 
example, gives customers (often software developers) the ability 
to deliver their own software applications over the Web to end 
users at a lower cost to the developer since they are using 
someone else’s servers to do so.81 IaaS, on the other hand, 
involves cloud providers giving customers access to raw 
computing resources in a manner similar to a utility service.82 
Because this Article focuses on individual consumers, the most 
relevant category of cloud service for our purposes is SaaS.  
                                                                                                     
 74. Couillard, supra note 42, at 2216; Martin, supra note 44, at 287. 
 75. See Martin, supra note 44, at 287 (explaining how cloud computing 
works). 
 76. Barnhill, supra note 48, at 639–40. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 639; Denny, supra note 46, at 237. 
 79. Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 31. 
 80. Martin, supra note 44, at 287–88 (“Under the SaaS model, a user 
interacts with an online service through the Internet, and the online service’s 
vendor provides the necessary software applications and remote data storage.”). 
 81. See id. at 289 (explaining the lower costs of PaaS compared to SaaS); 
Robison, supra note 4, at 1203 (noting the use of PaaS by third-party 
developers). 
 82. Robison, supra note 4, at 1204. 
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C. Advantages and Disadvantages of Cloud Computing 
Moving more services onto the cloud has many promises and 
pitfalls. It is possible that the future success of cloud services will 
depend on how these advantages and disadvantages balance with 
each other and, more importantly, with the public’s 
expectations.83 
Advantages of the cloud paradigm include data 
preservation,84 high levels of expertise on the part of cloud service 
providers,85 scalability,86 affordability,87 and availability.88 
Additionally, some studies have shown that businesses that adopt 
SaaS enjoy a return-on-investment of almost 600%.89 Cloud 
providers are benefited because they have control over content, 
can set access terms, and can also monitor usage statistics.90 
                                                                                                     
 83. Stylianou, supra note 44, at 606 (“In effect, the combination of the 
sensitive nature of information that cloud services usually attract, the lack of 
adequate security from cloud services, and the intensification of governmental 
intrusiveness, stands as an impediment to the spread of cloud services.”). 
Stylianou also suggests that if cloud services implemented stronger security 
measures, like encrypting stored data, such changes could make cloud services 
more attractive to business customers. Id. at 609.  
 84. See Martin, supra note 44, at 294 (describing the benefit of being able 
to access applications and data from anywhere at any time). 
 85. Id.; Stylianou, supra note 44, at 603. 
 86. See Cascia, supra note 17, at 888 (citing the Department of Education’s 
position that the scalability of cloud-based IT services would help schools cut 
costs); Jiang, supra note 48, at 413; Martin, supra note 44, at 294 (stating that 
cloud computing offers rapid and intelligent resource adjustment as well as 
economies of scale); Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that cloud 
computing allows a system’s capacity and capability to be increased without 
additional infrastructure or personnel investments). Wittow and Buller cite the 
example of Animoto, which went from 25,000 users to 250,000 users over the 
course of just three days and was able to keep pace with this very high rate of 
growth by acquiring more virtual servers. Id. at 5–6. The scalability advantage 
works both ways, allowing small companies to easily expand their technological 
resources, and allowing downsizing companies to easily cut unnecessary IT 
costs. Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 31. 
 87. Barnhill, supra note 48, at 640–41; Martin, supra note 44, at 289; 
Soghoian, supra note 5, at 366.  
 88. Jiang, supra note 48, at 413; Soghoian, supra note 5, at 366. 
 89. Martin, supra note 44, at 289 
 90. See Jiang, supra note 48, at 413; see also Soghoian, supra note 5, at 
364–65 (listing the ability to terminate user access and make sure that users 
are always running the current software version as two advantages of the cloud 
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These additional advantages for cloud providers also make cloud 
services attractive to copyright holders because the control 
exercised by the cloud provider can provide additional security 
and protect the copyright holder from infringement.91 
There are also many disadvantages to the cloud paradigm, 
and many of these disadvantages arise in part because of 
consumers’ loss of control over data. Because consumers are 
entrusting their data to a third party, they are relying on that 
third party to adequately secure the information,92 have the 
services and data available at all times,93 and allow the consumer 
to move their information between providers freely,94 all in a 
context in which it is unclear how modern privacy law (including 
the Fourth Amendment and laws related to confidentiality) may 
                                                                                                     
to the service provider). 
 91. See Jiang, supra note 48, at 422; Soghoian, supra note 5, at 364–65 
(noting the value of the cloud for helping content owners better protect 
copyrights and trade secrets). 
 92. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 374 (“[N]early all [] leading cloud 
providers offer products that are by default vulnerable to snooping, account 
hijacking, and data theft by third parties.”). Soghoian suggests that the reason 
that hackers are a threat to users of cloud services is because cloud providers 
have not yet adopted strong encryption technologies. Id. at 361. Businesses are 
likely to be very concerned about the potential security issues of the cloud, so 
they will have to balance the financial benefits of moving to the cloud against 
the costs of data security like encryption and key management. Couillard, supra 
note 42, at 2217. 
 93. See Kattan, supra note 8, at 623 (explaining how cloud computing 
creates dependency); Martin, supra note 44, at 294 (describing the benefit of 
being able to access applications and data from anywhere at any time). While 
cloud services strive for reliability, the technology is still developing and thus is 
still very susceptible to human error and programming bugs, like the leap day 
bug that caused Microsoft’s Azure service to be unavailable all day on February 
29, 2012. Bill Laing, Summary of Windows Azure Service Disruption on Feb 29, 
2012, WINDOWS AZURE TEAM BLOG (Mar. 9, 2012, 6:03 PM PST), 
http://blogs.msdn.com/b/windowsazure/archive/2012/03/09/summary-of-
windows-azure-service-disruption-on-feb-29th-2012.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 94. Martin, supra note 44, at 297–98; see also Kattan, supra note 8, at 623 
(noting that a customer who moves data storage and processing onto the cloud 
may have difficulty if he later decides to revert to the PC model). Martin notes 
that this lock-in problem is likely to not apply to IaaS because a customer of an 
IaaS provider will typically have everything on a virtual machine over which the 
customer can exercise full control. Martin, supra note 44, at 294. 
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apply.95 Another disadvantage is related to the risk of loss. If a 
provider fails to secure data and a consumer’s information is 
compromised, the risk of loss is likely to fall on the consumer 
rather than the cloud service provider.96 
In this Article, we emphasize the need for data control in the 
cloud, which we define as consisting of the ability to withdraw 
data (data withdrawal) and move data to a new location (data 
mobility). We argue that data control is essential for meaningful 
consumer choice. Consumers will inherently have less control 
over data stored in the cloud,97 but being able to choose (and 
switch to) providers that are more reliable or that offer stronger 
security measures is important for preserving consumer 
                                                                                                     
 95. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 44 (citing a publication of the World 
Privacy Forum). Privacy is likely to be especially important to consumers in the 
context of electronic health records. See Colin P. McCarthy, Note, Paging Dr. 
Google: Personal Health Records and Patient Privacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2243, 2253 (2010) (discussing the potential problems of personal health records). 
These concerns are not just limited to health services. Confidentiality is a 
significant concern to a number of other professions when considering the 
adoption of cloud services as well. See Cascia, supra note 17, at 884 (noting that 
outsourcing IT management to third parties may make it more difficult for 
schools to make sure that the personal information of students remains private); 
Martin, supra note 44, at 295. Martin mentions the legal field by name as one 
industry that should be hesitant at this point when considering whether to use 
cloud services in support of its practices. Id. at 300. It is also unclear how the 
Fourth Amendment will apply to information held by third party cloud service 
providers. See id. at 295–96; see also Soghoian, supra note 5, at 361 (noting that 
cloud computing leaves users vulnerable to invasions of privacy by the 
government, resulting in “evisceration of traditional Fourth Amendment 
protections of a person’s private files and documents”). Martin also notes 
concerns that the federal statute governing electronic messaging may be 
difficult or unable to apply to modern technology. Martin, supra note 44, at 295–
96. 
 96. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 378–79 (discussing why cloud computing 
providers have little incentive to protect users); see also infra Part IV.A 
(discussing contents of TOS agreements, including explicit limitations on 
providers’ legal liability). 
 97. See Kattan, supra note 8, at 623 (noting the customer’s dependence on 
cloud service providers to protect the customer’s data); Martin, supra note 44, at 
289 (noting customers’ lack of control over data and the security practices of the 
cloud vendor); Stylianou, supra note 44, at 595 (explaining that some private 
data will be transferred away from the user’s immediate physical control); 
Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 6 (noting the lack of control that users have 
over data in the cloud and the importance that the user be able to trust the 
cloud service provider). 
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autonomy. Currently, there are systemic limitations to 
meaningful choice. SaaS customers may experience lock-in 
problems because a cloud provider may store the customer’s 
information in a format unique to the cloud provider and thus 
make it difficult for the customer to switch cloud providers 
later.98 This control over content also leads to some concerns 
about private censorship. Werbach notes the existence of 
concerns over cloud services having too much power to censor 
controversial causes, such as when Amazon Web Services 
dropped Wikileaks as a customer.99 
D. Cloud Computing Legal Issues 
For our purposes, there are two important categories of legal 
issues raised in the context of cloud computing: data use and 
procedural issues. Data use issues could include the use of both 
public and private information, thus our use of the term “data 
use” also includes privacy concerns, examined in more detail 
below. Procedural issues relating to cloud computing can include 
E-Discovery and jurisdiction questions. The appropriate degree of 
regulation is also in controversy, so even if we could identify all of 
the possible legal issues related to cloud computing, it may prove 
difficult to effectively regulate the industry.100 
One data use issue is the problem of “scraping,” specifically 
the question of how courts should deal with the unauthorized, 
automated collection of information by, for example, auction 
services that list relevant auctions in one search across multiple 
                                                                                                     
 98. Martin, supra note 44, at 297–98; see also Kattan, supra note 8, at 623 
(noting that a customer who moves data storage and processing onto the cloud 
may have difficulty if they later decide to revert to the PC model). Martin notes 
that this lock-in problem is likely to not apply to IaaS because a customer of an 
IaaS provider will typically have everything on a virtual machine over which the 
customer can exercise full control. Martin, supra note 44, at 294. 
 99. See Werbach, supra note 8, at 1820 (“From a broader perspective, 
though, the rise of cloud computing changes a default assumption that data will 
be within the control of the user.”). 
 100. See id. at 1766 (referring to network neutrality as the “final hurrah” of 
the regulatory framework under the Telecommunications Act, as views of the 
industry have shifted “from regulated monopoly to managed competition within 
defined industry segments”). 
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auction websites.101 Claims relating to scraping have been 
brought based on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),102 
the tort of trespass, and a “hot news” theory.103 An analysis of 
these options and whether they provide adequate means of 
redress for companies whose data is mined poses an interesting 
research question for future research. Our concern about the 
privacy of individual users also makes us question whether 
recourse for “scraping” might also apply to protect individuals 
whose data is mined without their consent, though this is outside 
the scope of our research. 
1. Privacy 
Our primary focus in this Article is on the implications of 
cloud computing and corresponding privacy agreements on 
personal privacy. There are several legal issues relating to 
privacy and cloud computing, including the uncertain 
applications of the Health Information Portability and 
Accessibility Act (HIPAA),104 the Stored Communications Act,105 
and the Fourth Amendment, especially the third-party doctrine of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.106 If a legal regime is put into 
place to provide stronger privacy protections, it is unclear 
                                                                                                     
 101. See Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 8–9 (discussing how the scraping 
issue impacts cloud computing). 
 102. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
 103. See id. (discussing how the scraping issue impacts cloud computing).  
 104. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1181 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 300gg, 1320d et seq. (2006)); Denny, supra note 46, at 239–40 (“Yet another 
statutory hurdle to cloud computing in the United States is the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (‘HIPAA’).”). 
 105. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 
100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); 
Werbach, supra note 8, at 1819 (noting that a search warrant is required to 
access e-mail stored on a user’s hard drive, but that under the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, a lower standard would be applied if that same e-
mail had been stored on Google’s Gmail servers for more than six months). 
 106. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 596–97 (“[I]t is still debatable whether 
access to online stored data should be considered a search . . . or whether by 
communicating data to a remote server the subject is considered to have 
knowingly exposed the information.”). 
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whether data collection should be addressed based on the 
quantity collected or the type collected, and there is also a lot of 
uncertainty about how to address the transfer of data between 
countries with different privacy laws.107 
Many aspects of the privacy debate rely on an understanding 
of privacy theories. Several things influence privacy protections 
online, including social norms, website architecture, and the 
law.108 Some note that there are societal obstacles to 
strengthening privacy protections online, arguing that the 
younger generation values the interconnectedness and low cost of 
cloud services more than they value their personal privacy.109 
Werbach asserts that the range of concerns about cloud providers’ 
information practices goes beyond our current concept of 
“privacy,” and suggests referring to it as “information 
governance.”110 In lieu of creating a new category, Solove suggests 
revising the concept of “privacy” to encompass these concerns.111 
It is likely that there will be an increase in public policy activity 
in this area in the near future,112 underscoring the importance 
and timeliness of this topic. A significant problem that arises 
when dealing with technologically sophisticated policy issues, 
however, is that some judges and other policy makers may be ill-
                                                                                                     
 107. See id. at 595–96 (discussing whether access to cloud data is a search). 
 108. See Michael Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, Does Law Matter Online? 
Empirical Evidence on Privacy Law Compliance, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. 
REV. 337, 339–41 (2011) (“Certain non-legal mechanisms can affect online 
privacy and shape the power of individuals to control their personal data.”). 
 109. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1237–38 (“[Y]ounger users are more likely 
to embrace the Internet’s interconnectedness and convenience by participating 
in social networking, sharing digital content, and using cloud services.”). But see 
Chris Hoofnagle, Jennifer King, Su Li, & Joseph Turow, How Different Are 
Young Adults from Older Adults When It Comes to Information Privacy 
Attitudes & Policies? 20 (Working Paper Series, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589864 (noting that their study results failed to show 
the expected significant differences between the behavior of young adults and 
older adults online with regard to privacy). 
 110. Werbach, supra note 8, at 1833. 
 111. See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 477 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, Taxonomy] (setting forth a new taxonomy 
for the understanding of information privacy). 
 112. See Werbach, supra note 8, at 1835 (“Public policy activity in this area 
seems bound to increase.”). 
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informed about the underlying technology, leading these policy 
makers to hesitate when faced with current issues.113  
There may also be legal harms arising from data gathering 
practices. Richards discusses the “database problem,” in which 
there are very large databases that make it efficient and valuable 
for businesses to use consumer information, but the legal rights 
of the consumers in these databases are unresolved.114 Stylianou 
acknowledges that cloud computing does result in more private 
information being collected and this could be harmful, but 
concludes that most of this increase in information collection 
happens voluntarily, and that the compromises in privacy appear 
to be no greater than necessary for the delivery of cloud 
services.115 Some were critical of the settlement in Authors Guild 
v. Google116 for its lack of restrictions concerning data gathering, 
arguing that privacy issues should be addressed in the settlement 
to protect people from having their reading choices readily 
available to third parties.117  
2. Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction issues concerning a court’s ability to hear a 
claim will arise in the context of the cloud for two reasons: (1) the 
                                                                                                     
 113. For example, in the oral arguments of City of Ontario v. Quon, Justices 
Roberts and Scalia noted their confusion as to how wireless communications are 
transmitted, with both indicating that they were not aware that these messages 
were inherently processed by a third party. See Transcript of Oral Arguments at 
48–50, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No. 08-1332), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1332. 
pdf (exemplifying the confusion of Justices Roberts and Scalia as to how wireless 
communications are transmitted). 
 114. Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 
52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1150, 1156–65 (2005). 
 115. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 594–96 (discussing voluntary 
information collection). 
 116. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 117. See Denny, supra note 46, at 238–39 (“Much of the recent debate 
surrounding cloud computing and privacy stems from a settlement in Authors 
Guild v. Google Inc.”); Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 7 (“Privacy concerns 
also have been raised in the context of the pending Authors Guild v. Google 
[Inc.] book search settlement, which creates a cloud-based database of 
searchable books.”). 
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lack of borders in cyberspace; and (2) the vast differences between 
privacy laws in different locations.118 If a conflict arises with 
respect to a cloud service, where could that conflict be resolved? If 
there is a conflict between a customer and cloud provider within 
the United States, the customer might be bound by arbitration 
language in a TOS agreement, or by a choice of law or venue 
clause.119  
But what about more geographically vague situations? Some 
discussions about jurisdiction assume that the applicable law will 
be determined by the physical location of the data, but this 
information is often unknown to the customer.120 Sometimes, a 
defendant may claim that he has insufficient contacts with the 
forum state for a particular court to exercise jurisdiction.121 
Because of these jurisdictional problems, it is important that the 
TOS agreements for cloud services specify where data will be 
stored and which laws will apply.122 Otherwise, the uncertainties 
related to jurisdiction in the cloud may chill some online activity 
by discouraging people from engaging in electronic commerce.123 
Approaches to informational privacy can vary between 
nations, and the United States as a whole has a privacy law 
                                                                                                     
 118. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 596 (discussing the transfer of data 
between countries). 
 119. See Christopher Kuner, Data Protection Law and International 
Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 1), 18 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 176, 178 (2010) 
[hereinafter Kuner, Part 1] (noting the overlap between choice of law and 
jurisdiction). 
 120. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 44 (“[D]ata that might be secure in one 
country may not be in another, and in many cases, users of cloud services do not 
know where their information is being held.”); Stylianou, supra note 44, at 602 
(“Because different national laws accord different levels of protection to personal 
and private information, it is important that users know where their data is 
stored.”). 
 121. See Pinguelo & Muller, supra note 46, at 1 (“It is apparent that the use 
of a cloud can potentially increase the number of ‘contacts’ a party is found to 
have for personal jurisdiction purposes, and thus raise its exposure to lawsuits 
in multiple forums.”). 
 122. See Denny, supra note 46, at 239 (“According to the Privacy Authors, if 
readers were worried that information about their reading habits could be 
disseminated to the government, divorcing spouses, or other interested third 
parties, these readers would be less likely to view books on controversial 
topics.”). 
 123. Kuner, Part 1, supra note 119, at 178. 
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regime that is much less protective of personal privacy than that 
of the European Union.124 Can a court in the European Union 
exercise jurisdiction over a U.S. company that violates the 
personal privacy of EU citizens? Generally, the answer will be 
yes, based on principles of jurisdiction. 
In the international context, jurisdiction can be described as 
the right of one country to regulate actions that are not solely 
conducted within that nation’s borders.125 Three categories of 
international jurisdiction are legislative jurisdiction, under which 
a nation’s laws can apply to cases with a foreign element; 
adjudicative jurisdiction, when the nation’s courts have the power 
to try cases involving a foreign element; and enforcement 
jurisdiction, when the nation has the power to act in another 
nation’s territory to enforce its own laws.126  
Exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction may be justified when 
the acts were committed or completed within the nation’s 
territory, when the perpetrator or victim was a citizen of that 
nation, when the act has effects within that nation (a justification 
that is commonly criticized for its open-endedness), or when the 
act jeopardizes the nation’s sovereignty.127 Because adjudicative 
jurisdiction can be found when the victim of a wrong is a citizen 
of the adjudicating nation, this means that service providers in 
                                                                                                     
 124. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 597 (noting that the use of the Safe 
Harbor agreement allows U.S companies to process the data of European 
citizens). This agreement is in lieu of a privacy law overhaul to make the U.S. 
approach to privacy match the approach of the EU. Id. 
 125. See Kuner, Part 1, supra note 119, at 178–79 (defining international 
jurisdiction as “the State’s right under international law to regulate conduct in 
matters not exclusively of domestic concern.” (citation omitted)). 
 126. See id. at 184 (discussing categories of jurisdiction). Generally, direct 
enforcement of one nation’s laws in another nation is not permitted, though a 
nation may apply its domestic law to conduct that occurs elsewhere, provided 
recognized legal grounds exist for doing so. Id. at 185. Enforcement jurisdiction, 
however, is rarely found. See Christopher Kuner, Data Protection Law and 
International Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 2), 18 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 
227, 232 (2010) [hereinafter Kuner, Part 2] (“[A] State may not carry out an 
investigation in another State, if the purpose is to enforce its own 
administrative, criminal, or fiscal law. These restrictions apply even if the 
persons or entities in the second State consent to the first State’s enforcement 
actions.”). 
 127. See Kuner, Part 1, supra note 119, at 188–90 (examining adjudicative 
jurisdiction in detail). 
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the United States must act carefully to comply with the privacy 
laws of other jurisdictions when a customer is a foreign citizen.  
E. Calls for Action in the Cloud 
The current legal regime applicable to cloud computing has 
drawn a lot of criticism from organizations that want the law to 
consider current technologies.128 Legislative reform will likely be 
necessary to address the new environment created by cloud 
computing, but such reform will need to take into account many 
different concerns.129 For example, reforms will need to take data 
protection into consideration because customers are likely to 
want data stored in the cloud to be protected the same as it would 
be on the customer’s own tangible storage devices.130 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)131 is 
examined in detail below in Part III.B.2. Several institutions 
have urged lawmakers to amend the ECPA. Microsoft proposed 
the Cloud Computing Advancement Act (CCAA)132 in 2010, and 
the Center for Democracy and Technology has also recommended 
                                                                                                     
 128. See Kattan, supra note 8, at 645 (suggesting revision of the Stored 
Communications Act and referencing the position of the nonprofit Digital Due 
Process that the ECPA should be modernized and clarified); Martin, supra note 
44, at 286 (noting recommendations made by Microsoft and the Center for 
Democracy and Technology). Digital Due Process is an organization that is 
focused on modernizing the approaches of law enforcement to electronic data, 
and they encourage the reformation of the ECPA to take into account recent and 
emerging technologies. Lanois, supra note 18, at 45. 
 129. See Werbach, supra note 8, at 1826 (“The solution to the contemporary 
challenges of cloud computing likely requires some legislative reform in addition 
to FCC action.”). 
 130. See Couillard, supra note 42, at 2205–06 (“Despite the shift in Internet 
usage, users expect their information to be treated the same on this virtual 
cloud as it would be if it were stored on their own computer, phone, or iPod.”). 
 131. See Electronic Commc’n Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 
Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2712 (2006)). 
 132. See Brad Smith, Gen. Counsel, Microsoft Corp., Speech at the 
Brookings Institute Policy Forum: Cloud Computing for Business and Society 
(Jan. 20, 2010) available at http://download.microsoft.com/download/C/0/ 
0/C00D24A5-A686-4109-9DB8-14A29E058069/Building_Confidence_in_the_Clo 
ud_General_Counsel_Brad_Smith_Brookings_Speech.docx. 
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legislative action to address cloud computing issues.133 The CCAA 
would strengthen the privacy protections of the ECPA, unifying 
the concepts of “electronic communications service” and “remote 
computing service,” and would also enhance the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (CFAA)134 by presuming a loss of $500 for each 
count of unauthorized access.135 The CDT proposal, on the other 
hand, focuses more on civil liberties, urging Congress to amend 
the ECPA to require probable cause before a seizure of online 
information can be executed without notice.136 
1. Transparency and Control 
Other calls for revisions of the system have focused on the 
need for transparency.137 To say that practices of cloud providers 
should be transparent about information use means that 
customers should be well-informed of what companies are doing 
with the customers’ personal data. In examining Internet issues, 
the FCC maintains that transparency is important for consumer 
protection in the telecommunications context.138 Martin suggests 
that when addressing cloud computing concerns, it will be 
important to ensure that the practices of cloud providers are 
understood and that customers have the ability to exercise 
control over their data.139 Transparency could have additional 
advantages by encouraging cloud platforms to be more 
interoperable, allowing for greater data portability.140 If the 
                                                                                                     
 133. See Martin, supra note 44, at 286 (discussing recently proposed 
legislation, standards, and governing principles). 
 134. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
 135.  Martin, supra note 44, at 309–10. 
 136. Id. at 310. 
 137. See, e.g., Werbach, supra note 8, at 1767 (“To achieve its public interest 
mandates, the FCC must consider . . . [and examine] transparency.”). 
 138. See id. at 1837 (discussing the FCC’s adoption of a transparency 
mandate in its Open Internet Order). 
 139. See Martin, supra note 44, at 286 (“Any solution needs to incorporate 
guarantees that data owners would be able to gain control of their data in a 
usable form should their service providers become inoperable.”). 
 140. See Werbach, supra note 8, at 1839 (noting the ancillary benefits of 
transparency). 
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industry takes an approach to personal data that focuses on the 
ability of users to control their data, transparency may prove 
beneficial and alleviate some of the information asymmetry 
between cloud providers and their customers.141 
Industry leaders are conscious of transparency concerns. A 
consortium of industry leaders put forth the Open Cloud 
Manifesto, advocating the use of standardization and 
collaboration to develop an “open cloud.”142 The Open Cloud 
Manifesto focuses on transparency and interoperability between 
cloud providers, with one of the goals being to minimize the lock-
in issue.143 If implemented, this manifesto might mitigate some of 
the data control issues that we are concerned about in this 
Article. 
It could also facilitate transparency for users to be proactive 
about seeking information. The European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) suggests that users ask 
cloud providers about things like the provider’s personnel 
security procedures, use of subcontractors, operational security 
procedures, disaster recovery protocol, and miscellaneous legal 
issues like data location, jurisdiction issues, and how the 
customer can recover data upon termination of the service.144 We 
posit that users who are given the right to control their 
information are likely to be more involved in the process of 
controlling their own data.  
F. Cloud Services in Different Industries 
There are a number of professions in which practitioners are 
required to handle client or patient data with care, making data 
protection in these sensitive industries very important. One of these 
industries is the legal field, in which attorneys and their staff 
                                                                                                     
 141. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1882. 
 142. Martin, supra note 44, at 286. 
 143. See id. at 310 (discussing the Open Cloud Manifesto in detail). 
 144. See id. at 311 (examining the European Network and Information 
Security Agency report, which recommends a series of user procedures that can 
be employed for self-protection). 
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are required to take great steps to protect client confidentiality.145 
Still, some state bar associations may recognize the convenience 
of cloud services and may be inclined to approve of attorney 
practices in which client information is stored using public cloud 
services.146 Martin, however, suggests that the ABA should 
establish ethical guidelines relating to topics like document 
storage, e-mail, and confidentiality in the cloud.147 
In the health care industry, there has been a shift toward 
using electronic medical records (EMR) as an alternative to paper 
records.148 A more recent push is toward maintaining personal 
health records (PHR) online through services like Epic, 
Microsoft’s HealthVault, and Google Health, in which the patient 
will have control over her records.149 However, PHR providers do 
not fall within one of the statutory categories of “covered entities” 
under HIPAA, so the storage and transmission of personal health 
information is not currently regulated by HIPAA or any of the 
related rules.150  
In addition to control, security of health information is also of 
paramount concern. McCarthy notes that the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act151 requires 
users to be notified if there is a breach threatening PHR data, 
                                                                                                     
 145. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 5.3 (1983) (discussing 
confidentiality and the duties of nonlawyer staff, respectively). 
 146. See Martin, supra note 44, at 300–01 (citing a New York bar opinion 
about using e-mail services that scan e-mail content to generate targeted 
advertising). 
 147. See id. at 313 (“[T]he ABA should move quickly to establish ethical 
guidelines for lawyers who use cloud computing services . . . [including] 
document storage, e-mail, collaboration, due diligence for confidentiality, and 
breach notification related to cloud services.”). 
 148. McCarthy, supra note 95, at 2250–51. EMRs, however, are generally 
limited to that specific provider, with no sharing of information. See id. (“Each 
health care provider maintains its own EMRs—physician’s offices maintain 
their EMRs, hospitals maintain their EMRs, and so on.”). 
 149. See id. at 2245, 2251–54 (“Until now, patients could request a copy of 
her [sic] medical records from their health care providers but have not had the 
opportunity to control them in the way that PHRs offer.”). 
 150. Id. at 2258. 
 151. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 
Pub. L. 111–5, Div. A, Title XIII, Div. B, Title IV, 123 Stat. 226, 467 (2009) 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
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and that the HHS has also promulgated a rule that requires PHR 
vendors to comply with notification requirements if a breach 
occurs.152 The increased vulnerability of data in the cloud 
necessitates strong protections for PHR, like encryption, 
password protection, and authentication requirements.153 One of 
our recommendations for regulating cloud providers focuses on 
establishing baseline standards for data protection, which could 
help address some of these issues.  
III. Privacy Fundamentals 
A. Privacy Theories 
“Privacy” is an example of a word that can mean many 
different things.154 It can be a handmade sign on the door of a 
teenager’s room prohibiting entry by parents and little brothers. 
It can be the right to make one’s own decisions without undue 
burden imposed by the government. On the Web, some people 
might consider social networking posts “private” if they are only 
viewable by the poster’s four hundred closest friends,155 while 
others do not consider anything that they do on the Web “private” 
unless all data is heavily encrypted and all of their traffic is 
routed through an anonymizer.156  
                                                                                                     
 152. See McCarthy, supra note 95, at 2263–64 (discussing new federal law 
governing PHR privacy and security). 
 153. See id. at 2267 (“PHRs should be required to employ best practices in 
data encryption, password protection, and authentication in order to safeguard 
PHI stored on their servers.”). 
 154. See Anita L. Allen, Privacy-As-Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and 
Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 864 (2000) [hereinafter 
Allen, Data Control] (noting the wide variation in how “privacy” is defined, even 
among people who seemingly are talking about the same privacy paradigm of 
privacy being data control). 
 155. Some argue, however, that such postings are still functionally private 
because of the boundaries that exist by making a posting viewable only by 
certain people. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1920–21 (citing Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 
(2005)). This view arguably does not consider the potential of screenshots of 
“friends only” postings being reposted elsewhere. 
 156. These three categories of privacy have been referred to as physical and 
proprietary privacy, decisional privacy, and informational privacy. Allen, Data 
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Some view privacy as a negative freedom, providing a 
freedom from something instead of a claim to something else.157 
Perhaps the most prevalent view of privacy over the years has 
been the secrecy paradigm of privacy, where privacy is limited to 
things that are secret.158 There is also an “invasion conception” of 
privacy, where privacy violations are viewed as invasions of an 
interest.159 Some view privacy as referring to inaccessibility, 
when a person or information about her is inaccessible to 
others.160 Some also address what sort of harm is necessary to 
find a privacy violation. Solove asserts that there can be an 
infringement of privacy “even if no secrets are revealed and even 
if nobody is watching us,” connecting the concepts of privacy and 
human dignity.161  
The importance of privacy is sometimes stated in grandiose 
terms, tying the concept of privacy to democratic ideals like 
                                                                                                     
Control, supra note 154, at 865–66. 
 157. See Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 747–
48 (1999) [hereinafter Allen, Coercing Privacy] (discussing conservative and 
liberal interpretations of the right to privacy). 
 158. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 111, at 497–98 (“Under the secrecy 
paradigm . . . if the information is not previously hidden, then no privacy 
interest is implicated by the collection or dissemination of the information. In 
many areas of law, this narrow view of privacy has limited the recognition of 
privacy violations.”). This paradigm can be seen in the approach courts have 
taken to the Fourth Amendment, as well as in the tort of intrusion upon 
seclusion. Id. Solove takes the view that the secrecy paradigm approach to 
information privacy law is outmoded. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 
143. 
 159. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 8 (defining the invasion 
conception of privacy). Solove says that the Warren and Brandeis theory of 
privacy falls within this conception of privacy, with a focus on the existence of 
discrete wrongs to individuals. See id. at 93–94 (discussing the two models for 
the protection of privacy). Solove also criticizes the invasion conception of 
privacy by arguing that it overlooks the structural nature of certain privacy 
problems that affect not just an individual, but also society as a whole. See id. at 
97. 
 160. See Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 867 (“[O]ther than in 
contexts in which ‘privacy’ holds its decisional and proprietary meanings, 
privacy refers to a degree of inaccessibility of a person or information about her 
to others’ five senses and surveillance devices.”); Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra 
note 157, at 724 (“Privacy obtains where persons and personal information are, 
to a degree, inaccessible to others.”). 
 161. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 44, 55. 
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independent thought and the right to take political actions.162 
Alan Westin, an early information privacy scholar, defined 
privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others.”163 The law 
has taken a number of approaches to address different concerns 
associated with privacy. The right to privacy has been recognized 
in the United States for over a century, though coherent 
definitions have generally been lacking.164 Solove views privacy 
as a concept that encompasses many different kinds of distinct 
but interrelated issues.165 
The concept of privacy also overlaps with constitutional 
protections under the Fourth Amendment, where the focus is on a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”166 This legal concept is 
connected to several philosophical questions: what is privacy, 
where does it exist, and is it reasonable to expect a particular 
action to be private? If the government conducts surveillance 
somewhere that there is an expectation of privacy, a warrant is 
                                                                                                     
 162. See Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note 157, at 734 (“Liberal theorists 
claim that we need privacy to be persons, independent thinkers, free political 
actors, and citizens of a tolerant democracy.”); Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 
111, at 489 (citing Julie Cohen and Paul Schwartz for the argument that 
“privacy is a constitutive element of a civil society”). 
 163. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).  
 164. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1155 (discussing the sometimes 
uneasy coexistence of privacy and speech); Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus 
Peifer, Prosser’s Privacy and the German Right of Personality: Are Four Privacy 
Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1925, 1963 (2010) (“[I]n 
their comprehensive work, Privacy, Property and Personality, [the authors] 
argue that the right of privacy in the United States ‘remains somewhat 
conceptually uncertain and poorly defined.’” (quoting HUW BEVERLEY-SMITH ET 
AL., PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY 207 (2005))); Solove, Taxonomy, supra 
note 111, at 562 (“But our understanding of privacy remains in a fog, and the 
law remains fragmented and inconsistent.”). 
 165. Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1914–15; Solove, Taxonomy, supra 
note 111, at 562. 
 166. See Rebecca N. Cordero, No Expectation of Privacy: Should School 
Officials be Able to Search Students’ Lockers Without Any Suspicion of Wrong 
Doing?, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 305, 308 (2002) (“In his concurrence, Justice Harlan 
coined the term a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ to describe an area subject 
to the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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necessary to protect against unreasonable intrusion.167 Generally, 
public surveillance is not viewed as an intrusion because 
behaviors are being exposed to the public, but there may be 
exceptions when such surveillance is overzealous.168 As one court 
said, “The mere fact that a person can be seen by someone does 
not automatically mean that he or she can legally be forced to be 
subject to being seen by everyone.”169 
The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, the protections afforded to electronic 
communications under the ECPA, and privacy torts are three 
large legal categories for the concept of privacy.170 As we examine 
in later sections, the application of the Fourth Amendment and 
the ECPA to the Information Age is far from clear. Additionally, 
there is also a sense that privacy tort law is ineffective at 
addressing these issues.171 The traditional model for privacy 
protection simply does not address the sorts of privacy problems 
that have arisen recently.172 
The desire for privacy is arguably an innate human trait, and 
privacy theorists thus often make philosophical or literary 
allusions when explaining the importance of privacy. One of the 
most vivid images for the modern information privacy problems is 
Jeremy Bentham’s design for a prison that he called the 
                                                                                                     
 167. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
 168. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 111, at 498 (“In some cases, however, 
courts have recognized a harm in public surveillance.”). 
 169. Sanders v. Am. Broad. Comps., Inc., 978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1999). 
 170. Other relevant elements of constitutional law include the freedom of 
association and the freedom of anonymous speech under the First Amendment. 
See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 64–65 (discussing the right to 
privacy). 
 171.  See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1889 (“Today, the chorus of 
opinion is that the tort law of privacy has been ineffective, particularly in 
remedying the burgeoning collection, use, and dissemination of personal 
information in the Information Age.”). 
 172. See id. at 1918 (“Tort law has not emerged as the leading protector of 
privacy.”). Solove argues that many of the privacy problems we confront today 
are systemic in nature, stemming from information flows, with multiple actors 
being responsible for these problems. Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, 
and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1232 (2003) 
[hereinafter Solove, Architecture]. 
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Panopticon.173 In the Panopticon, prison cells are distributed 
around a central observation tower, and someone placed in the 
tower can monitor all of the prison cells without the prisoners 
knowing when they are being observed, and this fear of 
observation leads to the prisoners behaving better.174 In the 
context of the Internet, Schwartz has argued that there is a 
danger both of a government Panopticon and private Panopticons 
operated by private entities that collect and use information 
while resisting attempts at transparency.175 
Privacy concerns gained more public visibility in the early 
1980s, perhaps due to the era’s relationship with George Orwell’s 
dystopian novel Nineteen Eighty Four.176 Similar to the 
Panopticon, the telescreens of Nineteen Eighty Four allowed the 
government to monitor citizens without their knowledge that 
they were being observed.177 Perhaps thanks in part to this work 
of fiction—and the fact that it is required reading for many high 
school seniors—U.S. citizens are keenly aware when government 
action has the potential to intrude on privacy and lead to an 
authoritarian state.178  
                                                                                                     
 173. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE 
PRISON 201 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (listing the essential elements of the 
Panopticon’s effectiveness being visibility and unverifiability, visibility referring 
to that of the tower, and unverifiability referring to the prisoners’ inability to 
know whether they are being observed). 
 174. Id. at 201; Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1240. Solove also 
notes Foucault’s argument that the Panopticon represents power relations in 
society. Id. at 1240. 
 175. See Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 
815, 852–53 (2000) [hereinafter Schwartz, State] (discussing the creation of a 
privately operated Panopticon in the context of Internet privacy). 
 176. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1825–26 (“Part of this attention 
was driven, in turn, by the arrival of George Orwell’s titular year, 1984.”). 
 177. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 31. 
 178. See James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy 
Center (Watch What You Say), WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www. 
wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/1 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) 
(describing a massive new National Security Agency data collection center 
under construction) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Solove 
takes issue with the frequent comparisons to Nineteen Eighty Four, instead 
arguing that because the privacy threats are distributed across private 
companies and government bureaucracy, a better comparison would be to 
Kafka’s The Trial. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 7–9 (“[F]or a more 
 
380 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341 (2013) 
1. Warren and Brandeis 
Theoretical discussions of privacy law often begin in 1890, 
when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published their article 
about privacy as a right of personality.179 Warren and Brandeis 
were especially concerned about the use of private information by 
the media and the implications of technological developments like 
new and cheaper photography technologies.180 Warren and 
Brandeis also argued that a person’s intellectual property was 
not a matter of private property, but rather was related to the 
person’s “inviolate personality.”181  
Warren and Brandeis were supportive of the idea of applying 
the common law to protect a right to privacy, which they 
famously summarized as a “right to be let alone.”182 In their 
article, they supported enforcing the right of privacy using tort 
damages to provide individuals with compensation for the 
“mental suffering” caused by the privacy invasions.183 This view 
                                                                                                     
complete understanding of the issues, I turn to . . . Franz Kafka’s depiction of 
bureaucracy in The Trial.”). In The Trial, the protagonist is under arrest and 
does not understand why because the bureaucratic government has a large 
amount of information about the protagonist that it refuses to share with him. 
See id. at 8–9 (discussing Kafka’s novel The Trial). 
 179. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890); see also Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1888 
(writing that Warren and Brandeis popularized privacy in American law with 
their famous article in 1890); Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1819 
(recognizing the Warren and Brandeis article as a famous example of privacy’s 
early jurisprudence). 
 180. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1198 (“[M]odern thinking about the 
right of privacy is often traced to Warren and Brandeis’s privacy article, in 
which their concern was not primarily data privacy, but rather media use of 
private information.”); Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1819 (“The 
paradigmatic privacy invasion for Warren and Brandeis concerned the press 
intruding on the privacy of individuals by printing gossip about them.”). This 
position leads to a balancing of the interest in privacy against interests under 
the Freedom of the Press Clause of the First Amendment. Richards & Solove, 
supra note 1, at 1892; Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1229. 
 181. Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, at 1944. 
 182. Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1891. 
 183. Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1229–30. Warren and Brandeis 
expressed a preference for money damages over injunctions, which they noted 
may be appropriate in narrow circumstances, and asserted that narrower 
circumstances would be required for criminal penalties to be appropriate. Id. at 
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of privacy harms focuses on dignitary harms, like harm to 
reputation, based on the concept that privacy violations are a 
type of invasion to the victim’s dignity.184 
Case law on privacy was heavily influenced by the Warren 
and Brandeis article, especially when the dispute involved the 
use of photographs of ordinary people to promote a company’s 
product.185 However, by the time the Warren and Brandeis article 
was fifty years old, privacy was still a very minor doctrine in tort 
law. Only twelve states recognized the right of privacy by 
common law, and only two recognized it by statute.186 
2. Prosser 
For modern privacy scholars, the next major development in 
the privacy law of the United States was the 1960 publication of 
William Prosser’s article, Privacy.187 In this article, Prosser 
argued that there were four categories within privacy tort law: 
appropriation privacy, intrusion privacy, unauthorized public 
                                                                                                     
1230. 
 184. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 111, at 487; SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, 
supra note 2, at 93–94 (referring to the privacy theory of Warren and Brandeis 
as being based on an “invasion conception” of privacy, which turns on the 
existence of discrete wrongs to individuals). 
 185. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1892–93 (“Warren and 
Brandeis’s approach to privacy was in one sense profoundly conservative, as it 
was part of a broader legal strategy employed by late-nineteenth-century elites 
to protect their reputations from the masses in the face of disruptive social and 
technological change.”). 
 186. See id. at 1895 (discussing the number of states that recognize certain 
common law privacy rights). 
 187. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); see also 
Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, at 1926 (“Today, Prosser’s verdict on the 
momentous article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis can fittingly be 
applied to his own work: ‘It has come to be regarded as the outstanding example 
of the influence of legal periodicals upon the American law.’” (quoting William L. 
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960))). 
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disclosure of private facts, and false light.188 In constructing these 
four categories, Prosser analyzed hundreds of privacy cases.189  
Prosser’s approach was thus fairly comprehensive, but the 
categories he created were also narrow and rigid.190 The rigidity 
was perhaps based on Prosser’s concern that privacy torts might 
swallow up established doctrines like defamation law and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.191 In some ways, 
Prosser seemed to be skeptical of privacy laws because of their 
potential to interfere with the flow of information, and he would 
have been concerned with the balance between newsworthiness 
and conflicting privacy interests.192 Unfortunately, this rigidity 
also makes it difficult to apply these torts to modern information 
privacy problems.193 
                                                                                                     
 188. Richards, supra note 114, at 1198–99; see also SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, 
supra note 2, at 58; Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, at 1941; Schwartz & 
Solove, supra note 3, at 1820. 
 189. Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1889. 
 190. See id. at 1890 (“His skepticism about privacy, as well as his view that 
tort privacy lacked conceptual coherence, led him to categorize the law into a set 
of four narrow and rigid categories.”). 
 191. See id. at 1890, 1900 (describing Prosser’s concern that privacy law’s 
“haphazard development threatened to swallow up established doctrines, such 
as defamation law, as well as new doctrines, such as intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, that he felt had more promise”). The intrusion into seclusion 
tort includes, as its main element, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
but does not require a showing of extreme outrage, serious mental harm, or a 
showing that injuries were nontrivial. Id. at 1890. Prosser expressed concern 
that the false light and disclosure of private facts torts involved an examination 
of reputation, overlapping with defamation law. Id. Prosser was also concerned 
about privacy torts being overbroad and interfering with freedom of speech and 
of the press. Id. 
 192. See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, at 1956–57 (“Due to Prosser’s 
strong belief in liberal flows of information, moreover, his article reflects a 
strong undercurrent of skepticism about the legal protection of privacy.”). 
 193. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1904 (“[W]hile Prosser gave tort 
privacy a legitimacy it had previously lacked, he also fossilized it and eliminated 
its capacity to change and develop.”). But see Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, 
at 1929 (disagreeing with some of Richards and Solove’s criticism of Prosser, 
asserting that if it had not been for Prosser, privacy would likely be much less 
protected in the United States); id. at 1983 (“Rather than creating an ossified 
privacy concept, Prosser’s contribution generated useful doctrinal categories 
where there previously had been unclassified cases and a lingering air of 
skepticism towards the tort.”). 
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Breach of confidentiality has been described as a tort that 
addresses privacy violations in specific contexts.194 Though the 
concepts are related, Prosser did not include breach of 
confidentiality in his categories of privacy torts.195 This may be 
because Prosser drew a line between privacy and what would be 
addressed under agency or contract law. Compared to Warren 
and Brandeis, Prosser was also less focused on the idea of 
personality as a justification underlying privacy protections.196 
a. Prosser’s Privacy Torts and Information Privacy 
Prosser’s torts differ significantly from each other. In 
Prosser’s article, he points out that intrusion and disclosure both 
require an invasion into something secret, which is not required 
of false light or appropriation.197 Disclosure and false light have 
publicity as an essential element, while intrusion and 
appropriation do not (though appropriation usually involves 
publicity).198 Additionally, only false light requires falsity, and 
only appropriation requires that the defendant have gained some 
advantage from the use.199 
The tort of appropriation has evolved somewhat from 
Prosser’s time. When Prosser originally wrote Privacy, he noted 
                                                                                                     
 194. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 77 (“The common law tort 
of breach of confidentiality . . . enables people to sue for damages when a party 
breaches a contractual obligation (often implied rather than express) to 
maintain confidentiality.”). 
 195. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1909 (“A second notable 
omission from Prosser’s taxonomy was the tort of breach of confidence.”). In 
Prosser’s treatise, Prosser addressed this concern by stating, “The right of 
privacy, as such, is to be distinguished from liability found upon the breach of 
some confidential or fiduciary relation . . . .” Id. at 1910 (quoting WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1062 (1st ed. 1941)). 
 196. One of Prosser’s contemporaries was Edward Bloustein, who differed 
from Prosser in the degree to which the former argued for the idea that privacy 
law protects an “inviolate personality.” Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, at 
1945. 
 197. See Prosser, supra note 187, at 407 (discussing and defining common 
facets of privacy).  
 198. See id. (examining false light in relation to privacy generally).  
 199. See id. (discussing false light in detail). 
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that under the common law, all four of the recognized categories 
of privacy claims were specific to the individual and were not 
assignable, though three states at the time did recognize under 
statute that a publication-based claim could be brought after a 
person’s death.200 On the other hand, the modern right of 
appropriation allows a likeness to be treated as descendible 
property.201 
These torts have questionable utility in the modern context 
of information privacy. The privacy tort of invasion typically 
requires the invasion to be of an offensive nature, but a lot of 
information collection appears largely innocuous.202 In Shibley v. 
Time, Inc.,203 the litigation concerned the magazine’s sale of their 
subscriber information to advertisers, but this sale was found to 
not meet the injury requirements for Ohio’s common law invasion 
of privacy tort.204 Courts have also rejected the theory that the 
tort of appropriation could apply to the data collection problem.205 
Thus, it is likely that addressing personal privacy issues will 
require either the revision of privacy torts or the introduction of 
new alternatives. 
3. Modern Informational Privacy Theory 
While there are many types of privacy, the type that we are 
most concerned with is informational privacy and the right of a 
person to keep information about herself from being used by 
                                                                                                     
 200. See id. at 408 (discussing the qualities of invasion that would constitute 
a tort). 
 201. See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, at 1965 (“The overwhelming 
majority of states in the United States have also recognized a postmortem 
dimension to the publicity right.”). Schwartz and Peifer point to the example of 
Elvis, whose publicity rights have been sold and resold multiple times since his 
death. Id. at 1966. 
 202. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1919 (stating that many 
“privacy torts—public disclosure, intrusion, and false light” require a showing 
that the privacy invasion be highly offensive). 
 203. Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). 
 204. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1919. 
 205. Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) 
(ruling that there was not an appropriation claim when American Express sold 
customer names to merchants); Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1919. 
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others. Our understanding of informational privacy in the 
modern context also needs to take social norms into 
consideration. In the United States, the younger generation 
seems to value privacy much less than the older generations,206 
though some empirical research casts doubt on the idea that 
there is a meaningful difference between how different age 
groups view and prioritize privacy.207 Solove has become a leader 
in modern informational privacy theory, with some scholars 
asserting that Solove is Prosser’s modern heir.208 Not entirely 
dissimilar from Prosser’s approach, Solove divides privacy 
problems into four categories: information collection, information 
processing, information dissemination, and invasion.209  
Informational privacy implicates the potentially conflicting 
interests of content owners and content users. If protections of 
personal privacy are too strong, businesses that use customer 
information to target people who would be interested in a new 
product may be prevented from doing so. There are some First 
Amendment concerns as well. Chiefly among them is to what 
extent do I have the right to use the law and the courts to prevent 
you from speaking about me?210 There is also a question of 
accountability to prevent legitimate privacy regulation from 
applying in ways that are not optimal for society.211 
Schwartz argues that privacy is a “constitutive value” that is 
valuable not for its own virtues or effects, but because some 
degree of protection for personal privacy is a necessary condition 
                                                                                                     
 206. See Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note 157, at 736–37 (“Generational 
differences in the taste for privacy may be significant in the United States, as 
younger Americans appear to be learning to live reasonably well and happily 
without privacy.”). 
 207. Hoofnagle, King, Li & Turow, supra note 109, at 20. 
 208. See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 164, at 1940 (“In this sense, Daniel 
Solove proves the modern heir of the Berkeley Dean.”). 
 209. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 111, at 489. 
 210. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The 
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 
STANFORD L. REV. 1049, 1049 (2000). 
 211. See Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 861 (citing Schwartz for two 
important normative questions facing contemporary privacy theorists: how to 
protect privacy while preserving accountability, and the appropriate role of the 
state in regulating personal privacy). 
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for a society that values individual identities and deliberative 
democracy.212 Taking the view that privacy is of vital importance, 
Allen argues that privacy can be lost through voluntarily giving it 
up, and that this raises similar moral and policy implications as 
someone who voluntarily sells himself into slavery.213 In the same 
way that people are forced to be free by being prohibited from 
selling themselves into slavery, Allen argues that people should 
be forced to be private to better allow them to “reap the full 
dignitarian and political consequences of privacy.”214 
a. Concepts of Privacy 
Different approaches to privacy find the value of privacy in 
different things. Under a communitarian view of privacy, privacy 
is valuable because it protects a social good by allowing citizens to 
more effectively participate in a deliberative democracy.215 The 
liberal approach to privacy focuses on the individual and on 
personal autonomy.216 A liberal concept of privacy could be 
                                                                                                     
 212. See Schwartz, State, supra note 175, at 834 (“Informational privacy, 
whether on or off the Internet, should not be considered a right of control. 
Instead, it should be conceptualized as a constitutive value.”). A constitutive 
value is one that derives its value not from the causal effects of the value’s 
existence or from the existence of the value for its own sake, but for its role in “a 
larger complex that is itself valued.” GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 80 (1988). The value of privacy is occasionally the 
subject of discussion, with some scholars asserting that privacy is not generally 
worth protecting except for people who have something to hide. JEFFREY H. 
REIMAN, CRITICAL MORAL LIBERALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 171 (1997). 
 213. See Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 869 (discussing the moral 
and political implications associated with privacy loss). Allen has also examined 
whether people could be forced to be private in the same way they can be forced 
to be free. See Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note 157, at 728 (“We are forced to 
be free. Liberal governments cannot permit us to sell ourselves into slavery. Are 
we forced to be private?”). 
 214. Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note 157, at 752. 
 215. See Schwartz, State, supra note 175, at 836 (“In searching for ways to 
construct this strong democracy, these thinkers emphasize common 
participatory activities, reciprocal respect among political equals, and the 
development of consensus about political issues.”). 
 216. See Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note 157, at 739 (“Liberal moral 
philosophers maintain that respecting the many forms of privacy is paramount 
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further broken down into categories including physical privacy, 
informational privacy, proprietary privacy, and decisional 
privacy.217 
Some view control over data as central to privacy.218 Solove 
points to the lack of control over data as one of the systemic 
problems that enables identity theft.219 One potential privacy 
right related to controlling data is a right to prevent access to the 
data.220 After personal information is collected, the person to 
whom the information refers typically has no control over future 
use of the information.221 Even if courts or policy makers decree 
that a person has a “right” to control his personal data, he still 
may lack the ability to meaningfully control his information.222 
Our recommendations address similar issues under the broad 
label of “data control,” including the need for data mobility and a 
right of data withdrawal. 
It is unlikely that an individual will ever be able to exercise 
absolute control over his data. The government can readily access 
                                                                                                     
to respect for human dignity, personhood, moral autonomy, workable 
community life, and tolerant democratic political and legal institutions.”). 
 217. Id. at 723–25. Allen notes that the concept of “private choice” is 
stronger than the general liberal concept of “privacy.” Id. at 727–28. Allen 
defines informational privacy in this way: “Informational privacy obtains where 
information actually exists in a state of inaccessibility, whether it is locked in a 
file drawer, computer, or in someone’s mind. Anonymity, confidentiality, 
reserve, and secrecy—not merely having the choice to bring these about—are 
forms of privacy.” Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 869. 
 218. See Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 863 (defining privacy as 
data control, and the right to privacy as the right to control, and asserting that 
the central aim of privacy regulation should be to promote individuals’ right to 
control their personal data). 
 219. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1258 (“Therefore, the 
problem runs deeper than identity theft. It is the fact that we have so little 
participation in our personal data combined with the fact that it flows so 
insecurely and carelessly without sufficient control.”). 
 220. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 344 (“There are two 
principal understandings of the right to privacy in personal data: privacy as a 
right to control data (‘privacy as control’) and privacy as a right to prevent 
access (‘privacy as access’).”). 
 221. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1234 (“[P]ersonal 
information is not only outside our control but also is subjected to a bureaucratic 
process that is itself not adequately controlled.” (citation omitted)). 
 222. Id. 
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individuals’ financial information, and medical privacy is subject 
to the sharing of medical information between medical 
professionals and health insurance companies.223 It is thus 
probably fair to say that to the extent that privacy involves the 
control of data, this control is qualified in certain circumstances. 
In the online context, Schwartz goes so far as to say that control 
over personal information on the Internet is an illusion.224 When 
consumers are presented with take-it-or-leave-it TOS agreements 
on websites, there is typically no negotiation of terms, and thus 
no ability to exercise meaningful control.225 Schwartz argues that 
informational privacy is not just a matter of having a right to 
control, but instead is a matter of line drawing to shape behaviors 
and thus either encouraging or discouraging the use of certain 
categories of expression and action.226 
b. The First Amendment Critique 
Some argue that a right of “data privacy” would conflict with 
the First Amendment by interfering with the dissemination of 
truthful information.227 Volokh is the most prominent proponent 
of the First Amendment critique, arguing that data privacy 
regulation amounts to “a right to have the government stop you 
                                                                                                     
 223. See Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 872 (discussing moral 
accountability, control, and privacy). However, though the federal government 
may have access to detailed financial records, this does not necessarily mean 
that the government can then disclose the information. In Wine Hobby USA, 
Inc. v. IRS, the court declined to order the government to disclose registered 
home wine producers under FOIA, concluding that such a disclosure would 
violate the registered parties’ privacy. Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. United States 
IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 135 (3d Cir. 1974); Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 
873–74. 
 224. See Schwartz, State, supra note 175, at 832 (arguing that simply 
declaring a property right in personal information will not resolve any of the 
major issues relating to information privacy); see also Allen, Data Control, supra 
note 154, at 869 (discussing the limits burdening the privacy control paradigm). 
 225. Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1235. 
 226. See Schwartz, State, supra note 175, at 858 (“As a result, information 
privacy should not create data fortresses, but shifting multidimensional data 
preserves that insulate personal data from different kinds of observation by 
different parties.”). 
 227. Richards, supra note 114, at 1150–51. 
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from speaking about me.”228 Cate argues that there should be full 
First Amendment protection for electronic information flows, and 
that truthful data should be allowed to flow unimpeded to 
prevent violations of the First Amendment.229 Richards counters 
these arguments, arguing that data privacy properly concerns 
economic rights, and that bringing the First Amendment into the 
debate wrongly makes it into a civil rights issue.230 Richards also 
points out that the First Amendment critique is weak because it 
does not consider the many types of “speech” that are outside the 
First Amendment’s protection, like fraud, solicitation, antitrust 
law, threats, and libel.231  
There is some case law support for the First Amendment 
critique. In U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC,232 the Tenth Circuit analyzed 
the constitutionality of the FCC’s interpretation of a statutory 
confidentiality provision, which required customers to opt in 
before a carrier would be permitted to share the customers’ 
confidential information.233 In that case, the Tenth Circuit stated 
that privacy “imposes real costs on society.”234 The court 
concluded that the opt-in regime for the sharing of confidential 
                                                                                                     
 228. See Volokh, supra note 210, at 1050–51; see also Richards, supra note 
114, at 1161 (discussing the First Amendment and privacy regulation (citation 
omitted)). 
 229. FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1–4 (1997); Richards, 
supra note 114, at 1161. 
 230. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1151 (“This Article takes issue with 
the conventional wisdom that regulating databases regulates speech, that the 
First Amendment is thus in conflict with the right of data privacy, and that the 
Constitution thereby imposes an insuperable barrier to basic efforts to tackle 
the database problem.”). 
 231. See id. at 1171–73 (discussing the fact that much “speech” is outside 
the scope of the First Amendment and providing an alternative approach). 
 232. U.S. West, Inc. v. F.C.C., 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 233. See id. at 1230. 
 234. See id. at 1235 (stating that privacy does not inherently constitute a 
substantial state interest for First Amendment commercial speech analysis 
purposes, and further justification is required). As part of its analysis, the court 
concluded that the FCC’s regulation was not narrowly tailored because it did not 
adequately consider a less restrictive alternative, specifically an opt-out regime. 
Id. at 1238–39. 
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information promulgated by the FCC violated the First 
Amendment commercial speech rights of the carriers.235 
Ultimately, the First Amendment critique has many flaws, 
but it illustrates the sort of theoretical balancing that Prosser, 
Warren, and Brandeis were concerned about. Whether 
informational privacy is truly more of an economic or First 
Amendment issue is outside the scope of our research. We 
mention the First Amendment critique here only to emphasize 
that the balancing of interests is a pervasive theme in discussions 
of privacy theory. 
c. Privacy as a Commodity 
Some theorists have suggested understanding privacy as a 
property right.236 Property can be described as an interest in an 
object in which the owner can enforce that interest against all 
others.237 To law students, the concept of property is often 
described as a bundle of rights. A lot of property is freely 
alienable; that is, it can be sold, traded, and gifted as the owner 
sees fit.238 Some property, like human tissue, can be donated but 
not sold.239 With regard to privacy, views differ about the extent 
to which privacy should be alienable at all.240 Some scholars 
advocate propertizing personal information, while others 
                                                                                                     
 235. See id. at 1230, 1240. 
 236. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 77 (noting that Alan 
Westin took this view). But see Schwartz, State, supra note 175, at 832 (arguing 
that simply declaring a property right in personal information will not resolve 
any of the major issues relating to information privacy). 
 237. Schwartz, Property, supra note 10, at 2058. 
 238. One scholarly definition of inalienabilities posits that inalienabilities 
amount to “any restriction[s] on the transferability, ownership, or use of an 
entitlement.” Id. at 2095 (citing Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the 
Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931 (1985)). 
 239. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 498 (Cal. 1990) 
(Arabian, J., concurring) (viewing the question of property rights in human 
tissue as a moral issue). 
 240. For example, Allen argues that privacy should not be viewed as 
optional, and that people should be restrained from trading away their privacy 
because of privacy’s importance in a society that values personal identity. Allen, 
Coercing Privacy, supra note 157, at 729. 
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advocate an outright ban on data trade.241 Schwartz suggests a 
category that he calls “information property,” which is itself a 
bundle of interests made up of five areas: “inalienabilities, 
defaults, rights of exit, damages, and institutions.”242 
Allen argues that the expectations of people with regard to 
privacy have been decreasing, with people being willing to 
prioritize informational privacy lower than they prioritize other 
goods.243 There is also some disconnect between what people say 
they want in terms of privacy, and then what people actually do, 
often being quick to accept something in exchange for their 
personal information.244 Currently, no value is consistently 
assigned to personal information, and Schwartz suggests that 
this lack of a value contributes to the lack of appreciation that 
people have for their private data.245 
                                                                                                     
 241. See Schwartz, Property, supra note 10, at 2057 (recognizing that “a 
strong conception of personal data as a commodity is emerging in the United 
States” but that some legal scholars have been “suspicious of treating personal 
data as a form of property”). 
 242. Id. at 2060. Schwartz suggests implementing a system that has use-
transfer restrictions and an opt-in default. See id. (“This Article’s model of 
propertized personal data involves the development of a hybrid inalienability 
consisting of a use-transfer restriction plus an opt-in default.”). 
 243. See Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note 157, at 729–30 (arguing that 
consumer behavior and popular culture show that people prefer less privacy 
when using technology than other goods). Allen also notes that because of the 
deprioritizing of privacy, people may be more willing to trade privacy for things 
like entertainment, personal profit, medical care, and access to a certain 
community. See Allen, Data Control, supra note 154, at 871 (noting that people 
may disclose private information for various benefits and in doing so either send 
strong messages to policymakers that people do not value privacy in their 
technological encounters or stimulate them to paternalistically “coerce” privacy). 
An antipaternalist approach to privacy would say that privacy is a good if people 
desire it, but that it should not be forced upon them. On the other hand, the 
paternalist approach would impose privacy on people who might not want it. 
There are a number of laws that mandate privacy, like laws requiring people to 
wear clothes in public and building codes regulating the placement and design 
of residential housing. See id. (noting that the idea of privacy coercion is not 
foreign in American law). 
 244. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 80–81 (noting that, 
despite people’s reflexive desire to protect their private data, most people take 
minimal precautions and would relinquish their data for money). 
 245. See Schwartz, Property, supra note 10, at 2076 (noting a higher 
appreciation for one’s personal data may accompany higher market value for it). 
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In their book, Hagel and Singer proposed the use of 
“infomediaries,” a label used to describe companies that would 
serve as intermediaries between consumers and companies that 
collect their data.246 While discussion of this idea has not been 
pervasive over the last decade, the ideas underlying it form the 
basis for some start-up companies.247 Though the impact of such 
efforts has not yet been seen, infomediaries might be an effective 
private market solution to the problems related to the decline of 
privacy on the Internet, provided it does not prove 
counterproductive to view privacy as a commodity. In a similar 
vein, Ayres and Funk have suggested implementing a system for 
telemarketers in which telemarketing is shifted to an opt-in 
paradigm in which customers can opt in to be contacted and are 
also compensated for receiving telemarketing calls.248 Solove 
argues that compensation for information would not solve the 
problem, however, arguing that the real problem is a lack of 
control over data, lack of meaningful participation in the process, 
and lack of transparency about future data use.249 
B. Privacy Law 
Because intrusions into privacy on the Web are so prevalent, 
some argue that the government should regulate the Internet to 
promote consumer privacy, but others worry that this could harm 
                                                                                                     
 246. See JOHN HAGEL III & MARC SINGER, NET WORTH: SHAPING MARKETS 
WHEN CUSTOMERS MAKE THE RULES 28 (1999) (suggesting a role of 
intermediaries in helping consumers obtain the most value in exchange for their 
personal information and also protecting that information from being abused). 
 247. See Joshua Brustein, Start-Ups Seek to Help Users Put a Price on Their 
Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at B3 (noting the existence of start-
ups that would allow people to control and maybe even profit from their “digital 
trails”). 
 248. See Schwartz, Property, supra note 10, at 2079 (noting that 
telemarketing is presently inefficient because it reaches an “excessively broad 
audience” and suggesting that opt-in programs would “add incentives to target 
likely customers”). 
 249. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 89–90 (noting that, if 
people only have the right to sell their data, the result is an “all or nothing” 
exchange in which the consumer is not left with a viable choice between the two 
alternatives). 
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the online advertising industry and other interests.250 In this 
subpart, we will first review some of the issues that emerge when 
discussing privacy regulation, before turning to existing bodies of 
law to evaluate the extent to which data control issues, like data 
mobility and data withdrawal, may fall within current law. 
1. Steps Toward Regulation of Privacy 
When a social issue has to be addressed, there are two 
primary options: address the problem through the market and 
self-regulation, or have the government regulate it. The 
dichotomy of self-regulation versus government regulation also 
arises in the privacy context. Some say that the government 
should not regulate privacy, suggesting that it would be too 
paternalistic to assume that the government knows best, though 
others argue that self-regulation is not a viable option because of 
the lack of mechanisms in the market to enable the exercise of 
informed, meaningful choices by individuals.251  
There are a number of arguments in favor of self-regulation 
of privacy issues online. Birnhack and Elkin-Koren concluded 
from their data that law was not important in the shaping of 
website behavior and privacy practices, suggesting the market 
forces may be more effective than law at protecting privacy.252 
Others say that rules to protect privacy could have negative 
                                                                                                     
 250. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 34 (noting that Internet tracking and 
selling of personal data has pushed the government to promote greater 
consumer privacy and others to seek relief through the courts, resulting in 
sizable awards). 
 251. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 90–91 (recognizing that 
although proponents of market-based solutions to privacy concerns criticize the 
government for paternalism, the market fails to provide adequate mechanisms 
for the protection of privacy). 
 252. Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 378 (arguing that the “law 
does not appear to play an important role” in Israeli Internet privacy practices). 
However, the authors do not think that law is completely irrelevant, arguing 
that there is a circular relationship between privacy regulations and what 
amounts to a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” See id. at 379 (“In the United 
States, data protection law plays another role. Given . . . the ‘reasonable 
expectations’ test within U.S. privacy law, concrete regulations help shape these 
expectations . . . . The fact that the law requires certain measures has a large 
effect on data subjects’ expectations and . . . the reasonability of expectations.”). 
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effects like decreasing the information available and increasing 
transaction costs.253 If the private resolutions to privacy conflicts 
are preferred, Solove suggests that fiduciary relationships could 
be recognized under the law when a company collects and uses 
personal information.254 
On the other hand, government intervention can be very 
helpful in advancing change. Consider, for example, the 
importance of civil rights legislation in ending institutional 
segregation. If remedying discrimination had been left to the 
market to self-regulate, improvements may have been much 
slower. With respect to online privacy, we disagree with the 
conclusions of Birnhack and Elkin-Koren concerning the value of 
government oversight, and assert that the enforcement part of 
the law is of the utmost importance and was not something that 
these researchers examined in adequate detail.255 Additionally, 
while it is true that government regulation might have negative 
effects, this is just as true of trusting market self-regulation. In 
virtually any context, when faced with multiple options, there 
will be potential downsides to every option. Thus, the most 
important thing is to balance the positive and negative.  
Fair Information Practices (FIPs) are often referenced as a 
guide for privacy regulations. When examining the core principles 
of privacy regimes of different governments, some patterns 
emerge, including an emphasis on notice, confidentiality, and 
data security.256 These principles also underlie the idea of FIPs, 
which address how to handle and use personal information,257 
and often focus on responsibility and participation in the 
collection and use of data.258 The Federal Trade Commission 
                                                                                                     
 253. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1159–60 (noting that this is the view of 
some law and economics scholars). 
 254. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 103 (recognizing that the 
disparities in knowledge between consumers and market participants of how 
consumer data is used may support a court’s finding of a fiduciary relationship). 
 255. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (discussing Birnhack and 
Elkin-Koren’s views on privacy law and the cloud). 
 256. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 350 (noting that 
foreign governments, like those of members of the European Union, exhibit data 
protection standards similar to those contained in U.S. law).  
 257. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1266 (describing FIPs). 
 258. See id. at 1268 (describing the two focuses of FIPs: responsibility and 
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(FTC) views FIPs as being based on five core principles: (1) notice 
and consumer awareness; (2) consumer choice and consent; 
(3) access and participation in the process; (4) data integrity and 
security; and (5) enforcement and redress.259 Schwartz and Solove 
suggest using FIPs to varying degrees, dependent on whether the 
personal information is identified or identifiable.260 
Whether new regulation is needed at all ultimately depends 
on whether the current regulatory scheme is too flawed to offer 
meaningful guidance. For this reason, we turn now to an 
examination of current U.S. privacy law.  
2. Federal Privacy Statutes and State Laws 
Federal privacy law focusing on consumer protection is 
typically narrow, often focusing on the type of records in issue or 
a particular industry.261 Early congressional action on privacy 
includes the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)262 in 1970 and the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)263 in 
1974.264 Other federal statutes addressing specific privacy issues 
                                                                                                     
participation); SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 105 (same). 
 259. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 
(1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23.shtm (reporting 
to Congress on five core principles of privacy protection). 
 260. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1880–81 (suggesting that, for 
example, full notice, access, and correction rights would probably not be 
necessary if only identifiable data is at issue, whereas FIPs concerning data 
quality, data security, and transparency should apply to both identified and 
identifiable data). 
 261. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 71 (“Thus, the federal 
privacy statutes form a complicated patchwork of regulation with significant 
gaps and omissions.”); see also Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 349 
(describing the focus of U.S. privacy laws in contrast to EU systems). 
 262. 15 U.S.C. § 168b (2006). 
 263. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006). 
 264. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1821 (explaining the history of 
congressional action on privacy laws). FCRA applies to consumer reporting 
agencies that furnish consumer reports about the creditworthiness or personal 
characteristics of a consumer, and limits the circumstances and purposes under 
which consumer reports may be provided to other parties. See id. (explaining the 
scope of FCRA). The focus of FERPA is student privacy, and it is the first federal 
statute that uses the term “personally identifiable information.” See id. at 1822–
23 (explaining the historical context of FERPA). 
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include the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),265 
the Health Information Portability and Accessibility Act 
(HIPAA),266 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA),267 and the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA).268 Several 
federal statutes focus on the presence of personally identifiable 
information (PII),269 while others focus on transparency and 
access to information,270 on protecting consumers from 
inappropriate use of their personal data,271 or on imposing duties 
of confidentiality.272 Federal statutes often include requirements 
for administrative agencies to promulgate regulations. HIPAA 
requires HHS to enact regulations to support the Act.273 Under 
                                                                                                     
 265. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 6501–6506 (2006) (preventing websites from, among other acts, collecting 
data from children using the Internet without giving notice of the type of data 
that will be collected, obtaining parental consent, and providing parents with an 
opportunity to refuse websites’ requests to collect data). 
 266. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 
U.S.C.) (providing the laws governing the privacy and security of health data, 
including guidelines for the collection of data related to electronic healthcare 
transactions). 
 267. See Electronic Commc’n Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 
Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2712 (2006)) (protecting 
wire, oral, and electronic communications while in transit, extending 
restrictions on government use of wire taps to computer-based communications, 
and preventing the government from accessing data on electronic storage 
devices under some circumstances). 
 268. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2006) (protecting financial data). 
 269. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1827 (explaining the differing 
focuses of electronic privacy legislation). Statutes concerned with PII include the 
Cable Communications Policy Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act, and the 
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act. See id. at 1824, 1829, 1830 (detailing the 
characteristics of CCPA, VPPA, and GLBA). 
 270. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 111, at 525 (listing the Privacy Act, 
CCPA, FCRA, and COPPA as examples). 
 271. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1167 (listing statutes that protect 
consumers’ PII from inappropriate uses); see also Kuner, Part 1, supra note 119, 
at 176 (“Data protection law gives rights to individuals in how data identifying 
them or pertaining to them are processed, and subjects such processing to a 
defined set of safeguards.”). 
 272. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1196 (listing statutes that impose 
confidentiality on handlers of PII). 
 273. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 44, at 297 (providing an example of a 
regulation promulgated under and supporting HIPAA (citation omitted)). 
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the GLBA, agencies regulating financial institutions are required 
to promulgate rules setting requirements for safeguarding 
customers’ personal information.274  
States also adopt their own privacy laws to protect 
consumers. For example, there is a statute in Massachusetts that 
requires detailed data security procedures,275 and forty-five states 
have statutes requiring customer notification in the event of a 
security breach.276 Minnesota has a merchant liability statute, 
under which a merchant can be held liable if there was a security 
breach and customer credit card information was insufficiently 
protected.277 California’s Song–Beverly Act278 protects PII by 
prohibiting merchants from requiring customers to give personal 
information like their address and phone number “as a condition 
to accepting the [customer’s] credit card.”279 
There are several federal statutes aimed at protecting 
children as a vulnerable population, including COPPA, FERPA, 
and the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment.280 COPPA 
                                                                                                     
 274. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1274 (explaining the 
GLBA). 
 275. See Denny, supra note 46, at 240 (explaining a Massachusetts Internet 
privacy law); see also Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 50–51 (describing the 
Massachusetts law as being controversial because of the high bar that it sets as 
a minimum threshold for security). 
 276. See Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 49–50 (explaining that most 
states have followed California’s passage of laws requiring businesses to notify 
customers in the event of a security breach); Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 
1884–85 (noting that forty-four states have enacted laws requiring that 
businesses notify customers when they experience a security breach). 
 277. See Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 50 (noting the existence of a 
Minnesota law imposing liability for negligent handling of consumer financial 
data). 
 278. Song–Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08 (2009). 
 279. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1831. The California Supreme 
Court also held that asking for a zip code would be sufficient to violate the 
Song–Beverly Act if the zip code was being requested as a condition of accepting 
a credit card. See Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 612 (Cal. 
2011) (“In light of the [Song–Beverly Act]’s plain language, protective purpose, 
and legislative history, we conclude a ZIP code constitutes ‘personal 
identification information’ as that phrase is used in section 1747.08. Thus, 
requesting and recording a cardholder’s ZIP code, without more, violates the 
Credit Card Act.”); see also Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1834 (explaining 
the outcome of Williams-Sonoma Stores). 
 280. See Cascia, supra note 17, at 891 (identifying federal laws that protect 
 
398 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341 (2013) 
imposes limitations on the types of information that a website 
may collect from children younger than thirteen, and privacy 
policies must address the website’s information collection 
practices with regard to children.281 COPPA explicitly spells out 
what elements are required for notice to be valid.282 There are 
also state laws aimed at protecting children’s online privacy, like 
a law in Maine that requires parental consent before someone 
collects, transfers, or sells a minor’s personal or health-related 
information for product promotion purposes.283 
Some privacy-related laws do not focus on consumer 
protection, but on procedural elements of government 
investigations. The Privacy Act of 1974284 regulates how federal 
agencies can collect and use personal records,285 the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001286 grants a right to the U.S. government to 
demand data in the interest of protecting homeland security,287 
and the ECPA sets out conditions under which the government 
can obtain a variety of electronic communications.288 Beyond 
statutes, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 
                                                                                                     
student privacy). 
 281. See id. at 892 (discussing COPPA). COPPA is why the terms of service 
or privacy policies in our sample typically contained language about not 
collecting data from or marketing to children under thirteen. FTC, Frequently 
Asked Questions about the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/coppafaqs.shtm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (answering 
common questions from website providers about how to keep within COPPA 
regulations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 282. See Schwartz, State, supra note 175, at 855 (describing ways that 
COPPA changed the previous practices of using data collected from children). 
 283. See Cascia, supra note 17, at 899 (discussing laws that states have 
enacted to support COPPA). 
 284. 5 U.S.C. § 522a (2006). 
 285. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 68 (describing the 
Privacy Act of 1974). The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 is similar and 
prohibits states from selling personal information from motor vehicle records to 
marketers. See id. at 69 (describing the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994). 
 286. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 367–68 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of U.S.C. (2006)). 
 287. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(j)(1) (2006); Lanois, supra note 18, at 45 (stating 
that the USA Patriot Act is a “hurdle to the international adoption of cloud 
computing” and explaining the Act’s expansion of federal power to collect data). 
 288. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (setting out procedures for compelling 
providers to disclose information). 
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searches and seizures.289 However, Fourth Amendment protection 
is also likely to be weaker in the cloud than it would be if the 
same information were stored solely on a personal computer in 
the suspect’s home.290 
a. Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
The ECPA was passed partly in response to the findings of 
the Office of Technology Assessment that the protections of e-
mails were “weak, ambiguous, or nonexistent.”291 The ECPA and 
a major update to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 
were both passed in 1986, though in subsequent decades, the 
criminal provisions of the CFAA have been expanded much more 
than the electronic privacy protection provisions of the ECPA.292  
The ECPA consists of three federal statutes: the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA),293 the Pen Register statute,294 and 
the Wiretap Act.295 Its protections supplement those of the Fourth 
                                                                                                     
 289. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
 290. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 386–87 (noting that law enforcement 
agencies have “essentially deputized” technology companies to monitor end-
users’ use of their applications operating on the cloud). 
 291. Kattan, supra note 8, at 627–28. 
 292. See Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 912 (2003) 
(noting that the CFAA was amended eight times between 1986 and 2003); see 
also Martin, supra note 44, at 308 (listing provisions of the Act that criminalize 
Internet-based conduct); Robison, supra note 4, at 1196 (describing the ECPA 
and one component thereof called the Stored Communications Act (SCA)). 
 293. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–10 (2006). 
 294. Id. §§ 3121–27. 
 295. See id. §§ 2510–22; see also Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The 
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Google, National Security, and Digital Papers 
and Effects, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153, 167 (2011) (identifying the three 
parts of the statute and highlighting court decisions that have interpreted the 
statute); Casey Perry, U.S. v. Warshak: Will Fourth Amendment Protection Be 
Delivered to Your Inbox?, 12 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 345, 349 (2011) (identifying the 
three parts of the statute and explaining the contents of the SCA). A “pen 
register” is a device that records phone numbers dialed, though the language of 
the statute also applies to other technological means. See “Pen Registers” and 
“Trap and Trace Devices,” ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE 
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Amendment.296 The application of each depends on what type of 
information is sought and where it is in the transmission 
process.297 The Wiretap Act covers interception of wire, oral, and 
electronic communications.298 Under the Wiretap Act, obtaining 
e-mail contents in real time requires a Title III order to be issued 
with Department of Justice (DOJ) approval and a grant by a 
federal judge, and the order must be renewed every thirty days.299 
Under the Pen Register statute, obtaining real time subscriber 
data requires an ex parte pen register order.300 Stored electronic 
information and the requirements for obtaining each type are 
addressed under the SCA,301 which we analyze in more detail in 
the section below.  
                                                                                                     
PROJECT, https://ssd.eff.org/wire/govt/pen-registers (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) 
(defining pen registers and trap and trace devices and explaining how they are 
used) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 296. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 167 (explaining the ECPA’s expansion of 
the Fourth Amendment’s general requirement of warranted searches); see also 
Perry, supra note 295, at 349 (noting that the ECPA supplements the Fourth 
Amendment). Congress had two main purposes when it adopted the SCA as part 
of the ECPA: to address privacy concerns that might hinder technological 
development, and to apply Fourth Amendment privacy principles to computer 
networks. Robison, supra note 4, at 1224 (identifying the two primary purposes 
behind the SCA). The legislative history of the SCA indicates that Congress 
acknowledged that e-mail and computer networks were analogous to first class 
mail. See id. at 1106, 1225 (explaining the legislative history of the Act and 
noting that Congress analogized e-mail to traditional postal mail). 
 297. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, 
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1231 
(2004) (defining the legal difference between stored communications and 
communications in transit). The Wiretap Act’s requirement for a search warrant 
is stronger than the requirements under the SCA, so law enforcement personnel 
arguably have incentives to use the SCA’s retrospective authority instead of 
complying with the Wiretap Act for prospective surveillance. See id. at 1232 
(explaining a possible weakness in the SCA’s privacy framework and court 
action on the issue). 
 298. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 411 (explaining the coverage of the 
Wiretap Act). 
 299. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006) (mandating procedures for the interception 
of electronic communications with a pen register); Bagley, supra note 295, at 
179 (explaining the procedures provided by the pen register statute). 
 300. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (setting out procedures for obtaining pen register 
or trap and trace device orders); Bagley, supra note 295, at 179 (explaining the 
procedures provided by the pen register statute). 
 301. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 179 (explaining the procedures provided 
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(1) Stored Communications Act 
The status of the SCA is problematic because much of the 
language is very unclear or outdated and interpretations of the 
statute by courts have varied significantly.302 The two most 
important sections for our purposes are: (1) § 2702, which 
addresses the circumstances under which a provider can 
voluntarily disclose customer information to others;303 and 
(2) § 2703, which addresses how the government can compel a 
provider to produce stored information.304 This sounds simple 
enough, but there are so many exceptions, subcategories, and 
additional requirements that the statute quickly becomes 
unwieldy. For example, one commonly referenced exception to the 
prohibition on disclosure allows for disclosure when the 
subscriber or customer (depending on the type of service) 
consents to disclosure,305 but the question then arises as to what 
actions can amount to consent. For example, is it consent under 
                                                                                                     
by the SCA). 
 302. See Kerr, supra note 297, at 1208 (calling the statute “dense and 
confusing” as well as “outdated”); Perry, supra note 295, at 361 n.82 (noting that 
although most believe that the SCA deals with retrospective surveillance only, 
the court in Warshak stated that the language of the statute on its face does not 
compel this reading (citing United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 290 (6th 
Cir. 2010))); see also Soma, Gates, & Smith, supra note 16, at 526–27 
(suggesting that incremental changes to the ECPA could help address these 
issues). 
 303. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (establishing prohibitions on the disclosure of 
customer data and establishing exceptions to these prohibitions). 
 304. See id. § 2703 (outlining cases in which the government can require 
disclosure of customer communications or records); see also Perry, supra note 
295, at 350–51 (explaining the effect of §§ 2702 and 2703 of the SCA). 
 305. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2006) (providing the consent exception). 
While one might assume that the originator and subscriber would be the same 
person, this is not always so, such as in the 9th Circuit case of Quon v. Arch 
Wireless, in which the issue was whether the employer-subscriber’s consent for 
Arch Wireless to disclose the contents of text messages was valid, or if the 
messaging service was an ECS, and thus the originator or recipient (in this case, 
the employee Quon) would have to consent for the disclosure to be valid under 
this exception. Quon v. Arch Wireless, 529 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008) (ruling 
that summary judgment for Arch Wireless on employee-plaintiffs’ claim of 
nonconsent was improper because a genuine dispute of material fact existed as 
to whether Arch was a “remote computing service” as opposed to an “electronic 
communication service” under SCA Sections 2701–2711). 
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the SCA to accept the terms of a very broad privacy policy 
without reading these terms? Another exception in § 2702 that 
raises new questions in the cloud computing context is the 
exception for disclosure to persons who provide the service.306 The 
definition of remote computing service in the Wiretap Act 
supplements this exception, permitting service providers to 
monitor activities on their networks in real time.307 This 
exception allows private employers to internally share 
information about the online activities of employees when the 
employer provides these services in-house,308 but will employers 
lose the right to monitor their employees’ online activities if they 
outsource IT to a cloud service provider? There is also some 
possible overlap between compelled and voluntary disclosures, 
such as when the government merely tells the provider about an 
ongoing investigation, and then the provider gives the 
government relevant information without a formal request being 
made for the information.309 In such circumstances, which set of 
exceptions or requirements should apply? 
To determine the propriety of a disclosure under the SCA, 
the government must first determine whether the sought 
information is stored as part of an electronic communications 
                                                                                                     
 306. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(4) (providing the service provider exception). 
 307. See id. § 2711(2) (defining RCS and excluding from limitations on 
interception devices such as those “being used by a provider of wire or electronic 
communication service in the ordinary course of its business”); Kerr, supra note 
297, at 1226–27 (explaining the advantages of a narrow definition of RCS for 
nonpublic service providers that want to monitor their networks); see also Soma, 
Gates, & Smith, supra note 16, at 516 (noting problems with the ECS/RCS 
dichotomy when applied to service providers that outsource their 
communications services). 
 308. See Soma, Gates, & Smith, supra note 16, at 516, 521 (“The key to legal 
[e-messaging] monitoring by closed community service providers, such as 
employers, is providing notice and [obtaining] consent.” (internal quotations and 
citation omitted)). 
 309. See Kerr, supra note 297, at 1224–25 (calling this overlap a “gray 
zone”). Kerr offers up these examples: If an ISP finds files and contacts law 
enforcement pursuant to one of the exceptions in § 2702, but the ISP requests a 
subpoena before turning over the files so that it has a paper trail, is that 
voluntary or compelled? On the other hand, if the police contact an ISP and ask 
the ISP if they would like to help in the investigation of a child molester, and 
the ISP says yes and turns over its files, is that voluntary or compelled? See id. 
(providing examples of the gray zone). 
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service (ECS) or a remote computing service (RCS). An ECS is 
defined as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability 
to send or receive wire or electronic communications,”310 while an 
RCS is defined as a “provision to the public of computer storage 
or processing services by means of an electronic communications 
system.”311 In the provisions prohibiting voluntary disclosure, 
ECS providers are prohibited from knowingly disclosing 
communication contents that the provider holds in “electronic 
storage,”312 and RCS providers are prohibited from knowingly 
disclosing communication contents that the provider maintains 
for the sole purpose of providing the subscriber or customer with 
“storage or computer processing services.”313 Some cases have 
thus turned on a party’s ability to establish the difference 
between when communications are in “electronic storage” and 
when communications are just in “storage.”314 
The process required to obtain information also varies with 
the type of information sought, with notice required prior to the 
disclosure of some information types, some of which require a 
warrant, while others require a special court order under 
§ 2703(d), and still others require only a subpoena.315 These three 
                                                                                                     
 310. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). 
 311. Id. § 2711(2). 
 312. Id. § 2510(17) (defining “Electronic storage” as: “(A) any temporary, 
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the 
electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by 
an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such 
communication”). Intermediate storage is thus covered by the ECS rules, while 
long-term storage is covered by the RCS rules. Kerr, supra note 297, at 1216 
(noting that intermediate storage is covered under the ECS rules and long-term 
storage is covered by the RCS rules). 
 313. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006) (mandating restrictions on providers of 
RCS). Insofar as RCS providers are prohibited from disclosing contents held for 
“storage or computer processing” purposes, these protections go away if the 
provider is authorized to access the communication contents for any purpose 
other than “storage or computer processing.” See id. § 2702(a)(2)(B) (delineating 
the scope and context of the prohibition). 
 314. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(reversing dismissal of plaintiff’s claim that an Internet service provider 
disclosed e-mails in violation of the SCA on the grounds that the e-mail 
messages were in “electronic storage” and therefore afforded SCA protections); 
see also Kerr, supra note 297, at 1229 (discussing the Theofel case). 
 315. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (requiring, for example, a warrant for disclosure of 
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methods of compelling information are listed in descending order 
of the strength of the showing required to obtain them. To obtain 
a § 2703(d) court order, the governmental entity must show 
“specific and articulable facts” establishing “reasonable grounds” 
to believe that the information sought is “relevant and material 
to an ongoing criminal investigation.”316 This standard is less 
than the “probable cause” standard for obtaining a warrant, but 
greater than the “reasonable relevance” standard for obtaining a 
subpoena.317 The type of information sought also determines 
whether a § 2703(d) order or subpoena must be accompanied by 
prior notice to the target.318 For example, the statute explicitly 
states that only a subpoena, and no prior notice to the customer, is 
required to compel an ECS or RCS provider to disclose 
noncontent, basic subscriber information, including the customer’s 
name, address, phone records (including session times and 
durations), length and type of service, phone number, and how the 
customer pays for the service.319 Most of this same noncontent 
subscriber information, it should be noted, can be freely disclosed 
                                                                                                     
contents of electronic communications in storage or a subpoena with prior notice 
from the governmental entity seeking disclosure, a court order for disclosure of 
electronic communications in an RCS, and a subpoena for disclosure of records 
concerning an ECS or RCS). 
 316. Id. § 2703(d). 
 317. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Kattan, supra note 8, at 631 (discussing the 
reasonable relevance standard); Kerr, supra note 297, at 1218–19 (discussing 
the specific and articulable facts requirement).  
 318. See Kattan, supra note 8, at 629–30 (noting that different requirements 
pursuant to a demand for disclosure exist depending on the way information is 
stored). The SCA also permits notice to be delayed in certain circumstances. See 
18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(2) (allowing the delay of notice when prompt notice would 
“[endanger] the life or physical safety of an individual; [risk] flight from 
prosecution; [lead to] destruction of or tampering with evidence; [lead to] 
intimidation of potential witnesses; or otherwise seriously [jeopardize] an 
investigation or unduly [delay] a trial”). 
 319. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2006) (detailing instances when the 
government has the power to require a provider of ECS or RCS to disclose 
records related to a subscriber or customer of its services); Kerr, supra note 297, 
at 1219 (explaining the disclosure rules that cover records). Information about 
how a customer pays for the service can include disclosure of the customer’s 
credit card or bank account numbers. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (allowing a 
government entity to compel disclosure of credit card information). 
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to nongovernmental entities pursuant to an explicit exception in 
the voluntary disclosure provisions.320 
Considering the many avenues for uncertainty within the 
SCA, it should come as no surprise that disclosures under the 
SCA are often a source of contention. A disclosure in violation of 
the SCA may give rise to a civil cause of action.321 However, good 
faith reliance on a seemingly lawful document compelling 
disclosure acts as a complete defense to a civil action against a 
provider who is compelled to disclose communications.322  
(2) Applying the SCA to the Cloud 
Orin Kerr has written a very detailed and well-received 
article analyzing and explaining the SCA.323 The SCA is a 
complex statute that Congress wrote based on how early 
computer networks operated.324 The category of RCS provider was 
intended to address the business model in which companies 
                                                                                                     
 320. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c) (permitting disclosure to the National Center 
for Missing and Exploited Children). The SCA thus leaves a hole for the 
disclosure to private parties of personally identifiable information, so the 
privacy policies of these providers would thus be more applicable to the 
protection of PII than the SCA. Because there is no explicit exception for 
subpoenas in civil litigation, courts interpret this omission as meaning that 
private litigants cannot obtain data other than noncontent information from 
ECS and RCS providers. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1208–09 (citing a number 
of cases that have so decided). However, because of the importance of civil 
discovery, courts may promote alternative methods of obtaining information 
held by an ECS or RCS provider, such as a Rule 34 motion to compel the party 
to produce data held by these providers. See, e.g., Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 
F.R.D. 346, 349–55 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (concluding that the SCA does not 
preclude civil discovery for electronic stored communications that are 
maintained by a nonparty service provider because the other party has control 
over that information and thus can be compelled to produce it under Rule 34). 
 321. See 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (creating a private cause of action for knowing 
or intentional violations of the law). 
 322. See id. § 2707(e)(1) (extending the good faith exception to “a court 
warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a 
statutory authorization”).  
 323. See Kerr, supra note 297, at 1213–33 (analyzing and explaining the 
SCA). 
 324. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1205 (explaining the legislative history of 
the SCA). 
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outsourced a lot of storage and processing functions due to the 
high cost of doing this in-house.325 It is thus likely that the RCS 
category would easily apply to commercial cloud services that 
provide options for outsourcing IT, but in most other contexts, 
there is substantial overlap between RCS and ECS. In part 
because of the rigid language of the statute and the substantial 
changes that have come about in the electronic communications 
field, it is unclear how the privacy protections of the SCA apply to 
other communications in the cloud.326 Kerr suggests eliminating 
the categories of ECS and RCS to address some of the 
confusion.327 
Currently, the degree of privacy in an e-mail likely depends 
on whether it is stored on a hard drive or in the cloud.328 E-mails 
downloaded from a service provider are easily covered by the 
requirement in the SCA that requires a warrant to obtain 
unopened e-mails fewer than 180 days old, but it is unclear 
whether a webmail provider would be considered an “electronic 
communication service” or a “remote computing service.”329 Some 
industry actors seem to oppose the 180-day rule because people 
now leave information on webmail services for long periods of 
time.330 Generally, many support the proposal to revise the SCA 
to better address cloud computing.331 
Some question whether the SCA would protect free cloud 
services at all because advertising-supported business models 
                                                                                                     
 325. See id. at 1206–07 (explaining the legislative history of the SCA). 
 326. See Kattan, supra note 8, at 619 (recognizing the uncertainty of the 
SCA’s protections of cloud-based electronic communications). 
 327. Kerr, supra note 297, at 1209 (calling the categories “confusing” and 
suggesting their removal); see also Kattan, supra note 8, at 653 (echoing this 
recommendation and suggesting that Congress consider whether it even makes 
sense to continue to distinguish between ECS and RCS). 
 328. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 45 (discussing cloud privacy issues). 
 329. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 167–68 (noting the SCA’s ambiguous 
relationship to webmail services). 
 330. See Kattan, supra note 8, at 642–43 (noting Microsoft’s objections to the 
180-day rule). 
 331. See id. at 645 (noting that Digital Due Process, a consortium of privacy 
advocates, are lobbying for amendment of the ECPA); see also supra Part II.E 
(discussing the need for legislative reform to create adequate privacy protections 
for the cloud). 
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often give the providers access to communication contents for 
targeted advertising purposes.332 This may prevent these services 
from being considered RCS providers because the provider is 
authorized to access communication contents for purposes other 
than rendering storage and computer processing services.333 TOS 
agreements and privacy policies thus have potentially significant 
effects on the extent to which the SCA protects the customer’s 
privacy because these terms may give the provider explicit 
authority to take actions that would disqualify the provider from 
being considered a provider of RCS.334  
3. Case Law 
While there is not an explicit clause in the U.S. Constitution 
that states the existence of a general right to privacy, courts have 
held that such a right exists and is protected by the Constitution. 
Much discussion of Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence focuses 
on decisional privacy; that is, the right of individuals to make 
decisions free of government intervention.335 In Whalen v. Roe, 
the Supreme Court recognized “the individual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters,”336 which has influenced 
many lower courts in recognizing a constitutional right to 
information privacy.337 
                                                                                                     
 332. See Kattan, supra note 8, at 638–40 (arguing that Gmail might not be 
considered an RCS provider because the privacy policy allows Google to access 
user communications for advertising purposes); Robison, supra note 4, at 1196 
(noting that this quid pro quo violates the SCA’s provisions). 
 333. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1213 (noting that cloud services may not 
qualify as RCS because these services allow advertisers access to customer 
data). 
 334. See id. at 1215, 1220–21 (identifying three varieties of terms-of-service 
agreements and explaining how courts have interpreted terms-of-service 
agreements). 
 335. Some of the best known examples of decisional privacy cases in the 
Supreme Court over the last fifty years concern contraception and abortion. See, 
e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (citing a right to privacy under the 
Constitution in prohibiting states from outright banning abortion); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (ruling unconstitutional a Connecticut 
law that prohibited the use of contraception). 
 336. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977). 
 337. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 111, at 558 (discussing the privacy 
 
408 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341 (2013) 
U.S. courts have often examined the distinctions between the 
public and private spheres. The public-disclosure-of-private-facts 
tort, for example, has been found to not apply to the republication 
of public postings on the web, even when the original posting is 
deleted a few days after it was first posted.338 In contrast to public 
postings, courts may be more protective of seemingly nonsensitive 
private data, like search queries.339 
Courts have also examined privacy in the context of the 
Fourth Amendment and statutes that relate to privacy, like the 
ECPA. Also relevant to our research, some courts have examined 
the implications of TOS agreements and privacy policies. It is to 
these topics we now turn.  
a. Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment declares that people have a right “to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”340 The Fourth Amendment 
also applies to seizure of digital evidence, though seizing digital 
evidence stored in the cloud is likely to be much easier than 
seizing identical data that is stored solely on a suspect’s personal 
computer within the suspect’s home.341  
                                                                                                     
doctrine’s effect in lower federal courts). 
 338. See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 862–63 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that initial publication was not sufficiently obscure 
or transient). The Moreno court concluded this in spite of the fact that the public 
backlash did not rise to unacceptable levels until after the college student’s 
MySpace posting about the town was republished in the local newspaper. See id. 
at 861–62. 
 339. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Google, 234 F.R.D. 674, 687–88 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(declining to compel disclosure of 5,000 search queries and noting the potential 
privacy concerns of such disclosures). 
 340. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Typically, this protection requires a search 
warrant to be issued, though in some circumstances it is acceptable for the 
warrant to be executed by parties other than law enforcement. See United 
States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1068 (8th Cir. 2002) (permitting an ISP’s 
technicians to execute a search warrant outside the presence of law 
enforcement). 
 341. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 386–87 (noting that digital search and 
seizure is far easier because of the development of the cloud). 
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Fourth Amendment cases often focus on the need for a 
warrant, the issuance of which requires a finding of probable 
cause by a judicial officer.342 When searches are executed without 
a warrant, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires courts to 
decide if the target of the search had a subjective expectation of 
privacy that society recognized as reasonable.343 Much turns on 
the existence of this “reasonable expectation of privacy” (REOP). 
Courts recognize a REOP in papers and effects sent in the mail, 
and some courts have held that e-mail is analogous to postal mail 
and thus a sender has a REOP in e-mail.344 A REOP might not 
exist, for instance, in a library’s shared computers that are 
available for public use, but may exist in a personal Yahoo! 
webmail account.345 A REOP is generally recognized in locked 
containers, and password protected computers may be considered 
analogous to locked containers.346 On the other hand, a public 
employee may have a reduced REOP in equipment provided by 
                                                                                                     
 342. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (ruling that a 
warrant is deficient for failure to show probable cause if the facts articulated on 
the face of the warrant are “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”); supra note 340 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Amendment).  
 343. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (espousing the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine). 
 344. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(extending Fourth Amendment protections to e-mail). But see Rehberg v. Paulk, 
611 F.3d 828, 847 (11th Cir. 2010) (ruling in favor of immunity because there is 
not a “clearly established” constitutional right to privacy in e-mail content 
“voluntarily transmitted over the global Internet and stored at a third-party 
ISP”). 
 345. See Wilson v. Moreau, 442 F. Supp. 2d 81, 104, 108 (D.R.I. 2006) (citing 
cases that declared a lack of reasonable expectation of privacy when using 
public library computers); see also United States v. D’Andrea, 648 F.3d 1, 5–14 
(1st Cir. 2011) (analyzing a government search of a password protected website 
used to store private images). On the other hand, courts might not find a REOP 
in information disclosed in a chatroom with other individuals. See United States 
v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1997).  
 346. See United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 193 (2d Cir. 2004) (ruling 
that a probation condition allowing for frequent or random monitoring of 
probationer’s computer use may be overbroad and violate a Fourth Amendment 
interest); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a 
third party’s authority to consent to search of shared spaces did not extend to 
the defendant’s password protected files).  
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his employer.347 On this point, the Supreme Court recently 
examined the issue of a public employer-issued pager and the 
extent to which the Fourth Amendment protected text messages 
sent over this pager, concluding that a search that is justified by 
noninvestigatory work-related purposes is reasonable.348 In City 
of Ontario v. Quon,349 the Court assumed, but did not conclusively 
determine, that there was otherwise a REOP in text messages.350 
If a warrantless search is conducted where a REOP exists, a 
court will examine if one of the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement applies, and if one does not, the evidence derived 
from the violation may be suppressed at trial. One of the 
exceptions is when the party with a REOP is the object of the 
search, or a third party with adequate authority, gives consent to 
the search.351 The scope of the permission is also important. 
Suppression may be an option when investigators seize more 
than permitted under the warrant, which is an especially big 
danger with e-discovery.352 However, suppression might not be an 
available remedy in the case of evidence that was within the 
                                                                                                     
 347. Compare United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir. 
2002) (noting that a public employer’s computer use policy may reduce an 
employee’s REOP in the employee’s office computer), with Maes v. Folberg, 504 
F. Supp. 2d 339, 347 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding a REOP in a public employee’s 
work laptop computer).  
 348. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632–33 (2010) (holding 
that the city’s review of a police officer’s text messages did not violate the 
officer’s Fourth Amendment rights).  
 349. See id. at 2619. 
 350. See id. at 2630 (“Even if Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his text messages, petitioners did not necessarily violate the Fourth 
Amendment by obtaining and viewing the transcripts.”). 
 351. Compare United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 721 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that a cotenant had apparent authority to consent to a search of the 
computer in defendant’s room when police used forensic software to bypass 
possible password protection), with Trulock, 275 F.3d at 402–03 (holding that 
third-party consent does not extend to the defendant’s password protected files). 
 352. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 
1177 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasizing the importance of procedures to segregate 
data covered by the warrant from data that is not covered, including the need to 
have disinterested computer technicians go through the information to separate 
covered data). 
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scope of the warrant, even if the seizure of evidence was outside 
the warrant.353 
There is also an important distinction between “content” and 
“noncontent” information, with the latter category including 
things like addresses on the outside of an envelope and phone 
numbers dialed on a phone. In the cloud context, a person is 
likely to not have a REOP in subscriber information provided to 
an ISP.354 Other noncontent information, like e-mail addresses in 
the “To” field of an e-mail or IP addresses of visited websites, are 
likely to not be protected by the Fourth Amendment.355 
The third-party doctrine of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is the focus of much discussion in the online 
privacy context, because the doctrine prevents a REOP from 
being found in papers and effects turned over to a third party.356 
                                                                                                     
 353. See United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 973–76 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(declining to suppress evidence found on storage media seized pursuant to a 
warrant that only addressed the seizure of a computer). If digital evidence 
within the scope of the warrant has been deleted by the computer owner, it is 
not outside of the warrant’s scope for police to restore deleted files when 
executing the warrant. See United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 
1999) (“The seizure of unlawful images is within the plain language of the 
warrant; their recovery, after attempted destruction, is no different than 
decoding a coded message lawfully seized or pasting together scraps of a torn-up 
ransom note.”). 
 354. See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that the defendant had no REOP for subscriber information given to 
ISP). 
 355. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that it is not a Fourth Amendment search to use computer surveillance 
techniques to obtain only information concerning the to/from fields of e-mails 
and website addresses visited); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 
256, 261–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that privacy concerns of disclosing 
noncontent information like data logs and IP addresses were only “speculative”). 
The Perrine court also suggested that the defendant’s use of peer-to-peer 
software also decreased the defendant’s expectation of privacy, especially as to 
the files shared over the P2P service. See Perrine, 518 F.3d at 1205 (ruling that 
Perrine’s use of peer-to-peer software, which allowed other Internet users to 
access files on his computer, partially reduced the expectation of privacy that he 
would otherwise enjoy in his computer, therefore leaving Perrine with no Fourth 
Amendment interest in subscriber information he gave to Yahoo! and Cox). 
 356. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436–40 (1976) (finding no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in financial records disclosed to a financial 
institution in the ordinary course of business); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 
322, 335–36 (1973) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in financial 
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Bailments of concealed items, however, might not be limited by 
the third-party doctrine because the bailee entrusted with 
concealed items does not necessarily have the authority to view 
the items or to consent to the search of the items by others.357 
Thus, much will turn on the authority that the third party has 
with respect to the entrusted items. If a private carrier’s terms 
retain the right to inspect a package for any reason, acceptance of 
these terms by a customer of the private carrier may also result 
in a loss of a REOP in packages sent using this private carrier.358 
Information privacy scholars often argue that this third-
party doctrine will prevent Fourth Amendment protections from 
applying in the cloud because users must inherently reveal their 
information to third parties in order for it to be transmitted or 
processed.359 On the other hand, recent case law casts doubts on 
this view. In the Sixth Circuit case United States v. Warshak,360 
the court distinguished e-mail interception from other third-party 
doctrine cases by holding that the e-mail provider was an 
intermediary in the communication, not a recipient.361 However, 
the Warshak court also noted that if an agreement with a service 
provider gave the service provider the authority to “audit, 
inspect, and monitor” the e-mails of its subscribers, that might 
cause the subscriber to lose a REOP in those e-mails. 
                                                                                                     
records turned over to an accountant for tax return purposes).  
 357. See United States v. James, 353 F.3d 606, 613–15 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(overturning a child pornography conviction because the police obtained the 
evidence from a person entrusted with computer disks with specific instructions 
to not use the disks). 
 358. See United States v. Young, 350 F.3d 1302, 1307–09 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(finding no REOP when a private carrier retained the right to inspect packages 
for any reason and when defendant also violated other terms set out by the 
carrier). The court in Young also held in the alternative that reserving a right to 
inspect gave the carrier the ability to later consent to a search of the package by 
law enforcement. See id. at 1308 (“Just as the ‘right to inspect’ notice defeated 
Young’s privacy interest, we believe it also served to defeat Young’s Fourth 
Amendment challenge because it authorized Federal Express, as a bailee of the 
packages, to consent to a search.”). 
 359. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 295, at 173–74 (arguing that Fourth 
Amendment protections should be extended to data that is revealed 
involuntarily and incidentally to using a service). 
 360. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 361. See id. at 288 (distinguishing Miller). 
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For Fourth Amendment protection to apply to a search, it 
must be executed by a state actor because the Fourth 
Amendment only protects against intrusions by the state.362 
Searches conducted by a private party thus do not inherently 
raise Fourth Amendment concerns unless the private party is 
behaving as a state actor,363 an analysis that often turns on state 
entanglement with the private party’s business.364 Under the 
Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Jacobsen,365 if the 
papers or effects are secured such that it is clear that the 
nonstate-actor searcher does not have a right to look at the 
contents, but the searcher executes a private search anyway, a 
REOP might not protect the owner of the contents if law 
enforcement then duplicates the private search.366 The United 
States v. D’Andrea367 case suggests a narrow interpretation of 
Jacobsen, however, with the former court implying that a private 
search of password protected online storage would not validate a 
subsequent warrantless search unless the content owner was 
careless with his password security.368 
                                                                                                     
 362. See U.S. CONST. amend. 4 (providing protections against unreasonable 
and warrantless searches); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) 
(stating that the Fourth Amendment is construed as “proscribing only 
governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an 
unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the 
Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental 
official’” (citation omitted)).  
 363. See United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 365–66 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that an ISP was not turned into a state actor by a statute that required 
ISPs to report to law enforcement if the ISP found child pornography on its 
network). 
 364. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 716–17 (1961) 
(finding state action sufficient to implicate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment when a restaurant in a city-operated parking garage 
denied service to a customer because of his race). 
 365. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 109. 
 366. See id. at 126 (holding that if a third party violates the person’s 
expectation of privacy, the government may use that information to the same 
extent, but cannot exceed the scope of the private search). But see United States 
v. D’Andrea, 648 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2011) (ruling that the private search doctrine 
would not apply when the property owner did not give the private searcher 
permission or means to search the property, unless the property owner was very 
careless about security of the property). 
 367. See D’Andrea, 648 F.3d at 1. 
 368. See id. at 8 (noting that the private search doctrine might apply if the 
 
414 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341 (2013) 
b. Stored Communications Act 
As discussed above, the ECPA includes the Wiretap Act, the 
SCA, and the Pen Register statute.369 The SCA is a complicated 
statute that courts often interpret differently. The Ninth Circuit, 
for example, adopted a broad interpretation of the phrase “for 
backup purposes” within the definition of “electronic storage.” 
The Theofel v. Farey Jones370 court held that a provider was 
holding e-mails in “electronic storage,” and thus the ECS terms 
applied rather than the RCS terms that would apply if the e-
mails were merely in “storage.”371 Kerr criticizes the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation of “electronic storage” under the SCA,372 
specifically its broad interpretation of “backup purposes” that 
may permit more frequent findings that a service is acting as an 
ECS provider.373  
It is unclear how the SCA will apply to webmail. The Theofel 
court itself suggested that storage would not be for “backup 
                                                                                                     
property owner was careless about the security of the property). 
 369. See supra note 295 and accompanying text (discussing the ECPA’s 
three components). When applying the Wiretap Act, courts require the 
interception to be contemporaneous with transmission in order to find a 
violation. See United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 85 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that the Wiretap Act is violated if a provider intercepts electronic 
communications that are in transient electronic storage as part of the 
communications process); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 
F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing the contemporaneity requirement). The 
Steve Jackson Games court also acknowledged that it is unlikely that Congress 
intended for a Wiretap Act violation to also violate the SCA. See Steve Jackson 
Games, Inc., 36 F.3d at 461–63 (discussing the legislative history of the Wiretap 
Act and the SCA). 
 370. See Theofel v. Farey Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 371. See id. at 1075 (concluding that “backup purposes” can include when an 
ISP keeps a copy of an e-mail on its server in case the user needs to download 
the e-mail again later, thus broadening the category of communications to which 
the stronger requirements for ECS can apply). 
 372. See Kerr, supra note 297, at 1218 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation). 
 373. See id. at 1218 n.61 (providing reasons for the author’s labeling of the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Theofel as “implausible and hard to square with the 
statutory text”); see also Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075 (providing a broad definition 
of “backup purposes”); Quon v. Arch Wireless, 529 F.3d 892, 902–03 (9th Cir. 
2008) (concluding that by archiving text messages, Arch Wireless was providing 
backup protection instead of storage services, and thus was an ECS provider). 
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purposes” if the information were not stored anywhere else.374 In 
United States v. Weaver,375 the court held that Hotmail was an 
RCS provider, so only a trial subpoena would be required to 
compel Hotmail to produce previously accessed e-mails under 181 
days old.376 It is also unclear the extent to which the SCA would 
prevent a party in civil litigation from seeking records 
maintained by a cloud service provider during discovery.377 Even 
if a provider does violate the SCA, the remedy for such a violation 
is not suppression, as it would be with a Fourth Amendment 
violation because the available remedies are explicitly limited 
under § 2708.378 
The intersection of the SCA and the Fourth Amendment may 
also raise issues of the ultimate constitutionality of the SCA. 
Because the e-mail acquisition actions of law enforcement in 
Warshak relied on the SCA, and the Warshak court viewed e-mail 
as having the same Fourth Amendment protection as postal mail, 
the Warshak court ultimately concluded that insofar as the SCA 
permitted law enforcement to obtain e-mails without a warrant, 
                                                                                                     
 374. See supra note 371 and accompanying text (discussing the Theofel 
court’s interpretation of the “backup purposes” language contained in the SCA). 
 375. See United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769 (C.D. Ill. 2009). 
 376.  See id. at 771 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2)’s subpoena 
requirements and ruling that e-mails under 181 days old must be seized using a 
subpoena). 
 377. On its face, the SCA does not include an exception for disclosure for 
civil discovery purposes, so adverse parties may be precluded from requesting 
stored information directly from service providers. However, because of the 
importance of civil discovery, courts are likely to find other avenues for allowing 
such information to be compelled, such as by compelling the opposing party to 
produce it directly under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 
Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 352–53 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (concluding 
that the SCA does not preclude civil discovery for electronically stored 
communications that are maintained by a nonparty service provider because the 
other party has control over that information and can be compelled to produce it 
under Rule 34). Thus, because the subscriber requests the information from the 
nonparty service provider, the information is being disclosed consistent with the 
statutory exceptions. 
 378. See 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (2006) (“The remedies and sanctions described in 
this chapter are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional 
violations of this chapter.”); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (ruling that violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2708 do not warrant exclusion of 
evidence). 
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the SCA was unconstitutional.379 Accordingly, if more courts 
adopt the reasoning of Warshak, the influence of the SCA in the 
e-mail search context may be significantly reduced. 
c. Contracts and Privacy 
In the cloud context, one should also consider case law 
precedent concerning contract law and agreements between 
consumers and service providers. As the Warshak court noted, 
excessively permissive TOS agreements may deprive a customer 
of a REOP in contents stored or transmitted using a service,380 so 
the validity of these contracts has implications for privacy law. 
Additionally, privacy policies and TOS agreements have 
implications for SCA cases because one of the most important 
exceptions under the SCA is for information obtained after the 
subscriber or customer has given valid consent.381 Thus, a privacy 
policy that reserves a license to use the customer’s information 
and content for business or marketing purposes may be read as 
consent to disclosure under the SCA.382 To the extent that the 
consent applies to communications stored for computer storage 
and processing purposes, consent renders the SCA completely 
inapplicable if the service otherwise only qualified as an RCS 
instead of an ECS. 
Contract law is typically state law, so standards will vary 
across cases. Generally, contracts can be invalidated if they are 
found to be unconscionable. Some courts have invalidated 
excessively one-sided TOS agreements on unconscionability 
                                                                                                     
 379. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (ruling 
that the portion of the SCA that allows the government to obtain e-mails 
without a warrant is unconstitutional). 
 380. See id. at 287 (noting that “if the ISP expresses an intention to ‘audit, 
inspect, and monitor’ its subscriber’s emails, that might be enough to render an 
expectation of privacy unreasonable” (citation omitted)). 
 381. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(3), 2703(c)(1)(C), 2703(c)(2) (explaining the 
consent exceptions to the SCA). 
 382. However, this may be limited to content for which the customer does 
not elect stronger privacy protections. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 253 
F.R.D. 256, 264–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (concluding that acceptance of Youtube’s 
TOS and privacy policy does not amount to consent to the disclosure of private 
content). 
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grounds, often when the customer was seeking to avoid 
mandatory arbitration provisions.383 Courts have also examined 
terms not related to arbitration, and may also invalidate terms 
that the court finds to be excessively unfair.384 
At least one court has held that privacy policies are purely 
aspirational, and thus not contracts that are enforceable at law, 
when they do not afford any rights or remedies to the customer.385 
However, this position does not take into account recent actions 
by the FTC to enforce privacy policies against companies on the 
grounds that violating its own privacy policy amounts to an 
unfair business practice.386 Thus, we do not anticipate that this 
“purely aspirational” characterization of privacy policies will be 
adopted. 
                                                                                                     
 383. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“Reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and 
unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers are essential 
if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility.”); Bragg v. Linden 
Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding procedural and 
substantive unconscionability sufficient to invalidate an arbitration provision 
that was part of a TOS that amounted to a very one-sided adhesion contract); 
People v. Network Assocs., Inc., 758 N.Y.S.2d 466, 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) 
(holding that some terms of a software license were unenforceable due to their 
unfairness when the provisions included terms prohibiting customers from 
publishing reviews of the product or benchmark test results without the 
company’s permission).  
 384. See Network Associates, 758 N.Y.S.2d at 470 (holding that some terms 
of a software license were unenforceable due to their unfairness when the 
provisions included terms prohibiting customers from publishing reviews of the 
product or benchmark test results without the company’s permission). Courts 
value the rights of parties in contracts, however, so perhaps they are likely to 
only invalidate unfair terms that pass a certain threshold. See MDY Indus., LLC 
v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging 
the contract claim that arises when a user violates a game’s prohibition on the 
use of “bots” to automatically play a game); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 
F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (enforcing a shrinkwrap agreement that prohibited 
reverse engineering).  
 385. See Freedman v. Am. Online, 325 F. Supp. 2d 638, 640 (E.D. Va. 2004) 
(finding that a subscriber agreement “is plainly aspirational only . . . and is not 
intended to confer any rights and remedies upon the subscriber”). 
 386. See infra note 465 and accompanying text (discussing FTC enforcement 
actions). 
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4. European Privacy Law 
The United States and the European Union take very 
different theoretical approaches to privacy. In the United States, 
the idea of privacy is often related to concepts like secrecy and 
intrusions.387 In the United States, privacy is viewed as an aspect 
of liberty, with the goal of protecting against intrusions by the 
state.388 The European approach, however, views privacy as a 
right of human dignity, with a focus on an individual’s personal 
autonomy in deciding how his personal data will be used by 
anyone, including the free market.389 
European privacy law is very complicated, and a detailed 
examination is outside of the scope of this Article. However, 
because we now live in a global information economy, cloud 
providers must inevitably consider how their services and 
practices will need to be altered for a European market. For this 
reason, we will give a fairly brief introduction to this complicated 
topic.  
In the European Union, privacy is considered to be a 
fundamental right.390 The first European data protection laws 
were enacted in the 1970s, followed by the adoption of the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data391 in 1981, and the 
enactment of the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46 (DPD 
95/46)392 in 1995.393 
                                                                                                     
 387. See supra Part III.A (discussing fundamental privacy theories). 
 388. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 341 (“In the American 
model, privacy is understood as a liberty, protecting citizens against the State.”). 
 389. See id. (“[T]he common European understanding is of a right to human 
dignity—an individual right to determine the end uses of our personal data—in 
which threats to privacy arise from both the State and the free market.”). 
 390. Lanois, supra note 18, at 37 (stating that “the European Union has 
enshrined the status of privacy as a fundamental right”). 
 391. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. no. 108, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm. 
 392. Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EU). 
 393. See Kuner, Part 1, supra note 119, at 176–77 (providing a discussion of 
the early data protection laws in Europe). 
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DPD 95/46 focuses on the protection of “personal data,” which 
it defines as “information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person.”394 By its terms, it applies EU law to data 
controllers that use “equipment” within the EU for the processing 
of personal data, but the term “equipment” has been read broadly 
to apply to things like cookies and JavaScript.395 Other provisions 
that U.S. cloud providers must comply with include DPD 95/46’s 
requirements for robust authentication and access safeguards.396 
a. The Safe Harbor Framework 
DPD 95/46 also governs the transfer of data, permitting data 
transfers only to other countries with adequately protective 
privacy laws.397 The United States does not have sufficient 
privacy laws, but the data of European users can nonetheless be 
transferred to the United States if the company handling the 
transfer complies with the Safe Harbor agreement between the 
                                                                                                     
 394. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 392, at 38; see also Schwartz & 
Solove, supra note 3, at 1873–74 (comparing the reduction in privacy law in the 
U.S. to its expansion in the EU). 
 395. See Kuner, Part 2, supra note 126, at 228–29 (explaining the 
controversy over the use of the term “equipment” to encompass things such as 
“cookies”). Other EU regulations also restrict the use of cookies and similar 
technologies, requiring the informed consent of a user to be obtained prior to the 
provider commencing to store and access information that is on the user’s 
computer. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 40 (discussing the consent requirement 
under the EU Data Protection Directive and both the 2002 and 2009 ePrivacy 
Directives). Because cookies involve information that is considered personal 
data under the Data Protection Directive, which includes IP addresses, a 
company that uses cookies in the EU must comply with the terms of both the 
Data Protection Directive and the more recent ePrivacy directive of the EU. See 
id. at 41 (“[T]he use of cookies or similar devices involving a unique user ID or 
an identifier will result in the application of both the Data Protection and the 
ePrivacy Directives.”). 
 396. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 47 (“[D]ata may only be transferred 
outside of the EU if that country provides an ‘adequate’ level of 
protection . . . .”). 
 397. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 596 (noting that “[t]he gravest 
expression of the implications of different levels of privacy protection occurred 
when the European Union . . . passed the Data Protection Directive, which 
allows the transfer of data intended to undergo processing to third countries 
only if they ensure an adequate level of protection”). 
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United States and the European Union.398 Because of the limits of 
DPD 95/46 on transferring personal data, some cloud providers 
have also established segregated EU clouds.399 
The Safe Harbor framework provides a method for companies 
to certify compliance with European privacy standards without 
necessarily using segregated clouds. Under the Safe Harbor 
Privacy Principles, organizations must: (1) provide notice about 
data collection; (2) give individuals a choice to opt out of the 
disclosure of their personal information to third parties or before 
their information is put to a secondary use (or to opt in to sharing 
if the personal information is considered sensitive); (3) extend 
these standards to onward transfers—that is, ensure that third 
parties to whom personal information is transferred also adhere 
to the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles or have comparable 
controls in place; (4) provide individuals with access to their 
personal information held by the organization; (5) take 
reasonable security precautions to protect personal information; 
(6) take reasonable steps to protect data integrity; and (7) provide 
adequate measures for enforcement of the principles.400  
Adhering to the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles provides a 
mechanism for companies in the United States to preserve the 
                                                                                                     
 398. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 48 (discussing how the Safe Harbor 
program works between the United States and the European Union); Stylianou, 
supra note 44, at 597 (explaining the Safe Harbor agreement, “according to 
which American companies could transfer data from Europe as long as they 
abided by a commonly agreed upon privacy framework set by the United States 
Department of Commerce and the European Commission”). The European 
Commission has found that membership in the U.S. Safe Harbor system 
provides an “adequate level of data protection,” but the Commission suggests 
that further transfer of the data beyond the Safe Harbor member must comply 
with EU privacy law as well. See Kuner, Part 2, supra note 126, at 231 
(discussing personal data protection concerns regarding “onward transfers of 
data” from U.S. Safe Harbor members to third parties). 
 399. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 48 (“The most simple and obvious way to 
comply with the EU Data Protection Directive is to ensure that personal data 
does not leave the EU . . . which is why certain cloud vendors offer segregated 
EU clouds that keep personal data from being transferred outside of the 
European Union.”). 
 400. See Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV (Apr. 26, 2012, 3:08 PM), 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) 
(providing an overview of the U.S.–EU Safe Harbor program) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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status quo of a self-regulatory approach to privacy while still 
being eligible to serve customers in the European Union.401 We 
note that these principles also resemble many of the ideas 
underlying FIPs, and that the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles 
might provide another model for how companies should handle 
personal information belonging to customers located in the 
United States. 
IV. Companies, Customer Data, and Customer-Company 
Interactions 
A. Companies and Customer Data 
In this Article, we examine the interaction between privacy 
theories, privacy law, and the relationships between consumers 
and the companies that serve them in the cloud. These 
relationships are largely defined by TOS agreements and privacy 
policies, and these agreements typically enumerate what a 
consumer can expect concerning the use of his personal 
information. The concerns about how companies handle customer 
data go beyond these agreements, however, and include issues 
like data security, identity theft, and behavioral marketing.  
1. Terms of Service Agreements 
TOS agreements set forth terms governing the relationship 
between a service provider and its customers.402 Generally, cloud-
based services targeted at individual users are accompanied by 
non-negotiable TOS agreements that favor the service provider 
                                                                                                     
 401. See James T. Sunosky, Privacy Online: A Primer on the European 
Union’s Directive and United States’ Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, 9 
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 80, 85 (2000) (explaining the benefits of the Safe 
Harbor Privacy Principles). 
 402. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Contemporary Issues in Cyberlaw: Nexus 
Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control of Virtual Worlds, 38 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 43, 44 (2011) (referring to terms of use and EULAs as the 
“social contract of the new millennium,” setting forth the rights and redresses of 
citizens). 
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over the end user.403 TOS agreements will generally address 
things like metering, monitoring, and data backup,404 and often 
include clauses in which the provider disclaims liability for harm 
and forbids customers from using the company’s intellectual 
property without authorization.405 Some also include terms 
concerning the retention, control, and ownership of a user’s 
information.406 TOS agreements take a variety of approaches to 
customer information. Some include terms that allow providers to 
access customer information for advertising and other purposes 
relating to the business, while others are less transparent about 
what the company may do with customer information, and still 
others make explicit promises in their TOS agreements that the 
companies will not access customers’ data.407  
The terms of TOS agreements can have a significant impact 
outside the context of the provider–customer relationship, 
potentially affecting the consumer’s legal rights. The DOJ has 
recently argued that violating a website’s TOS agreement 
amounts to unauthorized access under the CFAA,408 and courts 
                                                                                                     
 403. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 163 (“Google’s profit model is based on 
offering free services to consumers in exchange for their consent to non-
negotiable terms of service.”); Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 7 (“The SLAs of 
cloud-based applications and services generally are non-negotiable and much 
more favorable to the provider than to the end user.”). 
 404. See Martin, supra note 44, at 311 (noting the difficulties of providing 
good customer service because of the lack of standards to measure a cloud’s 
performance). 
 405. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 178 (“[L]anguage in a TOS agreement 
merely disclaims liability for any damage to a user’s computer data and forbids 
unauthorized use or redistribution of intellectual property.”).  
 406. See id. (explaining that TOS clauses “also dictate the terms by which 
the entity will retain, control, and own a user’s information”). Google’s TOS 
agreement includes a provision giving the company a license to use the 
customer’s data in ways that would otherwise violate the customer’s copyright. 
See Google Policies and Principles, Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Mar. 1, 2012), 
http://www.google.com/policies/terms/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing that 
Google may use personal data in accordance with their privacy policies) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 407. See Robison, supra note 4, at 1215–17 (providing an examination of 
existing cloud providers). 
 408. See Declan McCullagh, DOJ: Lying on Match.com Needs to Be a Crime, 
CNET (Nov. 14, 2011, 11:58 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-57324779-
281/doj-lying-on-match.com-needs-to-be-a-crime/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) 
(discussing the DOJ’s stance on CFAA violations in the context of popular 
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have also examined whether agreeing to an expansive TOS 
agreement or a broad privacy policy may cause a person to lose a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.409 As discussed above in Part 
III.B.2.a, the terms of TOS agreements may also impact the 
application of the SCA.410  
It is very important that consumers read and understand the 
terms of cloud services’ TOS agreements because of the large 
amounts of sometimes sensitive information stored with these 
services.411 Consumers should pay special attention to how the 
TOS agreements address customer data, including the 
information that the company claims rights in, and how the 
consumer can terminate his relationship with the cloud 
provider.412 Consumers might be storing information solely in the 
cloud, making it very important for the TOS agreements to 
                                                                                                     
websites such as MySpace and Match.com) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). The Ninth Circuit, however, recently rejected the DOJ’s argument 
on the reach of the CFAA in United States v. Nosal. See United States v. Nosal, 
676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the language “exceeds authorized 
access” in the CFAA should be narrowly interpreted and is therefore limited to 
violations of restrictions on access to information, and not restrictions on its 
use); Richard Santalesa, Ninth Circuit Narrows Reach of CFAA in En Banc U.S. 
v. Nosal Decision, INFO. LAW GROUP (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.infolaw 
group.com/2012/04/articles/computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-c/ninth-circuit-narrows-
reach-of-cfaa-in-en-banc-us-v-nosal-decision/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) 
(discussing the decision in United States v. Nosal) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 409. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that such protections likely would not apply to content stored with a 
provider that includes terms in an agreement reserving the right to “audit, 
inspect, and monitor” e-mail content); Bagley, supra note 295, at 181 (discussing 
cases examining the Fourth Amendment in the context of Terms of Service 
agreements). 
 410. See supra Part III.B.2.a (discussing the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act). 
 411. See Soma, Gates, & Smith, supra note 16, at 534 (examining the 
“blurred lines” between work and home life that e-technology has created and 
suggesting that “users must make a good faith effort to read, understand, and 
ask questions about service provider privacy and terms of use policies”); see also 
Stylianou, supra note 44, at 593 (noting that such terms attract greater scrutiny 
because of the large amount of data stored with these providers). 
 412. See Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 7 (asserting that cloud service 
TOS agreements should address data migration issues to assure business 
continuity and to protect the customer’s continued access to data after the 
customer’s relationship with the provider is dissolved). 
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include provisions protecting customers’ ability to retrieve their 
content if, for example, a service is shut down.413  
a. TOS Agreements as Contracts of Adhesion 
Under the common law of contracts, forming a contract 
requires mutual assent.414 When a contract is not subject to 
negotiation and is offered by the more powerful party on a “take 
it or leave it” basis, the contract is often referred to as a contract 
of adhesion.415 Privacy policies and TOS agreements typically 
meet this definition for an adhesion contract.416 Such contracts 
are not automatically invalid, but they may be subject to greater 
scrutiny.  
Excessively oppressive TOS terms may be invalidated if the 
court concludes that the terms are unconscionable.417 
Unconscionability analysis often has two prongs, and courts 
evaluate the circumstances for both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability.418 Courts might be more willing to find 
                                                                                                     
 413. This issue has come up recently in the context of the shutdown of 
Megaupload. Megan Geuss, Megaupload User Asks for His Perfectly Legal 
Videos Back, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 21, 2012, 10:10 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2012/03/megaupload-user-asks-for-his-
perfectly-legal-videos-back.ars (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (discussing the 
shutdown of the file-sharing locker Megaupload and the inability of customers 
to access their legally stored videos) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 414. See, e.g., 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 4:1 (4th ed. 
2012) (“[M]utual assent is essential to the formation of informal contracts . . . .”). 
 415. See Nolo’s Plain-English Law Dictionary, NOLO, 
http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/adhesion-contract-(contract-of-adhesion)-
term.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing the definition of an adhesion 
contract) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Bagley, 
supra note 295, at 183 (“[E]lectronic contracts of adhesion are limiting the 
private rights of an individual to protect their privacy in services so vital to 
daily life.”). 
 416. Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1235 (arguing that the idea that 
users give informed consent to these terms is a fiction, due to the total lack of 
negotiation). 
 417. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605 (E.D. Pa. 
2007) (finding an arbitration provision to be both procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable). 
 418. Id. 
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unconscionability when there are no market alternatives, but the 
diverse reality of the cloud market makes it unlikely that a lack 
of market alternatives will be a persuasive argument.419 
The unequal bargaining power between the provider and its 
customers means that providers often subject customers to terms 
that are more favorable to the provider.420 At least one court has 
looked favorably on a provider prohibiting the use of “bots” with 
its service,421 and Martin expresses concern that this opens the 
door for “predatory software vendor[s]” to prohibit customers 
from using third party software with the vendor’s projects, 
thereby eliminating beneficial effects of innovation by third 
parties.422 
2. Privacy Policies 
Privacy policies and TOS agreements often overlap, though 
for our purposes we consider privacy policies to be more focused 
on making the customer aware of the company’s policies 
regarding their data instead of the customer’s obligations 
concerning the service. Terms in a provider’s privacy policy might 
address things like the quantity and nature of collected data and 
the company’s policies on data retention and customer control 
over data.423 Privacy policies often also address data security 
issues, like the use of SSL encryption during data 
transmission.424 However, many of these providers insert 
                                                                                                     
 419. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 179 (discussing the difficulty of 
demonstrating unconscionability “in the search engine, e-mail, and digital 
media services market, where there are many companies even though only a few 
giants dominate”). 
 420. See supra note 403 and accompanying text. 
 421. See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (finding that the prohibition of the use of “bots” was permitted under 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act). 
 422. Martin, supra note 44, at 312. 
 423. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 599, 602 (discussing the quantity and 
nature of collected data as well as data retention policies and data storage 
location). 
 424. See id. at 603 (providing a discussion of data safety, security, and 
integrity). 
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provisions in their privacy policies or TOS agreements that 
repudiate any liability for data loss, and reserve to the provider 
the right to discontinue the service at the provider’s sole 
discretion.425 
Privacy policies typically consist of information provided by 
the service provider about how the provider may gather, use, 
disclose, and manage the personal information of its customers.426 
Privacy policies, like TOS agreements, are often adhesion 
contracts marked by significant advantages being reserved for 
the service provider, such as the right to amend its privacy policy 
unilaterally with little notice to its customers.427 Privacy policies 
may include broad permissions to allow the provider to access 
information for its own marketing purposes and to disclose 
customer information to its business partners for business-
related purposes.428 Privacy policies also might not be considered 
contracts at all, but purely as notices about a company’s policy. 
However, few consumers actually read a company’s privacy 
policy, and even fewer understand it.429 Solove criticizes many 
                                                                                                     
 425. See id. at 604 (examining Amazon’s, Mozy’s, and Apple’s data 
protection disclosures). 
 426. See Cascia, supra note 17, at 888 (“A privacy policy is a legal agreement 
between the user and the provider that discloses some or all of the ways the 
provider gathers, uses, discloses and manages a customer’s personal 
information.”). 
 427. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 82–83 (arguing that 
privacy policies are not a meaningful contract, with no bargaining over terms 
and containing mostly unreliable, vague promises); Cascia, supra note 17, at 
889–90 (discussing Google’s privacy policy and noting that “Google reserves the 
right to unilaterally amend its privacy policy leaving it essentially 
meaningless”). Birnhack and Elkin-Koren argue that if such a term is included, 
user privacy is not being effectively guaranteed by upfront notice and consent. 
See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 365 (arguing that “if the user 
agrees upfront to any use of data as detailed by an adjustable privacy policy, the 
user does not exercise real control over the collection and use of personal data”). 
 428. See Soma, Gates, & Smith, supra note 16, at 532 (noting that providers 
often include terms in e-messaging policies and usage agreements permitting 
the provider to access the systems for “routine monitoring purposes” and to 
comply with lawful requests by the government or litigants); infra Part V 
(providing an empirical analysis of agreements and policies in the cloud). 
 429. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1856 (“[S]tudies have shown 
that few consumers read privacy policies, and that those who do frequently fail 
to understand them.”). 
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privacy policies as being “written in obtuse prose,” containing 
large amounts of extraneous information.430 
Cloud services collect a lot of data, both through the 
customer’s voluntary disclosure of data and through the 
provider’s automatic collection of information through its 
operations or advertising policy.431 Many privacy policies assure 
limited use of customer information.432 Some, however, are vague, 
leaving ambiguities and loopholes. Transparency in privacy 
policies is very important, and consumers should be informed 
about how their data will be collected and used.433 In this Article, 
we posit that reserving explicit rights for consumers to control 
their data will raise consumer awareness of privacy issues. We 
anticipate that this raised awareness, combined with the 
increased control that an individual has over the use of his data, 
will have a positive effect on the market for cloud services. 
a. Sharing Information with the Government 
Consumers will often encounter inherent limitations in how 
much control they can exercise over their data because of common 
policies permitting the sharing of data with government entities. 
Privacy policies typically contain provisions reserving to the 
provider the right to disclose customer information pursuant to 
lawful government requests.434 Companies like Google and AT&T 
                                                                                                     
 430. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 82. 
 431. See Stylianou, supra note 44, at 599 (examining the quantity and 
nature of collected data by cloud services). Some companies may also collect 
information from other sources that pertains to the user indirectly. See id. at 
601 (using Microsoft as an example to demonstrate that the practice of indirect 
data collection is increasing). 
 432. See id. at 601, 604 (discussing Microsoft’s, IBM’s, and Amazon’s privacy 
and data protection policies). 
 433. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 353 (explaining the 
importance of user consent to data collection). 
 434. See Google Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (July 27, 2012), http://www. 
google.com/policies/privacy/ (noting that Google may share user data for legal 
reasons) (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); see also Soghoian, supra note 5, at 393–94 (citing a public statement by 
the CEO of Google in which the CEO listed assisting with lawful investigations 
as being one of the main reasons that Google keeps detailed data of the online 
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collect large amounts of personal user data from customers.435 
This sort of information was formerly used for marketing and 
research purposes, but recently the U.S. government has been 
building national security databases that contain personal user 
data provided by cooperating telecommunications companies like 
AT&T.436 Sometimes, providers may voluntarily provide data to 
government entities to improve the provider’s own security.437  
Governments have requested personal user information from 
various companies for a variety of purposes over the years.438 This 
is not limited to the United States. For example, the government 
of the United Kingdom is considering using data obtained by 
social networking sites for the purpose of monitoring users to 
prevent terrorism and crime.439 Generally, private companies that 
turn over information to the government are not considered state 
actors by doing so.440 Cloud providers sometimes also are required 
                                                                                                     
activity of its customers). 
 435. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 155–56 (“[T]hird parties such as 
information service provider, Google, and telecommunication giant, AT&T, 
amass large amounts of personal user data.”). 
 436. See id. at 156 (noting that “in recent years the United States 
government has built national security databases with personal user data 
allegedly obtained from cooperating telecommunication companies” that has 
resulted in Fourth Amendment litigation); Soghoian, supra note 5, at 385–86 
(discussing wiretaps obtained through telecommunication companies and 
Internet providers working with law enforcement officers). Bagley cites the 
wiretapping controversy as an example that did not involve warrants or 
subpoenas, but instead relied on voluntary agreements with private companies. 
See Bagley, supra note 295, at 156–57 (criticizing that the “traditional legal 
process was evaded” in this situation because “private companies did the data 
gathering and managed the phone calls” and the companies involved waived 
their Fourth Amendment rights). 
 437. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 154 (citing the example of Google 
voluntarily providing data to the NSA). 
 438. See id. at 161–62 (noting that the government sought user information 
from airlines after the September 11th attacks and from hotels and car rental 
agencies in 2003 to thwart terrorist threats against Las Vegas). 
 439. See id. at 164 (discussing the United Kingdom’s potential plan to use 
data collected by social networking sites). 
 440. See id. at 162 (“[P]rivate companies are not restrained as state actors 
when they voluntarily hand consumer data to the government . . . they are 
treated as a third party in whom a consumer is placing their trust.”). But see id. 
at 188 (arguing that there may be entwinement sufficient to find state action if 
a communication provider assigns employees to work with government agencies 
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to comply with certain content laws of other countries, like 
Skype’s Chinese counterpart that was required to implement a 
filter to prohibit text messages that included phrases like 
“Falungong” and “Dalai Lama.”441 There are also some concerns 
about the U.S. government’s ability to exploit software 
vulnerabilities or even enable the microphones of cellular phones 
remotely as part of criminal investigations.442  
There are a number of other reasons why government 
officials might request information. The federal government 
recently used data associated with customer shopping cards to 
trace the source of salmonella poisoning.443 The DOJ has also 
requested search records from companies like Google and 
Microsoft in the course of its investigation into the effectiveness 
of child protection legislation.444 However, the court in that case 
did not compel Google to turn over actual search queries, noting 
in dicta that there may be an expectation of privacy in such 
queries.445 
In addition to requesting the cooperation of private 
companies, the government itself has been collecting personal 
information for many years. Solove notes in his book that there 
are almost 2,000 databases of personal information maintained 
                                                                                                     
and respond to government requests). 
 441. Soghoian, supra note 5, at 408. Skype denied allegations that its 
Chinese software contained a backdoor to allow surveillance by the Chinese 
government, but it came out in 2008 that when text messages using this 
software were filtered, the offending message and the identities of the sender 
and recipient were forwarded to a publicly accessible server in China. See id. at 
408–09 (providing a discussion of the TOM-Software). 
 442. See id. at 400–02 (discussing the FBI’s use of “roving bug” software). 
 443. See Martin, supra note 44, at 299 (examining use of consumer data by 
the federal government). 
 444. See Gonzales v. Google, 234 F.R.D. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(examining a subpoena by the U.S. Attorney General to Google to compile and 
produce information from the search engine’s index and search queries); Bagley, 
supra note 295, at 165 (discussing litigation involving subpoenas for online user 
data). 
 445. See Gonzales, 234 F.R.D. at 684 (denying the motion to order Google to 
disclose search queries of its users); Bagley, supra note 295, at 165 (noting that, 
“[i]n the end, Google was compelled only to generate a list of URLs, rather than 
actual user search queries”). 
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by the federal government.446 Personal information collection as 
part of the census began in 1790, with the questions becoming 
more personal until the 1890 census, which included questions 
about things like diseases, disabilities, and finances.447 The 
massive databases that are already maintained by the 
government and over which citizens have no control might appear 
to threaten any attempts to improve informational privacy. 
Requiring data control protections in the private sector may seem 
like a relatively small issue compared to government databases. 
However, private data held by governments generally do not 
leave the government’s possession, and thus the circulation of 
this information is not as problematic as the circulation of 
information collected in the private sector.  
3. Effects of Security Breaches 
A major reason that we argue for consumers to be in control 
of their data is that we think consumers should be empowered to 
take proactive steps to protect their information. Consumers, in 
our view, should be free to withdraw their data from a service if 
they learn of security failings in that service. One of the dangers 
of insufficient data security for data in the cloud is the risk of 
identity theft as a result of data breaches.448 According to the 
Identity Theft Resource Center, in 2009 there were at least 498 
publicly reported data breaches, impacting 222 million total 
                                                                                                     
 446. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 15. Richards also notes that 
the government has huge databases of information about citizens. See Richards, 
supra note 114, at 1156 (discussing the history of personal data collection by the 
federal government that began as early as the nineteenth century). 
 447. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 13 (providing a historical 
look at the collection of public data by the federal government). The public 
outcry in response to the intrusiveness of the questions in the 1890 census 
eventually led to legislation to ensure the confidentiality of census data. See id. 
(“When the 1890 census included questions about diseases, disabilities, and 
finances, it sparked a public outcry, ultimately leading to the passage in the 
early twentieth century of stricter laws protecting the confidentiality of census 
data.”). 
 448. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 44 (discussing the increasing amount of 
“commercial, personal, and even secret data and other sensitive information . . . 
flowing around the globe in the cloud”). 
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records.449 A single data breach of a credit card processing 
company in 2012 may have resulted in 1.5 million credit card 
accounts being compromised.450  
Identity theft is a federal crime and has been referred to as 
the most rapidly growing white collar crime,451 though some 
criticize the law as not being adequately supported by resources 
or sufficient criminal sentences.452 Approximately half a million 
people are victims of identity theft every year.453 Twenty-six 
percent of consumer complaints submitted to the FTC in 2008 
concerned identity theft.454  
But identity theft is not the only risk related to data 
breaches.455 Some breaches can involve very personal and 
embarrassing information, such as when a firm accidentally 
posted to the Internet the names, addresses, phone numbers, 
credit card information, and details of the sex lives of ninety 
psychotherapy patients.456 Sometimes, breaches are due to a 
serious failing in a company’s procedures. In one instance, 
Metromail Corporation hired prison inmates to enter personal 
information into Metromail’s databases, and one inmate started 
sending sexually explicit letters with information about the 
recipients’ lives.457 In another more troubling instance, the 
                                                                                                     
 449. Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 9. 
 450. Credit Card Data Breach Contained, Says Global Payments, BBC NEWS 
(Apr. 3, 2012, 5:59 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-17596394 (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 451. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 110 (stating that the FTC 
estimated that 10 million Americans were victims of identity theft in 2003). 
 452. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1248 (noting the problems 
with viewing identity theft as an exclusively criminal matter). 
 453. Id. at 1244. 
 454. Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 9. 
 455. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1258 (“With ever more 
frequency, we are hearing stories about security glitches and other instances of 
personal data being leaked and abused.”). 
 456. See id. (providing examples of instances of security breaches of personal 
information in recent years). 
 457. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 53 (discussing 
“irresponsible and careless uses of personal information”). In another Metromail 
incident, a reporter contacted Metromail and successfully purchased a list of 
5,000 children after giving the name of the buyer as a known child molester and 
murderer. See id. at 53–54 (illustrating a lack of care and accountability in 
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company Docusearch provided a man with information about a 
woman named Amy Lynn Boyer, which the man then used in 
finding and murdering Boyer.458  
Cloud providers might not bear the risk of loss due to fraud, 
but companies have many incentives to secure data and prevent 
security breaches because large-scale breaches often result in 
negative publicity. Security breaches can destroy consumer 
confidence and devastate a company’s bottom line.459 However, 
this decrease in consumer confidence may not effectively 
incentivize the creation of stronger security protocols if cloud 
service providers store data in proprietary formats, making it 
difficult for current customers to leave. Thus, we argue that data 
control and format transparency could have benefits for security 
in the cloud by giving providers incentives to keep data secure in 
order to retain customers.  
4. Protecting Consumer Data—Who Watches the Watchers? 
Currently, consumers have fairly little control over their 
data, but there are other entities to help address data security 
issues. Several private bodies have set standards enabling 
companies to either seek certification as to the adequacy of their 
privacy practices, or otherwise measure their own actions against 
industry standards. These options include SAS 70 certification, 
which involves audits of firms’ control mechanisms to protect 
information;460 the Payment Card Industry Data Security 
                                                                                                     
corporate data collection). 
 458. See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1009 (N.H. 2003) 
(finding that Docusearch owed a duty of reasonable care when the company 
disclosed Boyer’s information to Liam Youens); SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra 
note 2, at 54 (providing the facts of the Docusearch case); Richards & Solove, 
supra note 1, at 1923 (discussing the holding in Docusearch and noting duty of 
care issues arising from computer databases).  
 459. See Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 26 (“A security breach affecting 
a corporation can destroy consumer confidence and be devastating to the bottom 
line.”). There was recently a breach at Heartland Security, leading to a loss of 
130 million credit card numbers. Id. at 45. Heartland has suffered major 
financial damages since the breach, including a $60 million settlement with 
Visa over the breach. Id. 
 460. See SAS 70 Overview, SAS 70, http://sas70.com/sas70_overview.html 
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Standard, which created IT guidelines for the credit card industry 
aimed at reducing the risk of a security breach;461 and the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which 
requires members to have policies and procedures addressing 
customer record safety, protecting against unauthorized access, 
and protecting against relevant anticipated threats.462 Companies 
on the Web may also seek TRUSTe certification for their privacy 
practices.463 These organizations are elements of the self-
regulatory framework that U.S. businesses currently use with 
regard to privacy. However, these certification authorities are 
largely sector-specific, and thus we recommend broader 
protections that do not rely on sector-specific self-regulatory 
bodies.  
When the sector-specific self-regulatory framework fails, 
there are sometimes other private solutions available. Customers 
may, for example, sue companies in the event of a database 
security breach, though courts disagree about whether a 
customer has standing based on a mere risk of future identity 
                                                                                                     
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing an overview of the standards) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Martin, supra note 44, at 297 
(“[P]ublic companies that fail to obtain SAS 70 qualification by adhering to 
certain procedures and controls can easily lose the confidence of investors and 
customers.”).  
 461. See PCI SSC Data Security Standards Overview, PCI SEC. STANDARDS 
COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/ (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2013) (providing an overview of the “comprehensive standards and 
supporting materials to enhance payment card data security”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 
44 (discussing the PCI DSS guidelines). Rhodes and Kunis note that there is a 
lack of direct enforcement of the PCI DSS, but argue that companies have 
incentive to enact the standards on their own. See id. at 45 (discussing the 
financial incentive to enact standards with the example of a breach at 
Heartland Security that resulted in a $60 million settlement with Visa). 
 462. See About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA, http:// 
www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing FINRA’s 
mission and message statement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); see also Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 46 (providing background 
on FINRA). 
 463. See Protecting Consumer Information Online, TRUSTE, http://www. 
truste.com/why_TRUSTe_privacy_services/privacy_best_practices (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2013) (providing examples of the best privacy practices that businesses 
can utilize to build trust with their customers) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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theft or if standing requires actual identity theft to have 
occurred.464 There are also other organizations that focus on 
online consumer protection issues, including the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Digital Due Process 
(DDP). These organizations are more policy-oriented and may do 
things like filing privacy-oriented amicus briefs in relevant 
litigation. 
In terms of government intervention, the FTC has also 
become involved with personal data security and other privacy 
issues, using its authority to challenge unfair or deceptive 
practices.465 The first FTC action that primarily concerned a 
company’s data security practices was in 2004 against BJ’s 
Wholesale Club after hundreds of instances of identity theft arose 
due to BJ’s data security failings.466 An advantage to FTC 
involvement over private litigation by consumers is the ability of 
the FTC to bring an action against a company in the absence of 
identity theft. For example, the FTC fined Choicepoint in 2006 
after a breach resulted in 163,000 private financial records being 
compromised, citing Choicepoint’s privacy policy as containing 
“inaccurate and misleading assertions about its security 
procedures.”467 The FTC may also bring an action when a 
company fails to adequately secure its data, even if there has not 
                                                                                                     
 464. See Jonathon J. Darrow & Stephen D. Lichtenstein, “Do You Really 
Need My Social Security Number?”: Data Collection Practices in the Digital Age, 
10 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 1, 30 (2008) (discussing the issue of standing in consumer 
data breach cases). 
 465. See Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 36 (discussing the FTC’s 
jurisdiction and enforcement authority); Wittow & Buller, supra note 7, at 9 
(noting that, as of the time of the authors’ writing, the FTC had filed twenty-
seven enforcement actions concerning the data security practices of companies). 
The FTC requires companies to institute “reasonable safeguards” to protect 
information, and what is “reasonable” depends on factors like how sensitive the 
data is and how costly it would be for the company to avoid potential risks. See 
Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 36 (discussing the “reasonableness” standard 
applied by the FTC beginning in 2006 to bolster the enforcement of data 
security risks). 
 466. See Rhodes & Kunis, supra note 23, at 37 (noting the FTC’s conclusion 
that the security failings amounted to an unfair practice in violation of federal 
law).  
 467. Id.  
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actually been a data breach.468 The FTC could also potentially 
bring an action against a business that uses deceptive practices 
to obtain information.469 
As an alternative to extending current regulations to new 
data issues in the cloud, some argue that the FTC and its current 
authorities could be used to enforce a company’s privacy policy 
against it.470 However, after examining a number of privacy 
policies, we argue that this approach would not be wise given the 
reality that many companies adopt vague privacy policy language 
regarding the company’s own obligations.471 It is also unclear 
whether the FTC would be the appropriate regulatory body in all 
instances because the FTC usually regulates e-commerce issues, 
but providers whose services count as telecommunications or 
information services would also be governed by FCC 
regulations.472 We also assert that relying on government 
                                                                                                     
 468. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1856–57 (“[T]he [FTC] has 
taken actions against companies that fail to provide adequate data security . . . 
even in the absence of a data breach, though more typically it acts only once a 
data spill has occurred.”). The FTC also settled an enforcement action against 
Sears in 2009, based on Sears’s practice of tracking customers without 
adequately disclosing details of the tracking program to the customers, and 
another action against EchoMetrix in 2010 concerning parental control software 
that also provided information to marketers about children’s computer activity. 
See id. at 1858 (discussing the “more substantive approach to disclosure of 
company behaviors” taken by the FTC in enforcement actions). 
 469. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1185 (“The use of fraud or other 
deceptive practices in obtaining consumer data could also constitute a violation 
of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), and would fall within 
the powers of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to deter and punish unfair 
trade practices . . . .”). 
 470. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 72 (noting that the FTC 
has recently brought actions for “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” against 
companies that violate their own privacy policies); McCarthy, supra note 95, at 
2260 (discussing the possibility of enforcing PHR vendors’ privacy policies 
against them). McCarthy argues, however, that HIPAA would be a stronger way 
to address privacy issues with personal health records. See id. at 2261 
(contrasting HIPAA and the FTC by stating that “HIPAA mandates that 
covered entities take constant concern over privacy and security by continually 
auditing, monitoring, and augmenting security when necessary”). 
 471. See infra Part V.C (providing an analysis of and statistical information 
on privacy policies). 
 472. See Soma, Gates, & Smith, supra note 16, at 490–91 (suggesting the 
possibility of a joint rulemaking between the FTC and FCC to address these 
issues). 
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agencies to address the failure of companies to give consumers 
meaningful control over their data would be ineffectual because 
the most likely approach would be through adjudication, in which 
individual consumers would not be clearly represented, in an 
adjudicatory process that by definition would only address 
problems on an ad hoc basis. On this point, we argue that 
regulating this behavior in advance would be more beneficial to 
consumers than case-by-case adjudication. 
5. Tracking Technologies and Behavioral Marketing 
Another element of privacy policies that is relevant to the 
issue of data control is the use of technologies to track consumer 
behavior. Privacy policies typically address the tracking 
technologies that a website uses for advertising or other 
purposes. When tracking users, advertisers may use technologies 
like cookies, flash cookies, and Web beacons. The degree to which 
companies disclose the use of these tracking technologies 
varies.473 The information collected using these tracking 
technologies can then be used by companies to profile 
consumers.474 Consumers typically have the option to decline 
some tracking technologies, often by adjusting the settings of 
their Web browsers to decline all cookies. However, we suggest 
that this option does not represent a meaningful exercise of 
                                                                                                     
 473. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 372 (providing data 
comparing actual privacy practices to declared privacy practices of numerous 
websites); Lanois, supra note 18, at 34 (referencing a study that found that the 
top fifty websites installed, on average, sixty-four pieces of tracking technology 
when a visitor loaded the site, and usually did not provide a warning that they 
were doing so). 
 474. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1157 (discussing the “profiling 
industry” and noting that the profiles may include “a person’s social security 
number, shopping preferences, health information . . . financial information, 
race, weight, clothing size, arrest record, lifestyle preferences, hobbies, religion, 
reading preferences, homeownership, charitable contributions, mail order 
purchases and type, and pet ownership”); see also SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, 
supra note 2, at 50 (noting private companies’ recent use of information to 
categorize people as either angel customers or demon customers, and the 
practices of some banks to deny credit card applications from college students 
majoring in liberal arts). 
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control because many websites require cookies to be enabled for 
website functionality. 
A cookie is a text file that is downloaded to a user’s computer 
when she accesses a website, and it acts as an identifier for the 
computer on which it is stored.475 Cookies by themselves do not 
contain a user’s personal information under most definitions of 
the term,476 but a company called DoubleClick provides a service 
to websites, connecting cookies to personal information to enable 
more targeted advertising.477 Flash cookies have a similar effect 
to text cookies, but some flash cookies may be able to reconstruct 
previously deleted browser cookies and cannot be controlled by 
the user.478 Recent research revealed that out of the one hundred 
most popular websites, fifty-four used flash cookies, but only four 
sites mentioned the use of flash cookies in their privacy 
policies.479 Web beacons, the third type of tracking technology 
noted above, permit the advertiser to observe a user’s website 
activity in real time.480  
Behavioral marketing is advertising that is targeted at 
individuals based on their past behavior patterns.481 The 
environment of behavioral marketing has developed substantially 
                                                                                                     
 475. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 24 (referring to cookies as 
“a form of high-tech cattle-branding”); Lanois, supra note 18, at 33 (explaining 
how cookies work and why they are useful for both advertising and consumers). 
 476. However, because cookies typically collect a user’s IP address, this is 
sufficient to find that cookies collect “personal data” for purposes of the EU’s 
Data Protection Directive. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 41 (“In practice, almost 
all cookies involve the processing of personal data because even if the user’s real 
identity remains anonymous, cookies typically involve the collection of the user’s 
IP address, the processing of unique identifiers, or both which are personal data 
within the scope of the Data Protection Directive.”). 
 477. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 24–25 (explaining how 
DoubleClick functions). 
 478. See Lanois, supra note 18, at 35 (discussing a lawsuit that involved the 
distinction between flash cookies and traditional cookies). 
 479. Id. at 36. 
 480. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1851 (“Some technology, 
particularly the beacon, or ‘Web bug,’ permits real-time observation of a user’s 
activity on an Internet page, including where one’s mouse moved and the 
information that one typed, such as search queries or personal information that 
an individual filled into a form.”). 
 481. See id. at 1849 (introducing the concept of behavioral marketing). 
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over the last century, becoming more effective as marketers have 
gained access to more detailed information.482 Behavioral 
marketing has led to advertisers buying access to individuals who 
match a particular consumer profile.483 There is a market for 
consumer data that is collected and can be used for targeting 
advertisements, with information about an individual’s browsing 
habits selling for a fraction of a cent on the data exchange.484 
Because declining all cookies would likely lessen a user’s Web 
browsing experience, researchers have worked to develop a 
technology that focuses on collection by third parties, like third-
party advertisers that collect data for behavioral advertising. 
Concerns over such data collection and the possible privacy 
implications thereof have led to calls for a “Do Not Track” (DNT) 
standard, similar to a “Do Not Call” registry, that would allow 
users to opt out of tracking by third parties.485 Mozilla’s Firefox 
already includes DNT capabilities.486 Additionally, Microsoft 
made DNT the default setting for Internet Explorer 10, and 
Google announced that Google Chrome would have DNT 
capabilities by the end of 2012.487  
                                                                                                     
 482. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 19 (noting that direct 
mail has a yield-per-cost ratio double that of television advertisements). 
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supra note 3, at 1851 (“Marketers draw on extensive databases . . . . They are 
able to cross-reference online activity with offline records including home 
ownership, family income, marital status, zip code, and a host of other 
information, such as one’s recent purchases as well as favorite restaurants, 
movies, and TV shows.”). 
 484. See Richards, supra note 114, at 1157–58 (noting that in some places, 
consumer profiles can be bought for $65 for a thousand names); Schwartz & 
Solove, supra note 3, at 1852 (explaining that browsing information sells for as 
little as a tenth of a cent but that it adds up to a billion-dollar industry). 
 485. See Do Not Track, Universal Web Tracking Opt Out, 
http://donottrack.us/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing an overview of the “Do 
Not Track” policy proposal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 486. See Do Not Track, MOZILLA FIREFOX, http://www.mozilla.org/en-US/dnt/ 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing answers to frequently asked questions 
about the “Do Not Track” preference) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 487. See Kate Solomon, Chrome Adds Do Not Track, Rolling Out by End of 
the Year, TECHRADAR (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.techradar.com/news/internet/ 
web/chrome-adds-do-not-track-rolling-out-by-end-of-the-year-1099241 (last 
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Modern consumers are often uneasy about the pervasiveness 
of behavioral advertising,488 and some research questions the 
ultimate value of targeted advertising.489 However, there is 
currently not much recourse available to consumers whose data is 
mined. The privacy torts typically require an invasion to be of an 
offensive nature, but most of the time, information collection is of 
largely innocuous information.490 For these reasons, one of our 
proposals relevant to data control focuses on the possibility of 
withdrawing data that was mined using these technologies. A 
DNT system, as described above, may also assist with limiting 
future unauthorized collection, provided that most websites 
eventually adopt it. At the time of this writing, however, many 
websites and advertisers have not adopted a DNT-friendly 
implementation.491 Even if the market solutions become more 
viable, our proposed data withdrawal and data portability rights 
are designed to inform and empower consumers, enabling more 
meaningful participation in the vigorous market for cloud 
services. In our view, such rights would be complementary to, and 
not supplanted by, an effective opt-out DNT regime.  
                                                                                                     
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (explaining the DNT option that will be added to the Google 
Chrome browser) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 488. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1854 (suggesting that 
consumer objections to behavioral advertising should be addressed through 
policy). 
 489. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lori Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy 
Policies, 4 J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 540, 541 (2008) (concluding that targeted 
advertising “may have negative social utility” after taking into account the 
opportunity costs required if everyone read and understood privacy policies). 
 490. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1919 (citing Shibley v. Time, 
Inc. for its holding that disclosure of subscriber information did not meet the 
requirements of causing “mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of 
ordinary sensibilities.” (citing Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ct. App. 
Ohio 1975))). 
 491. See Solomon, supra note 487 (“The main problem with DNT, though, is 
that not all that many websites and advertisers actually abide by it, since it’s 
more of a guideline than an actual rule.”). In fact, some critics say that DNT 
simply does not work and, in addition, that advertisers are adopting an 
interpretation of DNT that is contrary to the intent of those promoting DNT. See 
Ed Bott, Why Do Not Track is Worse Than a Miserable Failure, ZDNET (Sept. 
21, 2012, 12:35 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/why-do-not-track-is-worse-than-a-
miserable-failure-7000004634/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (criticizing DNT and 
arguing that it does not work) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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6. Personally Identifiable Information and “Anonymous” 
Information 
The final concept that we will address in the context of 
privacy policies is the treatment of certain types of information. 
Arguments about the degree of protection to which information is 
entitled often turn on the type of information being protected. In 
the context of information privacy, the focus is often on 
personally identifiable information (PII), and on information that 
is considered sensitive. Computer use in the 1960s led to PII 
becoming more of an issue because companies and government 
entities were processing a lot of personal data.492 PII is a term 
that is often used to describe information that is clearly 
connected to a specific person, though there is no uniform 
definition of the term.493 Service providers often focus on assuring 
customers that their PII will be kept safe. 
Regulatory intervention is often focused on protecting PII, in 
part because of the threats posed by identity thieves. Statutes 
define PII in several different ways. Some define PII as 
information that is personally identifiable, some define PII as 
information that is not public, and some define it by providing 
specific examples of information that is PII.494 With PII, the 
question is often whether information is identified or identifiable, 
which respectively refers to whether information immediately 
connects to an identified person or can be used to lead to an 
identified person, given more information.495 In the United 
States, the concept of PII is largely limited to identified data, 
whereas the European Union takes an expansionist view of PII 
that treats identified data the same as data that is only 
identifiable.496 Schwartz and Solove argue that the European 
                                                                                                     
 492. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1820 (explaining why the PII 
became an issue in the 1960s). 
 493. See id. at 1816 (“Given PII’s importance, it is surprising that 
information privacy law in the United States lacks a uniform definition of the 
term.”). 
 494. See id. at 1828 (identifying the competing definitions of PII). 
 495. See id. at 1817 (setting forth a “PII 2.0” model that proposes “two 
categories of PII, ‘identified’ and ‘identifiable’ data,” and treats them 
differently). 
 496. See id. (comparing the United States and European models); see also id. 
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Union’s expansionist approach is more consistent with the 
technology than a reductionist approach that limits PII 
protections to identified personal data.497 
The idea of categorizing information as PII, however, has 
become more problematic over the years. The line between 
identified and identifiable has become increasingly blurred, as 
has the line between sensitive and nonsensitive. A social security 
number is generally viewed as very sensitive information, but 
date of birth may be considered less so. However, computer 
science has shown that a person’s social security number can be 
estimated to some degree of accuracy if one knows the person’s 
date of birth and the city in which they were born.498 If a 
database contains a very large amount of nonsensitive 
information, the aggregation of the information can track a 
person’s whole existence.499 A person’s search queries are an 
example of seemingly anonymous information that could 
nonetheless lead to an identifiable person, especially considering 
common behaviors like searching for local businesses, 
information on particular medical diagnoses, and vanity searches 
when an individual will often search for her own name to see 
what results emerge.500 
                                                                                                     
at 1875 (noting that Canada takes a similar approach to that of the European 
Union). 
 497. See id. at 1875 (“The European Union’s expansionist approach to PII is 
more in tune with technology than is the United States’ reductionist 
approach.”). 
 498. See id. at 1846 (citing a recent study by Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph 
Gross). 
 499. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 164 (“The synthesis of data from a user’s 
web search history coupled with email, photos, documents, voicemails, phone 
logs, and location, creates a profile of an individual that serves as behavior 
modeling for advertisers. This same data could just as easily be disclosed to law 
enforcement officials for criminal profiling.”); see also Richards, supra note 114, 
at 1158 (acknowledging the privacy concern that “uber-databases can be 
created, composed of nonsensitive information in such enormous quantities that 
the database constitutes a highly detailed dossier of a person’s entire 
existence”). 
 500. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the 
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1717–18 (2010) 
(providing an example of AOL search queries being used to identify individuals); 
Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1848 (explaining that “if the user has 
engaged in a highly specific search, or multiple searches, she becomes more 
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Even if identifying information is removed, that does not 
necessarily solve the privacy problems. Reidentification science is 
a new field in computer science research that reattaches 
anonymized information to identified individuals.501 Researchers 
may reidentify a dataset by, for example, comparing two 
databases, one anonymized and one containing PII and some 
information fields in common with the anonymized database.502 
The FTC has recently acknowledged that the distinction between 
PII and de-identified information is often blurred.503 Because of 
the ease with which data can be reidentified, Ohm suggests 
rejecting the concept of PII entirely, though Schwartz and Solove 
instead suggest a reunderstanding of what information should be 
considered PII.504 
                                                                                                     
identifiable” and “[a]t some point, a search allows a person to be readily 
identifiable”). 
 501. See Ohm, supra note 500, at 1704 (arguing that the science of 
reidentification should be of more concern to policymakers than PII). 
 502. See id. at 1725–26 (explaining the basic principles of how 
reidentification functions). One potential source of databases containing PII is 
public records, which many times may be obtained upon a showing that the 
request is not for an improper purpose. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 
2, at 133 (discussing the history of public record disclosure laws). Public records 
that may be so obtained include a person’s vital records and records of a person’s 
interactions with government. See id. at 128–29, 134 (demonstrating the 
breadth of personal information contained in public records). When a person 
makes a state or federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the state 
may redact private personal information, but the person to whom the 
information corresponds cannot object to a disclosure if the state does not redact 
such information. See id. at 135 (“The federal FOIA doesn’t require that a 
person be given notice that his or her personal information is encompassed 
within a FOIA request. Even if an individual finds out about the request, she 
has no right under FOIA to prevent or second-guess an agency’s decision . . . .”). 
 503. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1828 (discussing the core 
conceptual problems with PII recently identified by the FTC). The Seventh 
Circuit has also noted the problem of reidentification, holding that redacting 
patient identities in a series of records about recipients of partial birth abortions 
was not sufficient to avoid violating the patients’ privacy rights. See id. at 1844 
(recognizing that “de-identified data can readily be re-identified” (citing Nw. 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004))). 
 504. Compare Ohm, supra note 500, at 1742–45 (arguing that the concept of 
PII must be replaced to allow for privacy law to move forward), with Schwartz & 
Solove, supra note 3, at 1817 (arguing that “PII must be re-conceptualized if 
privacy law is to remain effective in the future”). 
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Considering the technological issues, theorists who urge 
government regulation should evaluate which approach to PII 
should be taken. Reidentification science should be examined by 
policymakers to determine whether the concept of PII should be 
expanded to include both identified and identifiable information. 
Schwartz and Solove propose a model in which information is 
considered identified when the person’s identity is ascertained, 
identifiable when there is a nonremote possibility of future 
identification, and nonidentifiable when the risk of identification 
is remote and the information is not relatable to a person.505 We 
argue that limited government intervention would be beneficial 
to set a baseline for protection of PII to mitigate threats to 
identity security, but we do not take a position on the identified–
identifiable dichotomy. The existence of such regulations would 
likely raise consumer awareness of these threats. Once informed, 
we expect that consumers will express a preference for exercising 
meaningful control over their PII, whether identified or 
identifiable. 
V. Empirical Analysis of Agreements and Policies in the Cloud 
In the interest of empirically establishing a baseline for the 
current status of “data control” terms in contemporary 
agreements, we examined the privacy policies and TOS 
agreements of several different cloud providers. Our sample size 
is fairly small, consisting of twelve TOS agreements and nineteen 
privacy policies, but because so many companies use boilerplate 
language for these agreements, even though they may include 
different types of provisions, our small sample size is nonetheless 
very likely to be fairly representative of the industry. In fact, 
insofar as our sample emphasizes several enterprise-oriented 
companies with fee-based structures, in addition to consumer-
oriented companies that rely on advertising revenue, our findings 
may provide a more generous estimate of the degree to which the 
terms of agreements favor the customer. 
                                                                                                     
 505. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1878 (discussing their proposed 
model of PII). 
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A. Methodology 
In collecting the privacy policies and TOS agreements, we 
first used a report by BTC Logic that identified thirteen 
companies that are viewed as leaders in cloud computing.506 In 
addition to the BTC Logic report, we also collected TOS 
agreements and privacy policies for six additional consumer-
oriented cloud services whose information was available through 
Quantcast’s website.507 Most of these companies made their 
privacy policies available on a company website. In addition to 
privacy policies for all nineteen companies, we collected twelve 
separately labeled TOS agreements and one set of disclaimers 
from EMC that did not include other terms commonly found in 
TOS agreements.508  
                                                                                                     
 506. See BTC Logic Ranks: Top 10 Cloud Companies, BTC LOGIC (2010), 
http://www.btclogic.com/documents/BTCLogic_TopTen_Q22010.pdf (providing a 
ranking and report of the top ten cloud computing companies). Based on their 
appearances in the list of the top thirteen cloud companies, we included in our 
sample: Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Cisco, Citrix, EMC, Level 3, Oracle, Red 
Hat, Sales Force, Symantec, VMWare, and IBM.  
 507. The additional six companies whose agreements we analyzed were: 
Carbonite, Dropbox, Flickr, Facebook, GoDaddy, and Apple. For Apple, we 
specifically looked at the TOS agreement and privacy policy for Apple’s new 
iCloud service. Quantcast is a company that is very active in the Web 
advertising arena, with a website that provides detailed information about 
services on the web. Quantcast also provides a list of the top 100 websites in 
terms of visits. Top Sites, QUANTCAST, http://www.quantcast.com/top-sites (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing a ranked list of websites based on the number of 
people in the United States who visit each month) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 508. Some companies declined to disclose sample TOS agreements. We 
attribute this in part to the different business models of the companies. If a 
product is anticipated to be widely deployed to a large number of people, such as 
Amazon’s AWS or Google’s ad-supported services, the TOS will most likely be 
standardized to address the company’s relationships with a large population. 
When a service provider is contracting with an established enterprise that is 
paying a large sum for these services, we anticipate that the contracting is likely 
to be more balanced, with TOS agreements being tailored to the specific 
customer. Some companies such as IBM focus on very customer-specific services 
with a target audience of large enterprises, and the terms will change based on 
the specific needs of the customer. In those situations, the TOS will be more like 
a standard contract between two parties than the click-wrap agreements that 
individual consumers are familiar with through installing software on their 
systems. 















EMC X X 
Level 3 X X 
Oracle X 
Red Hat X 
Salesforce X X 
Symantec X X 
Vmware X X 
IBM X 
Carbonite X X 
Dropbox X X 
Flickr X X 
Facebook X X 
iCloud X X 
GoDaddy X X 
Google X X 
The remaining six companies, all from the BTC Logic 
sample, did not make a boilerplate TOS agreement available to 
noncustomers, and these companies often targeted their services 
at enterprise customers. In these situations, TOS agreements 
may be closer to a traditional contract. However, consumers with 
fewer resources, like end users and small businesses, are likely to 
have no bargaining power. These consumers are the anticipated 
beneficiaries of the changes we suggest. Currently, small 
businesses and end users are simply not given reasonable 
alternatives for controlling their data. Thus, the current market 
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is inefficient, notwithstanding the availability of more involved 
contracting when the customer is a wealthy enterprise.  
One of the challenges of educating the public about privacy 
policies and TOS agreements is that many times, people assume 
that these agreements are all the same. We posit that a detailed, 
side-by-side comparison of agreement provisions based on 
provision categories would prove the most helpful in noting both 
similarities and differences between these provisions. Thus, once 
we had collected the privacy policies and TOS agreements, we 
first carefully read the language of the agreements with an eye to 
creating categories and subcategories to permit us to compare the 
language of several agreements from a top-down perspective. We 
then categorized the different provisions and noted in our 
research whether certain provisions were present or absent in a 
given company’s available policies.  
The purposes of privacy policies and TOS agreements are 
very different. Privacy policies generally focus on information 
that can identify the individual, whereas TOS agreements 
generally focus on matters relevant to potential conflicts between 
a company and its customers. Both types of agreement reflect a 
company’s policies with regard to data control. Privacy policies 
are more directly relevant to data control issues relating to the 
control of personal information. TOS agreements, on the other 
hand, often address matters like the ownership of intellectual 
property and the processes to be followed to obtain stored data 
upon termination of service. 
Analyzing a collection of nineteen privacy policies and twelve 
TOS agreements applicable to cloud services, a number of 
patterns emerged. The following subparts will first give a brief 
overview of our findings with respect to TOS agreements and 
privacy policies, and then discuss the implications of these 
patterns.  
B. Terms of Service Agreements 
TOS agreements typically address potential legal conflicts in 
advance. These agreements may use choice of law and venue 
provisions to state where litigation must take place, indemnify 
the company against third parties, limit damages either by type 
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or by setting a cap for damage awards,509 and disclaim warranties 
to the extent permitted by law.510 The TOS agreements in our 
sample addressed major topics like these. Seven of the twelve 
noted that the company might alter the services offered, but only 
two of the twelve stated that they would give notice to customers 
of such changes. This is significant because that means that most 
of the companies in our sample provide little information upfront 
about the degree to which customers will be notified of service 
changes.  
For our purposes, one relevant aspect of this relationship is 
the issue of exercising control over data upon termination. Within 
our sample, eleven of the twelve TOS agreements set out 
conditions for account termination. Ten of the twelve set out 
conditions in which the company is authorized to terminate an 
account for cause, and two of the twelve set out conditions in 
which either party to the contract can terminate an account for 
cause, including a breach of the agreement between the parties. 
Six of the twelve also include provisions allowing customers to 
terminate their accounts for any reason.  
Only five of the twelve, however, address the issue of data 
access after an account is terminated, and how and when a 
customer may access the provider’s servers to back up their files 
and delete them from the servers. The removal of information 
from the company’s servers also implicates document retention 
policy, which is sometimes addressed in a company’s privacy 
policy. Eleven of our full sample of nineteen companies address 
document retention to some extent, and refer to the company’s 
possible limitations under the law concerning permanent deletion 
of a customer’s data.  
  
                                                                                                     
 509. See, e.g., Amazon Web Services, Customer Agreement, AMAZON (Mar. 15, 
2012), http://aws.amazon.com/agreement/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (disclaiming 
liability in paragraph eleven for “direct, indirect, incidental, special, 
consequential, or exemplary damages”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 510. States following the Uniform Commercial Code will often not recognize 
a contractual waiver of certain implied warranties unless the waiver is 
conspicuous within the written contract. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1977). 
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Table 2 
TERMINATION OF ACCOUNT (out of 12)   
Lists when company may terminate for cause 10 
Lists when either may terminate for cause 2 
Permits customer to terminate without cause 6 
Includes provisions for temporary account 
suspension 1 
Specifies time period for former customer to access 
and delete information* 4 
TOS does not address 2 
* However, 11 of the 19 in our full sample also 
refer to the possibility that they may be required 
by law to retain customer information.   
In TOS agreements, we were especially concerned about the 
extent to which the information remains the property of the 
customer. All twelve companies in our TOS sample included 
statements asserting the company’s rights in its own intellectual 
property that it was licensing to its customers, though only six of 
the twelve included a provision reiterating that the customer’s 
intellectual property remains his own. Three of the twelve 
(Amazon, Flickr, and Apple) reserve a license in the customer’s IP 
to the company limited to the purpose for which the customer 
submitted the content. Another set of three companies in the 
sample (Facebook, GoDaddy, and Google) also address the 
granting of a license to the customer’s IP, but these latter three 
do not include explicit restrictive language that would limit the 
scope of the license to the customer’s initial purposes. Eleven of 
the thirteen companies for which we had TOS agreements or sets 
of disclaimers also include provisions whereby the company 
retains full rights in suggestions or ideas submitted by 
customers, and can therefore use or implement these suggestions 
as they see fit without giving the submitter of the idea any form 
of credit or acknowledgment.  
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Table 3 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (out of 12)   
The company retains full rights in its intellectual 
property that it is licensing to the customer 12 
The customer retains full rights in his intellectual 
property that is maintained on the company’s 
servers 6 
The company obtains a license to use the 
customer’s content, not explicitly limited to 
purpose for which it was originally submitted 3 
The company obtains a license to use the 
customer’s content for marketing purposes 1 
The company owns all rights in any e-mails, 
suggestions, or ideas that the customer sends to 
the company 11 
C. Privacy Policies 
There are some things that all or almost all of the policies in 
our sample addressed. All of the companies that we examined 
gave examples of situations in which they would gather users’ 
personal information and how they would make use of it, such as 
obtaining the user’s name, e-mail address, and other contact 
information in order to register the user’s account and process the 
user’s requests. Eighteen of the nineteen companies in our 
sample also purport to give their customers some control over the 
collection of their personal information, which may include the 
ability to opt out of data collection or the ability to access and edit 
personal information already on file with the company. Eighteen 
of the providers in our sample also addressed compliance with 
either TRUSTe or Safe Harbor, security concerns, changes to the 
privacy policy, and included a section about the use of tracking 
technologies. 
  
450 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341 (2013) 
Table 4 
19 out of 19 Privacy Policies 
included: 
18 out of 19 Privacy Policies 
included: 
Data gathering by the company Customer control over information 
How the company uses that data Security of user information 
When may customer data be 
disclosed to third parties Changes to privacy policy 
  Complies with TRUSTe or Safe Harbor 
  Use of tracking technologies 
All of the providers in our sample also included information 
about sharing customer information with third parties. When the 
question turned to with whom and when a user’s personal 
information would be shared, however, the differences between 
the agreements began to stand out. For example, all nineteen 
companies included lawful government requests as a condition for 
disclosing customer information, ten said customer information 
may be disclosed in order to investigate, prevent, or take action 
concerning violations of the law or the company’s TOS, and four 
said that customer information may be disclosed so that the 
company can defend itself in court or assert its legal rights. 
Generally, the enumerated situations in which user information 
can be disclosed are fairly rational, with an eye to protecting 
customers’ privacy interests. However, two companies noted in 
their privacy policies that they may disclose customer 
information to the company’s business partners for the partners’ 
direct marketing purposes.  
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We identified eleven total categories of situations for 
information disclosure, and noted that out of our nineteen privacy 
policies, the companies listed between two and nine of these when 
describing information disclosure. Listing more categories of 
disclosure does not necessarily mean that a company is less 
protective of privacy, but it does underscore the variety and 
complexity inherent in analyzing these agreements. 
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People have been told for years to be careful of how much 
they disclose about themselves online in public forums,511 so it is 
not a surprise that many of the companies that provide chat 
forums and bulletin boards for their customers also include 
disclaimers in their privacy policies that information disclosed in 
these forums is not protected by the company’s privacy policy. 
Another fairly common-sense provision that fifteen of the 
nineteen providers include in their privacy policies is a disclaimer 
that the company does not control the privacy policies of third 
parties whose websites the customer may access through links on 
                                                                                                     
 511. See, e.g., David Gregorio, Be Careful What You Post Online, Career 
Counselors Warn, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2009, 1:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2009/08/06/us-careers-socialmedia-tech-life-idUSTRE5754U220090806 (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (describing how online interactions “present numerous 
opportunities to sabotage [one’s] hunt for a job or promotion”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Michelle Singletary, Be Careful Online: Not 
Everyone Is a True ‘Friend’, THE COLOR OF MONEY (May 14, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/13/AR20090513034 
39.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (“Like a pickpocket working a crowded public 
venue, cyber thieves may be collecting information that makes victimizing you so 
much easier with all the personal data you provide.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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the company’s website. These provisions usually advise the 
customers to read the privacy policies of the third-party websites.  
Of the nineteen, only Symantec and Citrix explicitly stated 
that their customers’ information may be disclosed to the 
company’s business partners for direct marketing purposes. 
Fifteen of the nineteen policies state that the company will not 
step outside the language of the privacy policy unless the 
customer gives consent. Disclosure to business partners is 
generally covered by another button on a form that a customer 
either checks or unchecks to give permission to the company to 
share information with these business partners for marketing 
purposes. Generally, the companies in this sample seem very 
aware of the negative press associated with selling user 
information to data farming firms.512 Four companies in our 
sample note that they may disclose aggregated information for 
statistical purposes. Red Hat is one of the four, but its privacy 
policy also assures that once this information is aggregated, it is 
no longer traceable to the original individual. 
Another element found in all but one of the privacy policies 
was a discussion of security measures to protect customer data. 
Data security is not directly related to data control, but as we 
noted above in Part IV.A.3, giving customers the power to 
withdraw and move their data may result in security-driven 
decisions to change services, thus giving companies incentive to 
implement stronger security measures to retain customers. 
Thirteen of the nineteen companies in our sample referred to 
their use of industry standard or commercially reasonable 
security measures. Some of these companies also listed specific 
technological or organizational measures in place, but others 
                                                                                                     
 512. See, e.g., Mitch Lipka, Twitter Is Selling Your Data, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 
2012, 11:35 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/twitter-data-
idUSL2E8DTEK420120301 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (“Twitter users are about 
to become major marketing fodder, as two research companies get set to release 
information to clients who will pay for the privilege of mining the data.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jason Morris & Ed Lavandera, Why 
Big Companies Buy, Sell Your Data, CNN (Aug. 23, 2012 3:42 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/23/tech/web/big-data-acxiom/index.html (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2013) (“Acxiom . . . is just one of hundreds of companies who are peering 
into your personal life, collecting data that is generated from everything you do 
online . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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simply included a vague statement about implementing industry 
standards. Another common element of security is encryption, 
and twelve of the nineteen stated that they use SSL encryption 
during the transfer of data. Twelve of the nineteen also stressed 
the importance of customers being proactive with the security of 
their own systems, and six emphasized that no electronic storage 
or transmission would ever be 100% secure. Only one company, 
Oracle, gave any information about what steps would be taken in 
the event that a customer’s user information was compromised.  
Because information will be governed by different laws when 
it is located in different countries, companies also must keep 
jurisdictional issues in mind when describing their privacy 
practices. A majority of the companies (fifteen of nineteen) 
include a provision in the privacy policy notifying the customer 
that their data may be transferred to and processed in other 
countries. Only Amazon appears to give customers a meaningful 
choice of where their information is stored and processed, with its 
privacy policy stating that data will not be moved to other regions 
without the customer’s consent.  
The question of where data is stored is significant, especially 
when the company has customers within the European Union. 
Because the European Union has strict privacy requirements, 
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U.S. companies that wish to transfer personal information from 
the European Union to the United States must certify compliance 
with the Safe Harbor program.513 Sixteen of the nineteen 
companies in our sample certify in their privacy policies that they 
are in compliance with this program. Two of the three companies 
that do not state compliance with Safe Harbor do, however, 
certify compliance with TRUSTe standards. Of the nineteen 
companies, eight certify compliance with both Safe Harbor and 
TRUSTe. Only one company, Citrix, does not refer to either the 
Safe Harbor program or adherence to TRUSTe standards in its 
privacy policy.  
To exercise meaningful data control, consumers should be 
informed about how data is collected. Most of the companies in 
our sample detailed their use of Web tracking technologies within 
their privacy policies. Eighteen of the nineteen companies 
disclosed their use of cookies on their websites, sixteen of the 
nineteen disclosed that they used IP logs to track user behavior, 
and thirteen of the nineteen indicated that they used Web 
beacons to track user behavior. Sixteen of the nineteen also listed 
other information that they collected from users, including 
information on the user’s browser and operating system, and 
other information that can be obtained using Javascript. Only 
four of the nineteen companies include flash cookies in the list of 
technologies utilized. However, as earlier research has noted, the 
use of flash cookies is sometimes unreported by companies.514 
                                                                                                     
 513. See Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 
95/46/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7 (EC); see also EXPORT.GOV, supra note 400. 
 514. See supra note 473 and accompanying text (“The degree to which 
companies disclose the use of these tracking technologies varies.”). 
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Privacy policies and TOS agreements for services in the cloud 
may also change periodically to reflect new priorities or activities 
on the part of the provider. When companies are empowered to 
change the terms of agreements unilaterally in material ways, 
this can undermine user efforts to control data at the outset of 
the contractual relationship. The privacy policies of eighteen of 
the nineteen companies in our sample addressed changes to the 
privacy policy. All eighteen indicated that notice of material 
changes would be posted on the company’s website. Only six of 
those, however, gave any indication of either how long the notice 
would be posted or whether it would be posted before the changes 
went into effect. Eleven of the eighteen also indicated that the 
company might contact the customers directly to notify them of 
material changes to the privacy policy. These varying approaches 
to keeping consumers informed of changes are troubling, and are 
also reminiscent of our findings in the TOS agreement portion of 
this study, where we found that of the seven companies that 
discussed changes to the service, only two indicated that the 
company would notify current customers of the changes. 
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D. Analysis and Discussion 
In analyzing these documents, we placed the provisions into 
broad categories. For privacy policies, the categories included 
provisions listing how and why personal information would be 
gathered, when and with whom it would be shared, security of 
information, whether personal information is transferred to other 
jurisdictions, the collection of non-personally identifying data, 
provisions addressing third party content and advertisements, 
and provisions addressing customer control over information. In 
terms of these larger categories, the companies that we looked at 
generally have similar priorities. With respect to security, the 
companies that we examined were more likely to speak in vague 
terms, with little specific detail (with the exception that most 
companies referenced SSL encryption). The TOS agreements that 
we analyzed tended to be more detailed, but this may be because 
TOS agreements are designed to protect specific rights of the 
companies. In a TOS agreement, a company will generally 
address the company’s liability for harms to the customer and 
what recourse a customer may have. A company is also likely to 
address intellectual property issues, though their primary 
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interest is typically on protection of the company’s rights rather 
than the customer’s rights.  
As noted above in Part IV.A.4, consumers are likely to be 
unable to enforce a company’s privacy policy against it. Under § 5 
of the FTC Act,515 however, the FTC is empowered to take action 
against companies that engage in unfair or deceptive trade 
practices,516 and the FTC has a precedent of using this authority 
to take action against companies that fail to comply with their 
own privacy policies.517 Given the possibility that a company 
could face legal problems for failing to comply with its own 
privacy policy, this gives a perverse incentive for a company to 
commit to as little as possible and inform its customers of as little 
as possible within its privacy policy. This threat of legal recourse 
may provide a partial explanation for why the companies that we 
examined are generally vague with respect to the rights of their 
customers and the methods used to protect their data. 
In general, the privacy policies and TOS agreements that we 
have examined are much more protective of the company that 
wrote them than of the customer that agrees to them. This is not 
much of a surprise, especially considering the literature about 
asymmetric “click wrap agreements” that customers are often 
required to agree to in order to install software or use services 
online.518 
                                                                                                     
 515. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006). 
 516. See id. § 45. 
 517. See supra Part IV.A.4 (describing FTC enforcement efforts). 
 518. See, e.g., Jared S. Livingston, Comment, Invasion Contracts: The 
Privacy Implications of Terms of Use Agreements in the Online Social Media 
Setting, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 591, 625 (2011) (“There are several kinds of 
asymmetric information in this market: (1) failure to read provided information 
about the agreement; and (2) failure to appreciate the risk of loss of private 
information.”); Lucille M. Ponte, Getting a Bad Rap? Unconscionability in 
Clickwrap Dispute Resolution Clauses and a Proposal for Improving the Quality 
of These Online Consumer “Products,” 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 119, 119 
(2011) (“In undertaking these online transactions, millions of consumers each 
day simply click on ‘I Agree’ to a site’s standard terms of use, often without 
reading or understanding the terms and conditions of their purchases.”). 
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E. Implications 
Publicly traded companies respond to public demand. As long 
as consumers ignore privacy policies and TOS agreements, accept 
that their control over their own data is subject to the will of the 
service provider, and remain uninformed about existing privacy 
threats, the companies have little incentive to write privacy 
policies and TOS agreements with their customers’ best interests 
in mind. On the other hand, if a data control policy became a 
legal mandate, the customer service experience of various cloud 
providers could see a marked improvement as providers compete 
to retain customers. Our research of the literature and our own 
analysis of the terms of TOS agreements and privacy policies lead 
us to conclude that there is currently a significant failure on the 
part of the market to ensure that consumers have sufficient 
control over their data in the cloud. We argue that this market 
failure is something that must be remedied to ensure the 
protection of personal privacy in the cloud. 
Given the prevalence of the data trade and the value of 
profiles to marketers, consumers who are willing to trade 
personal information and privacy for free services are not just 
using their own data as currency; to some extent, it could even be 
said that they are becoming a commodity themselves. This 
commodification is part of a trade-off, and consumers may even 
be trading some of their legal rights in exchange for services in 
the cloud. Currently, a company that provides services to 
individuals and small businesses can demand any number of 
allowances as to the use of customer data in its privacy policy, 
and can substantially limit customers’ permissible actions in its 
TOS agreement. The customer has no bargaining power to 
challenge these terms. These terms, in turn, can affect the 
customer’s legal rights, limiting the extent to which the Fourth 
Amendment and the SCA protect data that the customer entrusts 
to the company, and potentially even making the customer 
vulnerable to liability under the DOJ’s current interpretation of 
the CFAA. 
Throughout this Article, we promote the idea that consumers 
should have the ability to exercise meaningful control over their 
own data, including the ability to withdraw their personal 
information and move their data from one provider to another. If 
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a regulatory intervention like we propose in this Article gives 
consumers the power to exercise control over their data, but the 
consumers choose to not exercise these data control rights and 
still choose to trade their information for various services, such 
informed decisions may indicate that there is not a systemic flaw 
in this approach to personal data. However, we argue that the 
current utter lack of meaningful control prevents us from 
determining if the current data trade business model can be 
optimal. 
VI. Recommendations—Building a Baseline for Facilitating 
Transactions in the Cloud 
In the United States, privacy is largely protected using 
narrow laws that apply only to specific categories of information. 
To the extent that laws of general applicability apply to privacy 
in the cloud, like the Fourth Amendment and the SCA, customers 
may inadvertently remove their own privacy protections by 
agreeing to excessively broad terms in a cloud service’s privacy 
policy. Even though the FTC has brought actions against 
companies that violate their own privacy policies, these actions 
arguably serve only to give the providers incentives to write 
privacy policies that are as vague about the providers’ obligations 
as possible.  
After examining the privacy policies and TOS agreements in 
our sample and analyzing a variety of legal issues and privacy 
theories, we have arrived at a series of recommendations to what 
we see as the failure of the contractarian paradigm to adequately 
protect parties that indicate agreement with these terms. We 
recommend a new legal regime that would emphasize 
empowering consumers by setting a baseline of protection to 
ensure that a consumer has control over her own data. The 
baseline would be designed to protect the most sensitive 
information without hindering market development.  
A. Building the Baseline 
One of our foundational arguments is that relatively modest 
regulatory intervention into the relationship between providers 
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and consumers could support positive social change with regard 
to privacy protections. To some extent, legal regulations can 
provide structure for social interactions, and the strength of the 
legal control can affect perceptions of social control and personal 
freedom.519 Regulating privacy would involve the regulation of 
relationships, perhaps by placing limits on organizational 
power.520  
When implementing a legislative system to address 
problems, policy makers can either choose to implement rules, 
which tend to focus on strict requirements, or standards, which 
tend to be more flexible and open-ended. In regulating 
technologies, standards may be superior to rules because 
standards are more adaptable to further technological change.521 
Detailed and inflexible sets of rules can either chill technological 
development, or in the alternative can quickly become obsolete if 
the progress of technology continues unimpeded.522 On the other 
hand, if the implemented regulations are too open-ended and 
vague, they can end up being entirely ineffective.523 A study by 
Birnhack and Elkin-Koren questions the very idea that 
regulation of personal data collection and use would be effective 
at all.524 While we do not suggest specific language for regulations 
                                                                                                     
 519. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1240–41 (explaining his use 
of the term “architecture” to describe the protection or diminishing of privacy in 
our society). 
 520. See id. at 1242 (“Protecting privacy thus depends upon regulating 
relationships, often by enforcing limits on the power of bureaucratic 
organizations.”). 
 521. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 3, at 1871–72 (describing how 
“standards are generally the superior choice for dealing with situations of rapid 
change because . . . rules can become obsolete”). 
 522. See Solove, Architecture, supra note 172, at 1275 (summarizing 
research that shows how regulations, “if too specific, can quickly become 
obsolete, discourage innovation, and be costly and inefficient”). 
 523. See id. (“However, rules that are too open-ended and vague can end up 
being toothless. Although security standards must not be overly specific, they 
must contain meaningful minimum requirements.”). 
 524. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 343 (noting a low level 
of compliance with information privacy laws across several categories of 
websites in Israel). The authors noted that popular websites were more likely to 
comply with the privacy protection laws, perhaps because popular websites were 
likely to be maintained by organizations with the resources to have legal 
departments, and perhaps because complying with the law also serves as a 
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in this Article, we encourage policy makers to construct a regime 
that strikes a balance between rules and standards to make the 
new data protection regime specific enough to address discrete 
problems and open-ended enough to allow it to evolve.  
1. Baseline Regulation 
We recommend a regime that includes baseline privacy 
protections that would set a floor for the permissible approaches 
of companies that handle consumer information. The variation in 
the approaches taken by companies in our relatively small 
sample underscores the need for more uniformity.  
Many questions exist about the appropriate levels of baseline 
protections, posing interesting questions for future research. 
Baseline regulations should first identify minimum requirements 
in order to protect certain types of sensitive information. Such 
regulations should explicitly address the protection of personal 
health information, social security numbers, and financial 
information like bank account numbers and credit cards. The 
baseline regulation could also include a provision that places the 
risk of loss for online fraud on a cloud provider.525 Opponents of 
our approach may point to the results of the Birnhack and Elkin-
Koren study, an empirical study of Israeli websites that suggests 
that regulations setting a baseline for privacy agreements are not 
truly effective due to low compliance rates.526 But the authors of 
that study failed to focus on enforcement, and more effective 
enforcement would likely improve the efficacy of such regulations.  
After establishing categories of sensitive information that 
must receive special protection, the next question concerns what 
minimum requirements should be included to protect consumer 
information. Baseline regulations might, for example, include 
                                                                                                     
signal to consumers that the company is more reliable. See id. 
 525. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 378–79 (noting that cloud computing 
providers do not have the same incentive as banks and online merchants to 
protect customers from online fraud because the banks and online retailers 
legally bear the risk of loss instead of the consumer). 
 526. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 108, at 383 (describing how 
the authors “found that some areas of the law are simply irrelevant in the daily 
practices of websites”). 
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requirements for data security. End users are generally ignorant 
of many data protection issues, so there is not sufficient market 
demand for firms to pay more attention to security issues like the 
need to encrypt information.527 This could be addressed using 
regulations that require data to be encrypted.528 We envision two 
primary options for security baseline regulation: language 
requiring the use of “best available security technology,” or 
language requiring the use of “industry standard security 
technology.” The comparison of these two options is another 
possible direction for future research. 
We further suggest that baseline regulations should also 
address issues related to data breaches. First, the regulation 
should include security breach notification requirements in order 
to give users the information necessary to assess the negative 
consequences of a cloud vendor’s security failures.529 Second, 
there should be viable private causes of action for data breaches 
to address the current problem of consumers not having standing 
to sue a company after a breach in the absence of a distinct injury 
like identity theft. Some scholars have suggested finding 
companies strictly liable for data leaks,530 creating a new common 
law tort based on the use of Fair Information Practices,531 and 
                                                                                                     
 527. See Soghoian, supra note 5, at 380 (stating that many consumers know 
very little about data encryption and describing how this provides “no incentive 
to [devote resources] to something for which most customers have not expressed 
a want”). 
 528. See id. at 382–83 (proposing that government regulators require cloud 
service providers to use encryption just as this has already been done in the 
banking and health industries). 
 529. Martin suggests a similar approach. See Martin, supra note 44, at 313 
(“Congress should create new breach notification requirements that allow users 
to assess the exposure, damage, and operational costs of any security failures on 
the part of a cloud vendor.”). 
 530. See Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of 
Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
241, 245 (2007) (suggesting “a Rylands strict-liability model to address the 
hazards of leaking databases”). 
 531. See Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the 
Misuse of Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 140 (2006) (suggesting “a 
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remedies for individuals who have suffered harm to their core privacy interests” 
and stating that this tort “borrows from . . . the Fair Information Practices from 
the Privacy Act of 1974”). 
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imposing liability for breach of trust if a company misuses 
information.532 Imposing fiduciary obligations in some 
circumstances may also provide adequate private causes of action 
in response to security breaches. It is possible that some of the 
issues relating to information privacy could be resolved through 
the common law, such as if privacy tort law were expanded to 
take intangible harms into account, including the harm from the 
disclosure of data that is not embarrassing.533 We argue that an 
emphasis on private enforcement options would preserve the 
viability of the market by limiting excessive legislative oversight 
of business practices. 
B. Data Control 
The most important part of our proposal for a new legal 
regime that sets a floor for the use of data by private companies 
concerns data control, which we have defined in this Article as 
encompassing the ideas of data mobility and data withdrawal. In 
the cloud context, there are two sets of information that we are 
concerned about: PII, and what we call “course-of-business” data 
that is stored as part of the customer’s use of the service. Related 
to the use of PII, we are also concerned about secondary use of 
such information, including secondary use by third parties. We 
further argue that data mobility and data withdrawal provisions 
as described below would attract consumers who are more risk 
averse and who would not use these services in the absence of 
these protections, thus leading to a net benefit to the industry. 
                                                                                                     
 532. See Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1288 (2000) (“[A] rubric based loosely on breach of 
confidence might persuade courts to recognize at least limited data privacy 
rights.”). 
 533. See Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1922–23 
Courts can readily understand the harm caused by the disclosure of a 
naked photograph of a person, but they struggle in locating a harm 
when non-embarrassing data is disclosed or leaked. A broader 
understanding of harm is needed in order for the privacy torts to 
apply to the extensive gathering, dissemination, and use of 
information by various businesses and organizations. 
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Thus, these provisions should be mandatory, and the regulations 
should prevent parties from contracting around these terms.  
1. Personally Identifiable Information 
Baseline privacy regulations should protect the ability of 
consumers to control the use of their PII in the cloud. The 
security of PII should be paramount to prevent fraud and identity 
theft. This part of our recommendation is by no means 
revolutionary, however, because privacy policies are centered on 
protection of PII, and most privacy theorists focus on PII as the 
class of information that must be afforded the most protection. 
We also encourage discussions of PII to consider the 
commodification of data. If consumers are free to use their PII as 
a form of currency, disclosing it to obtain desired services, should 
there be limits on what information consumers can trade? If 
privacy is viewed as property, and property itself is really a 
bundle of rights, there may be some types of information where it 
would be against the best interest of society to permit the free 
trade thereof. For example, the relationship between doctors and 
patients is typically viewed as sacrosanct. We thus suggest that 
personal health information is one category of information that 
service providers outside this circle would not be able to seek 
under our proposed legal regime. 
The problem of reidentification raises additional issues 
because it can lead to anonymized, descriptive information about 
the consumer being reattached to the consumer’s identity. While 
we would not recommend a regime that stifles innovation and 
academic creativity, a legal regime to protect PII in the cloud also 
needs some forward-looking provisions addressing the possibility 
that reidentification science could lead to threats to personal 
privacy in the future. These provisions, for example, might 
prohibit the use of public records for reidentification purposes 
unless the user certifies compliance with some form of privacy 
standard. 
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2. Secondary Use 
Secondary use of PII is another very important consideration. 
Those who argue for limitations on secondary use suggest that 
the use of data should be limited to the purpose for which it was 
initially collected, absent further consent being obtained.534 
Existing rules prohibiting secondary use include legal ethics rules 
that prohibit a lawyer from using client information for a purpose 
unrelated to the interests of the client, and restrictions in the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act that prohibit an employer who obtains 
an employee’s credit report from using this information for 
nonemployment purposes.535  
Once PII is properly collected, we suggest imposing further 
limits on secondary use of the PII. One option is to give the 
consumer the ability to restrict secondary use of her PII. Privacy 
policies often give the customer the ability to access and amend 
PII stored on the collecting company’s system, so requiring these 
provisions to address secondary use would likely not be 
excessively burdensome.  
However, privacy policies do not give consumers control over 
PII given to third parties unconnected to the consumer. To 
address this third-party problem, the baseline regime should 
guarantee consumers a right of data withdrawal. By permitting 
data withdrawal when a consumer’s information is being used in 
a way that goes against the wishes of the consumer, we secure 
the right of consumers to control their data and feel more 
secure.536 To solidify this data withdrawal right, we recommend 
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giving consumers the ability to serve a notice-and-takedown order 
on third parties to require the removal of the consumer’s PII from 
the third party’s system. We recognize that consumers may have 
difficulty obtaining information about the secondary use of their 
PII, but argue that combining a notice-and-takedown regime with 
controls to enable meaningful informed choices could potentially 
address some of the problems relating to the secondary use of PII 
by third parties. Designing controls to enable meaningful 
informed choices is outside the scope of this Article, but it is an 
important and related issue that should be the subject of further 
study.  
Under a regime allowing for notice and takedown of PII, a 
party who wants his PII removed from a specific service could 
contact the operator of that service to (1) assert his rights in the 
PII, and (2) request that the PII be taken down. At that time, the 
operator would have to comply and notify the original submitter 
of the information about the takedown. The original submitter 
would then have an opportunity to contest the takedown and 
assert that the PII was not wrongfully made available. This 
proposal of a notice-and-takedown approach is patterned after the 
procedures of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),537 
which permits copyright owners to serve a notice on a website 
when infringing material has been posted.538 Our notice-and-
takedown proposal would permit consumers to request that 
entities take down information that was either posted by the 
consumer and then republished elsewhere, or that was derived 
from information posted by the consumer. The notice and 
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takedown approach could apply to secondary use by the original 
entity entrusted with the information, as well as to third parties.  
Another option we suggest is for the baseline regulation to 
declare that some information, like personal health information, 
should never be tradable. Thus, someone within the necessary 
circle encompassing the doctor–patient relationship would not be 
able to trade health information, even if it is anonymized, to 
marketers seeking to create profiles based on health needs. If 
some information is not tradable but others are, this can still 
leave room for many different business models to survive, as long 
as a minimum level of privacy and security are provided. 
3. Course-of-Business Data 
Recommendations about PII are very common in the privacy 
literature, but the information disclosed to cloud providers goes 
far beyond PII. One of the elements that we think deserves more 
discussion is the control of what we call “course-of-business” data, 
which consumers store with cloud providers as part of the service. 
Many cloud services permit customers to store photos, writings, 
and business data in the cloud. The storage of this information is 
often the customer’s purpose for using this service to begin with, 
whereas the transfer of PII is typically incidental to the rendering 
of service. Because the storage of this information is essential to 
the service, the terms relating to such storage should be explicit 
as a condition of the contract between the parties.  
In Part II, we noted that many private actors have called for 
improved transparency and control in the cloud. In the cloud 
context, the question of data control does not only involve 
targeted advertising, but also the importance of data mobility so 
that customers would not lose everything if a service provider 
became inoperable or if the data had to be moved to a new service 
provider.539 However, as our analysis of TOS agreements and 
privacy policies showed, companies often do not address the 
handling of such data after the contract has terminated. 
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guarantees that data owners would be able to gain control of their data in a 
usable form should their service providers become inoperable.”). 
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Above we emphasized the data withdrawal aspect of data 
control. The right of withdrawal may have less application to 
course-of-business data like writings and photos because such 
data may be protected by intellectual property law (IP law), and 
therefore a right of withdrawal may be duplicative of IP law 
protection. However, for course-of-business data entitled to lesser 
IP law protection, like databases, the right of withdrawal via 
notice and takedown should be available.  
More importantly, the baseline regulations must require a 
minimum level of protection to ensure data mobility. This means 
that data must be converted to an acceptable format before being 
delivered to a departing customer, such that the customer is not 
locked in to a particular service provider, and could easily move 
their data from one provider to another. Data mobility focuses on 
the access and consumer choice aspects of data control and would 
facilitate market transactions by enabling customers to move 
their data freely between competing services. What happens if 
the customer decides for any reason that she wants to use the 
cloud services of a competing provider? Is a user’s course-of-
business data stored in a proprietary format such that the user 
encounters a “lock-in” problem if she decides she wants to change 
providers? Currently, privacy policies and TOS agreements often 
may not address these issues at all. As part of the legal regime 
that we propose, format transparency would be required, and 
providers would also be required to include terms addressing end-
of-relationship handling of course-of-business data. Under our 
proposed regime, a company could still store the data in a 
proprietary format, but would be required to convert the data to a 
generally accepted format upon account termination to enable the 
data to be easily moved to a competing service. 
Data mobility is important because it allows consumers to 
more fully participate in the features and services that cloud 
providers offer. The importance of data mobility in the cloud can 
be emphasized by analogizing to mobile phone numbers. In 
November 2003, an FCC regulation became effective that 
required cell phone carriers to allow numbers to be ported from 
one carrier to another.540 There was a great deal of resistance on 
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the part of service providers that claimed that this rule would be 
too costly to carriers and might not be beneficial to consumers.541 
The FCC, however, concluded in 2006 that the number portability 
requirement did not significantly increase “wireless churn,” and 
did in fact have a positive impact on service quality due to the 
need that it created for carriers to devote extra effort to customer 
retention.542 We expect that a data mobility requirement may be 
met with the same initial resistance as the wireless number 
portability requirement, but that like wireless number 
portability, data mobility requirements will have a net positive 
effect on both the industry and on consumers. By allowing 
consumers to “port” their phone numbers into another provider’s 
system, cellular subscribers are better equipped to participate in 
the market because such porting greatly reduces costs that might 
otherwise be associated with switching mobile service 
providers.543 Similarly, data mobility in the cloud would facilitate 
consumer participation and reduce transaction costs for 
consumers when moving from one provider to another.  
Protection of course-of-business information could also be 
achieved through some application of the principles surrounding 
                                                                                                     
Notice of Proposed Rule, 11 FCC Rcd. 8352 (1996). The first compliance date 
was set for June 30, 1999, but after two requests for forbearance, the agency 
pushed the deadline for compliance to November 24, 2003. See Cellular 
Telecommunications & Internet Ass’n v. F.C.C., 330 F.3d 502, 503–04 (D.C. Cir. 
2003). 
 541. See Caron Carlson & Carmen Nobel, Carriers Resist Porting Numbers, 
EWEEK, Apr. 21, 2003, at 20 (describing how “[w]ireless carriers [were] looking 
for relief from a requirement that would . . . allow cell phone customers to keep 
their numbers when they change phone companies”).  
 542. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 21 FCC Rcd. 10,947, 11,006 (2006)  
[T]he advent of porting . . . did not lead to a significant increase in 
wireless churn, but did appear to have had a positive impact on 
service quality by inducing carriers to engage in aggressive customer 
retention efforts . . . . Significantly improved retention efforts (better 
deals on upgrade handsets, incentives for signing longer contracts, 
better customer service, and higher network spending) following the 
implementation of local number portability . . . have led to lower 
churn rates . . . (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 543. See Carlson & Nobel, supra note 541 (noting that the extra cost 
associated with changing a cellular phone number was sometimes viewed as the 
most important reason to stay with the same provider). 
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the law of confidentiality. Confidentiality as a concept is related 
to privacy, but primarily arises in the context of contracts 
between private parties. When fiduciary relationships exist, the 
law often recognizes obligations to keep information confidential. 
Solove has pointed out the potential application of fiduciary 
relationships in the privacy context.544 If elements of fiduciary 
relationships were integrated into the customer–cloud provider 
relationship, this would impose on the providers an obligation to 
keep not only the customer’s PII secure, but other data stored on 
the provider’s servers as well. Consumers could obtain stronger 
protections by opting into a fiduciary relationship with the 
service provider for a price. The consumer would thus get a 
guarantee that if the service provider acts badly, the consumer 
has a right of action against them. This differs from Solove’s 
proposal because we are more focused on consumer choice than 
on making fiduciary relationships into a default rule.  
VII. Conclusion 
Privacy issues online are not going to disappear overnight. 
Changes to the law are necessary to facilitate optimal market 
development that takes into consideration the autonomy of 
consumers in controlling their personal information. Foucault’s 
view of Bentham’s Panopticon as a metaphor for power relations 
in society is even more apt today than when Foucault was 
originally writing. The market forces peering into private lives 
may not be doing so with malicious intentions, but the 
corresponding decrease in consumer control of their personal 
information is nonetheless harmful.  
In this Article, we have examined issues relating to cloud 
computing through the lens of privacy theories and privacy law. 
In analyzing a sample of terms of service agreements and privacy 
policies, we have concluded that these documents have 
potentially serious implications for the rights of consumers who 
agree to them without reading the terms.  
                                                                                                     
 544. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 2, at 103 (making the “radical 
proposal” that the law should recognize a fiduciary relationship when a 
company collects and uses personal information).  
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Ultimately, we recommend the implementation of baseline 
regulations to guarantee some minimum level of protection for 
consumers in the cloud. These regulations should emphasize the 
importance of preserving consumer control of their data, and 
these control mechanisms should focus on data mobility and a 
right of data withdrawal. Data mobility will require cloud 
providers to make consumer data available in a generally 
acceptable format such that consumers can freely move their own 
data from one provider to another in the interest of maintaining a 
healthy, competitive marketplace. For data withdrawal, we 
propose a notice-and-takedown approach patterned after similar 
provisions in the DMCA, which would permit a consumer to 
request that entities take down his personal information.  
Our proposal raises a number of interesting new research 
questions. One of the most interesting problems is the effect that 
our proposals would ultimately have. Once the efficiency of the 
market is protected and consumers are in control of their data, 
would there actually be any statistically significant changes in 
consumer behavior? At the end of the day, if consumers are 
empowered to control their data, but behavior is largely 
unaltered, this may indicate that the current state of the market 
is actually optimal for society. However, the uncertainty that 
currently exists with regard to data ownership is harmful to 
consumer autonomy and makes it impossible to conclusively 
determine the optimality of the current regime. Thus, reduction 
of this uncertainty is essential to protecting the interests of 
consumers, and sufficient reduction will likely require some 
degree of regulatory intervention. We posit, however, that the 
degree of this regulatory intervention could be very modest, with 
narrow goals focusing on minimum protections and consumer 
choice, thus balancing the need to protect consumers with the 
need to preserve market vitality. 
